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Levels of subjective well-being differ across individuals, that is, some people are happier than others.  
Within the study of subjective well-being, research aims to uncover the psychological and 
physiological processes underlying subjective well-being and interindividual differences therein. The 
work in this dissertation aims to contribute to this. It focused on positive emotionality as a constituent 
element of subjective well-being and the idea that the maximization of positive experiences is one of 
the processes underlying higher levels of subjective well-being. More specifically, this dissertation 
investigates the affective processes – affective reactivity and emotion regulation – underlying short-
term changes in positive affective experiences and their relation to interindividual differences in 
subjective well-being. The three main research objectives that were addressed in the empirical studies 
of this dissertation concerned (1) whether stronger increases in positive affect when reacting to and 
when up-regulating in response to positive stimuli in the laboratory relate to higher subjective well-
being, (2) which brain regions underlie changes in positive affective experiences, particularly during 
the up-regulation of  positive emotions, and (3) whether enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to 
positive events in daily life relates to higher subjective well-being. Together, the studies thus 
encompass investigations of affective reactivity and emotion regulation at two levels of analysis (the 
subjective and neural level) as well as across multiple methods (in the laboratory and in daily life).  
Overall, findings showed that greater increases in positive affect (through enhanced affective 
reactivity to positive events or through greater success in up-regulating positive emotions) were not 
related to higher subjective well-being, both when investigated in the laboratory and in daily life. 
Instead, people with higher levels of subjective well-being showed reduced affective reactions to 
positive events in daily life, pointing to the importance of a relative greater emotional stability for 
higher subjective well-being. At the neural level, changes in positive affective experiences were 
mirrored by increased activations in emotion-related (medial frontal and subcortical) regions as well as 
deactivation in a fronto-parietal control network. The ventral striatum (VS) in particular related to 
changes in positive affect during the up-regulation of positive emotions in the laboratory, however, not 
to changes in affect when up-regulating in daily life.  
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Together, the work in this dissertation indicates that not the experience of particularly intense 
positive affective states, but rather less fluctuation in momentary positive affective experiences seems 
to be essential to the overall composition of subjective well-being. The present dissertation thus points 
to the importance of considering dynamic aspects of positive emotionality for gaining a better 
understanding of subjective well-being and specifically higher subjective well-being. Given that 
findings in this dissertation were informed by investigations from both the laboratory and daily life, 
the present dissertation further emphasizes the need to integrate different methods in the study of 
emotion. Concluding, this dissertation advances our understanding of the processes underlying 





Personen unterscheiden sich in dem, wie sie sich im Allgemeinen fühlen, kurz gesagt, manche 
Menschen sind glücklicher als andere. Das Ziel der Forschung zu subjektivem Wohlbefinden ist es, 
die psychologischen und physiologischen Prozesse, die diesen Personenunterschieden zugrunde 
liegen, zu beschreiben und zu verstehen. Das Anliegen dieser Dissertation ist es hierzu einen Beitrag 
zu leisten. Der spezifische Forschungsschwerpunkt lag auf affektivem positivem Erleben, als einem 
wichtigen Bestandteil von subjektivem Wohlbefinden, und der Annahme, dass Personen mit besonders 
hohem subjektivem Wohlbefinden ihr positives Erleben verstärken und so maximal davon profitieren. 
In dieser Dissertation wurden insbesondere die affektiven Prozesse – affektive Reaktivität und 
Emotionsregulation – welche den kurzfristigen Veränderungen positiver affektiver Erfahrungen 
zugrunde liegen, untersucht und mit Personenunterschieden in subjektivem Wohlbefinden verbunden. 
In drei empirischen Studien wurden die folgenden Forschungsfragen untersucht: (1) Haben Personen 
mit höherem subjektiven Wohlbefinden einen stärkeren Anstieg in positivem Affekt, wenn sie auf 
positive Stimuli im Labor reagieren oder ihre positiven Emotionen hochregulieren? (2) Welches sind 
die neuronalen Korrelate, die diesen kurzfristigen Veränderungen in positivem Affekt zugrunde 
liegen, insbesondere während der Hochregulation positiver Emotionen? Und (3) hängt ein höheres 
subjektives Wohlbefinden mit einer stärkeren oder geringeren Reaktion auf positive Ereignisse im 
Alltag zusammen? Diese empirischen Studien umfassen Untersuchungen der affektiven Reaktivität 
und der Emotionsregulation auf zwei Analyseebenen (subjektive und neuronale Ebene), sowie 
Untersuchungen im Labor und im täglichen Leben.  
Das Gesamtbild der empirischen Befunde hat gezeigt, dass ein stärkerer Anstieg in positivem 
Affekt (durch eine stärkere Reaktion auf positive Ereignisse oder durch das bewusste Hochregulieren 
positiver Emotionen) nicht mit einem höheren subjektiven Wohlbefinden zusammenhängt. Stattdessen 
hatten Personen mit einem höheren subjektiven Wohlbefinden eine geringere Reaktivität auf positive 
Ereignisse im Alltag, was auf die Wichtigkeit von emotionaler Stabilität (geringere Schwankungen in 
positivem Affekt) für hohes Wohlbefinden hindeutet. Auf der neuronalen Ebene spiegelten sich die 
Veränderungen in positivem Affekt durch eine durch verstärkte neuronale Aktivierung in 
emotionsbezogenen (medialen frontalen und subkortikalen) Regionen wieder, sowie durch eine 
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Deaktivierung in einem fronto-parietalen Kontrollnetzwerk. Eine verstärkte Aktivierung des ventralen 
Striatums (VS) hing insbesondere mit einem verstärkten Anstieg in positivem Affekt während der 
Hochregulation positiver Emotionen im Labor zusammen, nicht jedoch mit der Veränderung in Affekt 
während der Regulation im Alltag.  
Die Arbeit dieser Dissertation zeigt, dass nicht besonders intensives positives Erleben, 
sondern eher weniger Schwankungen in momentanen positiven affektiven Zuständen wichtig für das 
allgemeine Wohlbefinden sind. Die vorliegende Dissertation unterstreicht daher, dass, für ein besseres 
Verständnis von subjektivem Wohlbefinden, es wichtig ist auch kurzfristige Dynamiken des affektiven 
Erlebens zu berücksichtigen. Darüber hinaus zeigt diese Dissertation die Wichtigkeit auf verschiedene 
Analyseebenen und Untersuchungsmethoden (z. B. Datenerfassungen im Labor und im Alltag) in die 
Erforschung von affektivem Erleben und subjektivem Wohlbefinden zu integrieren. Insgesamt liefert 
diese Dissertation einen Beitrag zu unserem Verständnis der Prozesse die dem subjektiven 
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Humans have a strong quest for happiness. Already articulated by ancient Greek philosophers, 
Aristotle for example wrote that “happiness is the meaning and the purpose of life, the whole aim and 
end of human existence” (Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics). Modern scientists have supported this 
claim by showing that across different cultures, most people find the pursuit of happiness to be an 
important goal in life (Diener, 2000). Yet, there are substantial differences among people in how 
happy they are. Some people seem to generally possess positive conceptions about their life (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), while others seem to derive little joy from it (Myers & Diener, 1995). Hence, the 
question arises: Why are some people happier than others?  
Scientifically, this question can be approached through the study of well-being. Two different 
perspectives have emerged in an attempt to specifically study positive aspects of well-being, that is, 
positive human health and flourishing. According to one view, well-being is about the maximization 
of pleasure and avoidance of displeasure (hedonic well-being; Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), 
while the other emphasizes personal growth and self-realization (eudaimonic well-being; Ryan & 
Deci, 2001). The former – most often associated with the common meaning of happiness – is at the 
focus of the present dissertation. The hedonic view of well-being has been strongly influenced by the 
work of Diener (1984) who introduced the concept of subjective well-being, reflecting the subjective 
evaluation of one’s life in terms of the experiences and cognitive judgments. Research on subjective 
well-being has the goal to understand and explain the complex psychological and physiological 
processes underlying differences in subjective well-being and to identify factors that promote higher 
levels of subjective well-being (Diener et al., 1999; Lyubomirsky, 2001; Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The work of this dissertation can be understood along these lines. It focuses 
on positive affective experiences1 and their role in subjective well-being, and higher subjective well-
                                                     
1 Affect is usually used as an umbrella term for positively or negatively valenced psychological states, which 
encompasses both the experience of discrete emotions (e.g., joy or pride) as well as moods, which in contrast to 
the former, are longer-lasting and do not have an apparent trigger (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Yet, in 
accordance with the broad literature that does not distinguish between affect and emotion (e.g., Kuppens, 2015), 
these two terms are used interchangeably in the present dissertation.  
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being in particular. The idea that positive emotions are essential to subjective well-being seems very 
intuitive. Experiencing frequent and intense moments of feelings such as joy, love, or contentment 
should make one feel generally happier in life. This presumption is supported by theories that suggest 
a pivotal role of intense positive experiences in higher subjective well-being and stress the benefits of 
positive emotions for psychological functioning (Bryant, 2003; Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 
2001). In line with this, studies found high levels of positive emotions to be linked to – and also 
precede – various successful outcomes across multiple life domains, such job performance or marital 
happiness (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005).  
Most empirical approaches to the study of positive emotions as a constituent element of 
subjective well-being have focused on trait levels of positive emotions, that is, stable levels of positive 
affect that differ reliably across people (Costa & McCrae, 1980). One person may generally be 
described as happy, whereas another may be unhappy most of the time. Yet, emotions are dynamic in 
their nature, that is, they differ not only between people, but also fluctuate within individuals over 
time. Studying this within-person or intraindividual variability is of value as it informs on the 
underlying affective processes, namely affective reactivity in responses to (changing) environmental 
demands, and emotion regulation (Kuppens, Oravecz, & Tuerlinckx, 2010). These affective processes 
are not only thought to be an important aspect of one’s daily affective functioning (Ong, Sin, & Ram, 
2018; Röcke & Brose, 2013; Wessman & Ricks, 1966), but have also been theorized to be key 
mechanisms in the development of well-being and interindividual differences therein (Hollenstein, 
Lichtwarck-Aschoff, & Potworowski, 2013). Therefore, to better understand the role of positive 
affective experiences in subjective well-being, it is essential to not just consider stable levels of 
positive emotions, but to also take dynamic aspects into account.  
The present dissertation investigates the affective processes underlying short-term changes in 
positive affective experiences, as they occur within individuals, and relates these to between-person, 
that is, interindividual differences in subjective well-being. I specifically test whether enhanced or 
reduced affective reactivity to positive events relates to higher subjective well-being and whether 
greater increases in positive affect, when up-regulating positive emotions, relate to higher subjective 
well-being. Both subjective and neurophysiologcial aspects of affective reactivity and emotion 
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regulation are considered. To better understand both the basic mechanisms of the affective processes 
and how they unfold in everyday life, both laboratory and daily life research designs are used across 
and within studies. Specific research objectives are addressed in three empirical studies.  
First, I sought to relate affective reactivity and the up-regulation of positive emotions, as 
measured in the laboratory, to interindividual differences in subjective well-being (Paper I). Previous 
studies established a relation between, for example, greater trait levels of positive emotion regulation 
and higher levels of subjective well-being (e.g., Bryant, 2003). The research objective was thus to 
assess affective reactivity and the up-regulation of positive emotions through repeated reports of 
participants’ momentary affective experiences (capturing actual within-person changes in affective 
experiences) and to relate these performance-based indicators of affective reactivity and emotion 
regulation to subjective well-being. 
Following up on the previous, I examined the neural responses associated with within-person 
changes in positive affective experiences (Paper II), particularly during the up-regulation of positive 
emotions. The research objective was to elucidate the functional role of the ventral striatum – 
previously associated with differences in affect across people when up-regulating positive emotions 
(e.g., Greening, Osuch, Williamson, & Mitchell, 2014) – and to test whether increased activation in 
the ventral striatum also relates to within-person changes in affect (i.e., trial-to-trial changes). Further, 
I examined whether increased activation in the ventral striatum during up-regulation in the laboratory, 
relates to greater changes in affect when up-regulating positive emotions in daily life. 
Last, I investigated the relation between interindividual differences in subjective well-being 
and affective reactivity to positive events as measured in daily life (Grosse Rueschkamp, Kuppens, 
Riediger, Blanke, & Brose, 2018). Earlier research on affective reactivity only yielded an inconsistent 
picture. While some studies speak in favor of enhanced affective reactivity to positive events in people 
with higher subjective well-being (e.g., Bylsma, Morris, & Rottenberg, 2008; Carl, Fairholme, 
Gallagher, Thompson-Hollands, & Barlow, 2014), in line with the idea that intense positive emotions 
are beneficial for subjective well-being (Fredrickson, 2001), other theoretical assumptions and 
empirical findings point in the opposite direction (e.g., Oishi, Diener, Choi, Kim-Prieto, & Choi, 2007; 
Solomon, 1980). Thus, the research objective was to systematically test whether individuals with 
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higher levels of subjective well-being have enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to positive events 
in daily life.  
In the following, I will give an overview of essential concepts and describe a conceptual 
framework, which allows for the inclusion of both stable and dynamic aspects in the study of positive 
affective experiences and subjective well-being. Subsequently, I will give a detailed description of 
affective reactivity and emotion regulation at the subjective and the neural level, as well as an outline 
of how the multimethod approach of this dissertation is motivated. Finally, I will summarize the aim 
and specific research objectives of this dissertation.  
2 Essential Concepts and Overview 
2.1 Subjective Well-Being 
Subjective well-being is an integral element of human flourishing, that is, optimal human 
functioning (Keyes, 2002). It does not merely represent the absence of mental illness and 
psychopathology, but rather relates to a second dimension that characterizes the presence of mental 
health (Keyes, 2002; Ryff & Keyes, 1995). In line with this, the World Health Organization (2014) 
stated that “health is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity” (p.1), acknowledging that the absence of mental illness is a necessary, 
but not sufficient, condition for the presence of human flourishing.  
Subjective well-being is most commonly defined in terms of three components: The 
experience of high levels of positive and low levels of negative affect (affective components), and 
high life satisfaction (the cognitive component; Diener et al., 1999). As such, subjective well-being is 
considered a stable characteristic that differs between individuals (i.e., a trait; Costa & McCrae, 1980), 
indicating how people feel and think about their lives in general. According to this definition, a happy 
person would be someone who experiences predominantly pleasant emotions, only few unpleasant 
emotions, and who generally evaluates his or her life as positive. In line with the idea that subjective 
well-being is associated with a variety of desirable characteristics and favorable life circumstances 
(Diener et al., 1999), high trait levels of positive affect have been linked to a reduced susceptibility to 
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cardiovascular disease (Harker & Keltner, 2001), greater marital satisfaction (Boehm & Kubzansky, 
2012) and a longer life (Danner, Snowdon, & Friesen, 2001). A meta-analysis comprising more than 
three hundred studies found that high trait levels of positive affect are not only linked to, but also 
precede various successful outcomes and behaviors across multiple life domains, such as marriage, 
friendship, work performance, income, and health (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). 
A key assertion of Diener’s (1999) conception of subjective well-being is that positive and 
negative affect are two distinct components. Indeed, in line with the finding that positive and negative 
affect are only mildly (negatively) correlated (e.g., Bradburn, 1969), one prominent view proposes that 
positive and negative affect are two orthogonal bipolar dimensions (Tellegen, Watson, & Clark, 1999; 
Watson & Tellegen, 1985). This assumption of independence of positive and negative affect has been 
supported by different lines of research. For example, Cacioppo and colleagues (1999; 1997) suggest 
that two distinct affect systems (components of the nervous system) facilitate approach and avoidance 
behavior, respectively, and that positive and negative affect are therefore processed separately. 
Accordingly, studies from the affective neurosciences have associated different affective states with 
distinct neural circuitries. While approach-motivated affective states have been shown to primarily 
relate to activation in medial prefrontal cortex and specifically the striatum, avoidance-motivated 
affective states were systematically related to the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex (Wager, 
Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). Finally, research from personality psychology is also informative on 
the interrelation between positive and negative affect. In particular, the two personality dimensions of 
extraversion and neuroticism are thought to predispose individuals to the experience of positive and 
negative affect, respectively (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1987), an assumption that has been demonstrated 
across numerous studies (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1980; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991; Rusting & Larsen, 
1997). Together, the associations of positive and negative affect with distinct physiological and 
psychological measures (e.g., neural activations, personality traits) further support the argument for 
conceptualizing positive and negative affect as independent dimensions. With regard to subjective 
well-being, this implies that alleviating distress and negative affect does not (necessarily) indicate the 
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experience of high levels of positive affect. Therefore, understanding the processes that promote 
positive affective experiences constitutes an important inquiry in research on subjective well-being. 
2.2 Positive Affective Experiences and Subjective Well-Being  
Theoretical work from the realm of positive psychology has aimed at elucidating the 
psychological processes by which momentary positive affective experiences may promote high levels 
of positive affect, that is, higher subjective well-being. One theory is the “broaden-and-build theory” 
by Fredrickson (2001), which suggests that positive affective experiences trigger an upward-spiral of 
positive emotions that leads to higher subjective well-being. More precisely, the experience of positive 
emotions is thought to broaden people’s attention, thinking, and behavioral tendencies in ways that 
enable them to build a host of personal resources – cognitive, psychological, social, and physical. This 
improved mental and physical functioning then leads to greater openness towards future experiences 
of positive emotions. For example, experiencing excitement motivates engaging in activities and social 
encounters, which in turn increases further experiences of positive emotions. In other words, positive 
emotions and broadened thinking and behavior enhance each other. The broaden-and-build theory not 
only stresses the adaptive short-term effects of positive affective experiences on daily functioning (i.e., 
broadening of cognition and attention) but also suggests that they, over time, turn into more durable 
benefits (i.e., the building of personal resources) which increase subjective well-being.  
Empirical research has supported some of the basic assumptions of the broaden-and-build 
theory. For instance, the induction of positive emotions was related to a broader attentional scope 
(measured in a global-local visual processing task) and to higher action tendencies (measured via an 
open-ended Twenty Statements test; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), compared to a neutral control 
condition. Another study demonstrated that positive affect and broadened thinking, as measured with 
self-report questionnaires, reciprocally enhanced each other over a time period of five weeks 
(Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002). However, it is important to note that the broadening effect may not be 
the same for different positive emotions. According to Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008), positive 
affective states differ in the degree to which they facilitate the motivation to approach. The authors 
showed that only emotions scoring low on approach motivation (e.g., joy) broaden one’s attention and 
 
Essential Concepts and Overview 17 
 
thinking, while emotions with higher approach-motivation scores (e.g., interest) are associated with 
rather narrowed cognition and attention – the latter presumably facilitating the pursuit of one’s 
personal goals.  
While the broaden-and-build theory stresses the general adaptive function of positive 
emotions, another theoretical account, the savoring account, describes the process through which 
people derive joy from the positive affective experiences in their lives – and how this process is 
related to interindividual differences in subjective well-being. According to Bryant and colleagues 
(2003; 2007) some people are more attuned to their positive emotions, appreciative of the positive 
moments in their life, and therefore enjoy these moments more and for a longer period of time 
(Bryant, 2003; Bryant & Veroff, 2007). These people have a tendency to maximize their positive 
experiences, that is, they savor positive experiences more than others. This process of savoring is 
proposed to be one of the mechanisms underlying particular high levels of subjective well-being. 
Empirical evidence speaks in favor of these theoretical claims made by the savoring account. 
One study showed that savoring positive experiences is related to increased levels of momentary 
happiness (Jose, Lim, & Bryant, 2012). Additionally, Bryant (2003) showed that people who had 
stronger beliefs in their capacity to savor positive experiences were also the ones with higher levels of 
self-reported well-being. Similarly, high levels of trait savoring were predictive of greater global 
happiness scores, higher life satisfaction, as well as lower levels of depressive symptoms in a sample 
of older adults (Smith & Hollinger-Smith, 2015). Importantly, the savoring account also seems to be 
compatible with the broaden-and-build theory outlined above. It would be possible, for example, that 
actively savoring one’s positive emotions broadens one’s cognitive and attentional repertoire. In sum, 
these theoretical notions suggest that the promotion of intense positive affective experiences over time 
may lead to increased subjective well-being. 
By outlining the psychological processes by which positive affective experiences may 
contribute to overall high levels of positive affect, both theories, as reviewed above, are concerned 
with affective states, that is, momentary affective experiences as they occur within individuals over 
time. Empirically, however, these theories have mainly been approached through single-occasion 
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study designs, which capture trait levels of affect or interindividual differences in affective experience. 
Yet, for a comprehensive understanding of psychological phenomena that manifest significant 
moment-to-moment change (e.g., affective experiences), within-person variability must be considered 
(Nesselroade, 1991, 2001). Moreover, as the psychological processes, as theoretically outlined by the 
broaden-and-build theory and the savoring account, are dynamic in their nature (i.e., they unfold 
across time); single trait measures or interindividual difference measures do not suffice to capture 
them.  
Finally, single-occasion study designs usually makes use of retrospective self-reports, that 
require people to average across various contexts and to make rather global evaluations of their 
affective experiences. For example, people are asked to estimate how intense they experience positive 
or negative emotions “in general” or in reference to a certain period of time (e.g., the past two weeks). 
The underlying assumption is that these measures reflect an accumulation of the variety of affective 
states a person experiences over time. However, assessments of momentary affective experiences 
differ from retrospective self-reports (e.g., trait measures) of emotion in important ways: Retrospective 
self-reports rely on memory about past emotional events (i.e., episodic memory) or more general 
beliefs about oneself (i.e., semantic knowledge; Robinson & Clore, 2002a, 2002b). Thus, these reports 
are likely to be influenced by memory-specific or belief-based biases, such as identity-related or 
cultural beliefs about emotion. For example, a person with a positive self-belief will likely rate his 
overall emotional state as more positive, compared to a person with a less positive concept of herself. 
In contrast, online reports, that capture actual affective experiences in the moment, draw upon 
experiential knowledge and are therefore less prone to the biases as just described (Robinson & Clore, 
2002a, 2002b). Together, to provide some indication of how positive affective experiences unfold 
within individuals, it is imperative to take a process-oriented approach, in which affective states are 
captured repeatedly over time (Ong, Horn, & Walsh, 2007; Rush, Ong, Hofer, & Horn, 2017).  
2.3 Affect Dynamics and Subjective Well-Being 
As suggested above, one inherent characteristic of affective experiences is that they change 
from moment to moment, that is, people are not happy all the time, but there are more and less happy 
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moments. Descriptive reports of these short-term changes show, for example, that within-person 
variability of daily positive and negative affect (measured over 45 days) comprises more than half of 
the size of the variability of affect observed between individuals (Röcke, Li, & Smith, 2009). Within-
person variability has also been shown to be more pronounced in positive than in negative affective 
states (Eid & Diener, 1999). Importantly, the degree to which emotions change from moment to 
moment also differs between people (Kuppens, Stouten, & Mesquita, 2009). Studies in the field of 
personality psychology have shown that people high in neuroticism not only have a predisposition to 
high mean levels of negative affect but also greater variability in negative affect (Eid & Diener, 1999; 
McConville & Cooper, 1998; Williams, 1990), possibly due to a greater sensitivity to negative stimuli 
and situations (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1987). Age-differences in affect variability have also been 
documented, with greater variability in younger than in older adults (Röcke et al., 2009). Finally, Eid 
and Diener (1999) demonstrated that interindividual differences in daily fluctuations of emotions are 
considerably stable over time, leading them to consider affect variability a characteristic of people’s 
personality.  
Short-term changes in affect have also been related to interindividual differences in stable 
levels of emotion and well-being. In a recent meta-analysis, it has been shown that relatively much 
stability in emotions (i.e., comparatively little fluctuation between successive measurement occasions), 
lower emotional variability (i.e., deviation of affective states from mean levels of emotion), and lower 
emotional inertia (i.e., how much an affective state carries over from one moment to the next) are 
related to both higher levels of subjective well-being and lower levels of psychopathology (Houben, 
Van Den Noortgate, & Kuppens, 2015). Although most of the studies included in this meta-analysis 
focused on negative emotions, positive emotion dynamics have also been linked to well-being: A 
lower variability in positive emotions has been related to a greater life satisfaction and happiness (i.e., 
greater subjective well-being), as well as to lower levels of depressive and anxiety symptoms – even 
after controlling for overall levels of positive emotions (Gruber, Kogan, Quoidbach, & Mauss, 2013). 
In summary, to which extent our emotions change is an important aspect of our emotional lives (Eid & 
Diener, 1999; Röcke & Brose, 2013; Wessman & Ricks, 1966). Thus, for a comprehensive 
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understanding of subjective well-being and interindividual differences therein it is (1) essential to 
move beyond stable levels of (high or low) positive affect and to systematically consider dynamic 
aspects and (2) crucial to delineate the psychological and physiological processes that underlie short-
term changes in positive affective experiences. These psychological and physiological processes that 
shape people’s affective experiences in specific situations should offer explanation for how short-term 
variation in affective experiences come about and therefore also possibly provide a unique window 
through which interindividual differences in more stable emotion outcomes, such as well-being, can be 
understood.  
Moment-to-moment changes in our affective experiences are thought to be governed by the 
way we respond to emotionally relevant events and how we regulate our emotions (Hoeksma, 
Oosterlaan, & Schipper, 2004; Kuppens et al., 2010). Though often related and even intertwined 
(Gross & Barrett, 2011), these changes mark different underlying affective processes, two of which 
are affective reactivity and emotion regulation (but see for example Kuppens & Verduyn, 2017 for the 
inclusion of inertia and interaction as affective processes). Affective reactivity represents the 
spontaneous reaction to an internal or external event, based on its appraisal as rewarding or threatening 
(Lazarus, 1991). Emotion regulation refers to the effortful attempts to change or otherwise modulate 
(e.g., inhibit or initiate) the spontaneous affective reaction, resulting in changes in the temporal 
features of the affective experience (e.g., duration and intensity; Gross, 1998; Kuppens et al., 2010). In 
accordance with the conceptualization of emotions as multicomponent phenomena, these affective 
processes are thought to shape affective experiences, together with loosely coupled changes in 
behavior and physiology (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Importantly, there 
are substantial differences across people in the strength of their affective reactions and their regulatory 
capacities (Kuppens et al., 2010). For example, some people might experience more positive affect in 
positive situations than others, or alternatively, some people might be more successful in enhancing 
positive affective experiences through deliberate regulation attempts. 
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2.4 Short-Term Affective Processes and the Development of Subjective Well-Being  
Different theories propose that people’s daily changing affective experiences and behaviors 
are key mechanisms in the development of well-being and interindividual differences therein. For 
example, it has been proposed that daily experiences and one’s responses to these accumulate and may 
predispose people to the development of mental disorders, such as depression (Wichers, 2014). Some 
people might experience more negative affect in negative or stressful situations or they may take 
longer before turning to their baseline level of affect (Kramer et al., 2014). These heightened negative 
experiences in daily life, resulting from affective dysfunctional affective processing (e.g., enhanced 
affective reactions or emotion dysregulation) are thought to cumulatively lead to negative long-term 
outcomes and higher levels of depressive symptoms in particular (Wichers, 2014). Thus, in this view, 
depression is not seen as a discrete diagnostic entity, but rather reflects a dynamic process that plays 
out in everyday life.  
Such dynamic perspective on the emergence of interindividual differences in long-term 
emotional outcomes has also been adapted by another theoretical framework of flexibility and 
affective change. More specifically, it has been proposed that flexibility in affective experiences and 
behaviors occurs at three different time scales (Hollenstein et al., 2013): At the micro level, flexibility 
reflects affective change that is observable within a specific context, at the meso level, flexibility is 
assessed as affective changes in response to changing contextual demands. Finally, at the macro level, 
flexibility refers to more enduring affective change, which reflects transitions as a result from 
adaptation to life events or developmental change. Importantly, through continuing interactions 
between these levels, changes at lower levels (e.g., affective reactions to daily events) may give rise to 
more enduring changes at higher levels (e.g., increases or decreases in levels of well-being), and 
simultaneously, these higher-level changes constrain changes at lower levels (e.g., one’s level of well-
being determines how one reacts to daily events). In short, this suggests that interindividual 
differences in well-being evolve over time and reside in the affect dynamics of everyday life. 
The idea of approaching stable person characteristics (e.g., well-being) not merely as a trait, 
but rather as a process that evolves over time, has been prominent in personality research, and research 
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on the personality trait of neuroticism and daily stress processes, in particular. For example, Suls and 
Martin (2005) reviewed studies that all used longitudinal designs to investigate the impact of negative 
affect dynamics on neuroticism. They showed that more frequent experiences of stressful events, 
stronger negative appraisals, enhanced affective reactions to these events, and greater inertia of 
negative affect all contributed to the experience of high levels of negative affect and high neuroticism. 
While studies on the prospective link between positive affect dynamics and stable person 
characteristics is scarce, one recent study showed that daily positive affective experiences may elicit 
change in personality traits (Borghuis et al., 2018). In this study, higher daily positive affect predicted 
changes in Big-Five personality traits (i.e., increases in extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
emotional stability and openness) over a five-year time period (Borghuis et al., 2018). 
Research has also examined the prospective links of short-term affective processes on the 
development of well-being. In one study, a heightened reactivity to negative events in daily life was 
related to increased levels of depressive symptoms about 10 years later (Charles, Piazza, Mogle, 
Sliwinski, & Almeida, 2013). In another study, the experience of negative events in daily life (i.e., 
perceived intensity of negative events and the affective reactivity to those events) was predictive of 
depressive symptoms across three waves of experience sampling over a period of one year (Brose, 
Wichers, & Kuppens, 2017). Moreover, enhanced levels of ruminative thinking in response to 
negative experiences, thought to reflect maladaptive emotion regulation, have been shown to predict 
heightened levels of depressive symptoms up to 15 months later (Vanderhasselt, Brose, Koster, & De 
Raedt, 2016). Taken together, these theoretical notions and empirical evidence stress the importance of 
investigating the affective processes underlying changing affective experiences in daily life when 
aiming to understand well-being. 
3 Overarching Aim 
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to better understand interindividual differences in 
subjective well-being and specifically higher subjective well-being. So far, I have presented two 
different lines of work that take different stances on understanding the development of subjective well-
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being. The first – originating in the study of positive psychology – stresses the general adaptive 
function of positive emotions and posits that enhanced experiences of positive emotions foster 
subjective well-being and other beneficial outcomes (e.g., Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 2001; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). The second line of work – research on affect dynamics – emphasizes the 
dynamic nature of affect and proposes people’s changing affective experiences and underlying 
affective processes to be central mechanisms underlying the development of well-being (e.g., 
Hollenstein et al., 2013; Wichers, 2014). Even though both lines of work have remained rather 
separable in the literature – and have been presented here accordingly – theories from both lines of 
work are concerned with how short-term affective processes over time may translate into more 
enduring emotional outcomes. That is, people’s affective responses in certain situations and their 
specific affective experiences in everyday life may impact the development of subjective well-being. 
For example, the cumulative impact of enhanced affective reactions each time a positive event occurs, 
may over time maintain or even increase subjective well-being. Thus, zooming on the psychological 
and physiological processes underlying people’s changing affective experiences and behaviors poses 
one way to better understand subjective well-being and interindividual differences therein. The present 
dissertation investigates two affective processes – affective reactivity and emotion regulation –thought 
to underlie short-term changes in positive affective experiences and relates these to interindividual 
differences in subjective well-being (Figure 1).  
This approach mirrors research on negative affect dynamics and lower well-being, and 
psychopathology in particular. Here, studies established a relation between, for example, an enhanced 
affective reactivity to negative events in daily life and lower levels of well-being and poorer health 
(Affleck, Tennen, Urrows, & Higgins, 1994; Myin-Germeys, van Os, Schwartz, Stone, & Delespaul, 
2001; Sin, Graham-Engeland, Ong, & Almeida, 2015). Similarly, an inability to regulate one’s 
negative emotions has been associated with several forms of psychopathology, such as mood and 
anxiety disorders (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). Finally, 
studies from the affective neurosciences have made substantial progress in establishing the neural 
correlates of the affective processes underlying negative affective experiences. For example, engaging 
in cognitive reappraisal, one commonly used strategy to down-regulate negative emotions, has been 
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shown to recruit cognitive control regions (e.g., dorsolateral, dorsomedial, and ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortex) and the amygdala (Buhle et al., 2014). Variations in these neural activations have also been 
associated with clinical disorders, such as enhanced amygdala activation during the down-regulation 
of positive emotions in participants with mood disorders (Zilverstand, Parvaz, & Goldstein, 2017).
In the following, I will outline the processes of affective reactivity and emotion regulation at 
both the level of subjective experience and the neural level. I will then describe their potential relation 
to interindividual differences in subjective well-being, and especially higher subjective well-being. For 
this, literature from both psychology and the affective neurosciences is reviewed and specific open 
research questions are identified. Finally, it is elaborated on how the use of multiple methods (e.g., 
behavioral, neuroimaging, experience-sampling) helps to get a more complete understanding of the 
affective processes under investigation. 
Figure 1. Central variables investigated in this dissertation. Paths reflect assumed influences between 
the different variables. Relations between negative affect dynamics and psychopathology, as 
established by previous research, are marked in light grey.
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4 Affective Reactivity and Emotion Regulation  
Before turning to affective reactivity and emotion regulation in more detail, it is important to 
delineate them. Affective reactivity is generally defined as the spontaneous response to an event or 
stimulus, whereas emotion regulation is defined as the process that modifies (e.g., increases or 
decreases) the affective reaction in accordance with one’s regulation goal (Gross, 1998; Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). In such dual-process approach (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Sloman, 1996), affective 
reactivity generally represents an automatic and effortless process and emotion regulation a controlled 
processes that requires conscious effort for initiation (Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Even 
though the affective neurosciences have not fully determined the neural circuits that underlie the 
complexities of the affective processes, they generally support the idea of separating automatic 
reactions from controlled regulatory processes (Etkin, Büchel, & Gross, 2015; Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle, 2012). 
It is further distinguished between implicit (or automatic) and explicit (or deliberate) emotion 
regulation, with the former being a regulation process that occurs outside of awareness (Etkin et al., 
2015; Gyurak, Gross, & Etkin, 2011). However, as implicit emotion regulation – similar to affective 
reactivity – also reflects an automatic affective process, this further distinction is not made here, and 
the present dissertation solely focuses on explicit emotion regulation. 
It is important to note, that it has been subject to debate in the psychology of emotions and 
related disciplines, to what extent affective reactivity and emotion regulation can be separated at all 
(Gross & Barrett, 2011; Kappas, 2011). From a theoretical perspective, an answer depends on one’s 
definition of emotion in general (Gross & Barrett, 2011). For example, according to basic emotion 
theories, there is a clear distinction between affective reactions and regulation processes, as these two 
processes are assumed to have unique physiological substrates (Panksepp, 2004). Following 
psychological constructionist theories, in contrast, a distinction between affective reactivity and 
emotion regulation seems superfluous, as emotions are generally viewed as mental states that are 
constantly modified (Barrett, 2009). From an empirical perspective, a distinction between affective 
reactivity and emotion regulation (in contrast to viewing them as one integrative process) would be 
indicated if it helps to explain additional variance of the phenomenon under investigation. Affective 
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reactivity, as an automatic process, is more innate and therefore influenced by implicit factors, such as 
previous experiences, habits or implicit hedonic goals (Mauss, Bunge, & Gross, 2007). Emotion 
regulation, as a controlled process, is more influenced by cognitive capacities, such as working 
memory function, which is essential to cognitively monitor the affective reaction (Etkin et al., 2015). 
Considering these different influencing factors, it is reasonable to assume that affective reactivity and 
emotion regulation might differentially shape the subjective experience of positive affective states and 
therefore might not be identically linked to interindividual differences in subjective well-being. 
In this dissertation, I therefore follow this rather functional approach and distinguish between 
affective reactivity and emotion regulation – both when reviewing the literature and in my empirical 
studies. However, not without acknowledging that these affective processes are certainly strongly 
related and even intertwined. Therefore, in most situations, especially in daily life, affective 
experiences are rooted in a complex interplay between our spontaneous affective reactions and 
regulatory efforts.  
4.1 Affective Reactivity to Positive Events 
4.1.1 Subjective Experience  
As outlined above, affective reactivity can be defined as the spontaneous affective response to 
an event or stimulus that gives rise to multifaceted responses in subjective experience, behavior, 
cognition, and neurophysiology (Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007). Affective reactions are 
automatically triggered by an emotionally relevant event that (consciously or unconsciously) is 
appraised as positive or negative and is subsequently acted upon (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Ochsner 
& Barrett, 2001). A positive appraisal is made when a physiological need is fulfilled, a goal is attained 
(or a goal-inconsistent state reversed), or a specific outcome exceeds one’s expectations (Cohn & 
Fredrickson, 2009). Thus, in accordance with the appraisal perspective on emotion (Lazarus, 1991), an 
affective reaction to an event leads to increases in positive affect, if the valuation of a stimulus or a 
situation is positive (i.e., rewarding). It is important to note that even though affective reactions to 
positive events are thought to predominantly increase positive affect, at the within-person level of 
analysis positive and negative affect are not conceived as completely independent (Brose, Voelkle, 
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Lövdén, Lindenberger, & Schmiedek, 2015). Thus, affective reactions to positive events not only 
increase positive affect, but, at least to some extent, also lead to decreases in negative affect (Zautra, 
Affleck, Tennen, Reich, & Davis, 2005). 
It has been recognized that there are substantial differences across people in their strength of 
affective reactions (Davidson, 1998; Kuppens et al., 2010). Past research has aimed at accounting for 
these interindividual differences. For example, conceptualized as the within-person relation between 
daily affect and self-reported daily events, affective reactions to positive events have been shown to be 
stronger in younger, as compared to older people in one daily diary study (Röcke et al., 2009). 
Similarly, personality, and extraversion in particular, has been related to the strength of affective 
reactions to positive events. In the laboratory, higher levels of extraversion have been related to 
enhanced affective reactions to positive stimuli, as assessed through the change in positive affect after 
a positive mood induction procedure (i.e., mental imagery task; Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). However, 
studies conducted in daily life could not confirm these findings (Howell & Rodzon, 2011; Lucas, Le, 
& Dyrenforth, 2008). Together, these studies show that the strength of affective reactions to positive 
stimuli and events, as measured in the laboratory and in daily life, relates to interindividual difference 
variables. 
4.1.2 Link to Subjective Well-Being 
Following the idea that enduring emotional outcomes, such as subjective well-being, may 
reside in the short-term processes underlying specific affective experiences and behaviors in everyday 
life (e.g., Hollenstein et al., 2013), the strength of affective reactions to positive events should also 
relate to interindividual differences in subjective well-being. More specifically, given the presumed 
beneficial effects of intense positive affective experiences for subjective well-being (Bryant, 2003; 
Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 2001), especially an enhanced affective reactivity to positive 
events should be related to higher levels of subjective well-being. However, across several literatures 
(e.g., positive psychology, personality psychology, aging and clinical literature) and both laboratory 
and daily life studies, empirical data about the link between affective reactivity to positive events and 
interindividual differences in subjective well-being is mixed. While some evidence points to enhanced 
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affective reactivity in participants with higher subjective well-being (Carl et al., 2014; Larsen & 
Ketelaar, 1991), other evidence points in the opposite direction, that is, reduced affective reactivity to 
positive events (Oishi et al., 2007; Röcke et al., 2009). Similarly, one study showed depressed 
participants to have reduced affective reactivity to positive stimuli in the laboratory (Bylsma et al., 
2008), while another study found enhanced affective reactivity to daily positive events in people with 
major depressive disorder (Bylsma, Taylor-Clift, & Rottenberg, 2011). While the finding of reduced 
affective reactions to positive events in people with higher subjective well-being seems surprising in 
light of theories from positive psychology, there are theoretical considerations that possibly explain 
these findings. For example, according to the opponent process theory (Solomon, 1980), for one to 
experience intense positive affect, it is necessary to first experience intense negative affect. Along 
these lines, affect intensity, a stable individual difference characteristic of how strongly one usually 
experiences affect, has been shown to apply to both valences (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Thus, 
individuals who experience intense positive affect usually also experience intense negative affect. 
These theoretical notions imply that enhanced affective reactions to positive events might carry 
emotional costs, explaining why they could be related to lower levels of subjective well-being. 
Additionally, the findings on a relatively greater emotional stability in people with higher subjective 
well-being (Houben et al., 2015) may indicate that less deviation from one’s baseline in the face of 
positive events (i.e., reduced affective reactivity) is also related to higher subjective well-being.  
In sum, previous research yielded two different pictures of the relationship between affective 
reactivity to positive events and interindividual differences in subjective well-being. Moreover, 
available evidence differs widely in regard to methodological approaches (e.g., laboratory versus daily 
life studies) and indicators of well-being (e.g., indicators of subjective well-being versus clinical 
diagnoses). Hence, it remains an open question of whether an enhanced or reduced affective reactivity 
to positive events relates to higher levels of subjective well-being.  
4.1.3 Neural Level 
Several cortical and subcortical regions are generally assumed to be involved in automatic 
affective processing and assumed to underlie affective reactions to emotional stimuli and events 
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(Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2012): For example, the 
brainstem as well as limbic and paralimbic regions, including the amygdala, the hippocampus, the 
cingulate cortex, the insula, and the basal ganglia have been frequently found active during affective 
processing. Besides the broad evidence linking these brain regions to the general experience of 
emotion (e.g., Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist et al., 2012), it is not yet clear how neural activations in 
these brain regions are related to the experience of positive and negative affective states. A recent 
proposition – the affective workspace hypothesis – suggests that a general and large-scale affective 
network underlies both positive and negative affective experiences (Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, 
& Barrett, 2016). Meta-analytic results supported such valence-general affective network (largely 
comprising the regions mentioned above), which is active during both positive and negative affective 
experiences with valence being flexibly implemented in different patterns of activation across regions 
of this network (Lindquist et al., 2016). Besides this general implication of these brain regions in 
affective processing, specifically the amygdala and the ventral striatum (VS) seem to be central to the 
experience of positive and negative affect, due to their involvement in the processing of threat and 
reward, respectively (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2013; Buhle et al., 2014). 
The VS (including the nucleus accumbens) is a part of the basal ganglia and a main input site 
of dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area and the substantia nigra (Graybiel, 2000). 
As a central part of the brain’s reward circuit, the VS is mainly known for its role in reward processing 
and reward-related behavior in both non-human animals (Apicella, Ljungberg, Scarnati, & Schultz, 
1991) and humans (Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Delgado, 2007; Haber & Knutson, 2010). For 
instance, VS activity has been linked to the anticipation of taste-based (O’Doherty, Deichmann, 
Critchley, & Dolan, 2002) or monetary rewards (Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001; 
Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003). Additionally, increased activation in the VS is 
related to the attainment of rewards (Delgado, Locke, Stenger, & Fiez, 2003; Delgado, Nystrom, 
Fissell, Noll, & Fiez, 2000) and decreased activation in the VS with the omission of expected rewards 
(Berns, Mcclure, Pagnoni, & Montague, 2001; Knutson et al., 2001). From a psychological 
perspective, rewards are assumed to induce a feeling of pleasure and therefore contribute to the 
subjective experience of positive affect (Ashby & Isen, 1999; Schultz, 2000). Indeed, a study showed 
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that momentary happiness ratings were accounted for by one’s subjective responses to rewards, as 
reflected in BOLD-signal in the VS (Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan, 2014). Along these lines, 
studies have reported increased VS activity in response to various positive stimuli, such as pleasant 
music (Blood & Zatorre, 2001), smiling faces (Vrtička, Andersson, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 
2008), positive images (Sabatinelli, Bradley, Lang, Costa, & Versace, 2007), or positive 
autobiographical memories (Speer, Bhanji, & Delgado, 2014). Together, these findings underline the 
role of the VS for affective reactivity to positive stimuli and events.  
On a more general note, previous studies have demonstrated that there are differences across 
individuals in their neural responses to rewards and that these relate to stable person characteristics, 
such as psychopathic (Buckholtz et al., 2010) or affective traits (Wu, Samanez-Larkin, Katovich, & 
Knutson, 2014). A recent study even found differences in VS activity in response to monetary rewards 
to be positively linked to well-being, as indicated by well-being composite scores (which included 
measures of life satisfaction and trait positive affect; Morelli, Knutson, & Zaki, 2018). These findings 
therefore give first indication, that differences in one’s neural responses to rewards might not only 
relate to momentary affective experiences, but may also account for more stable differences in 
emotion, such as subjective well-being.  
4.2 Up-Regulation of Positive Emotions 
4.2.1 Subjective Experience 
Emotion regulation can be defined as the process “by which individuals influence which 
emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and express these emotions” 
(Gross, 1998, p. 275). Conceptualized this way, emotion regulation modifies the trajectory of the 
initial affective reaction through the implementation of controlled regulatory processes (Gross, 1998; 
Gross & Thompson, 2007). Various models have emerged that aim at classifying the different ways 
and strategies people use to regulate their emotions. These, for example, differentiate strategies based 
on the temporal specificities of where they target the emotional trajectory (Gross, 1998, 2015) or 
based on the target and function of the regulation process (Koole, 2009). 
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Regarding the regulation of positive emotions, most people aim at up-regulating or prolonging 
their positive affective experiences (Gross, Richards, & John, 2006). This finding is in line with the 
notion that people are generally pro-hedonically motivated, that is, they want to feel good most of the 
times (Riediger et al., 2009). When regulating positive emotions, affective reactions and regulatory 
processes usually work through reciprocal reinforcement (Jose et al., 2012), rather than compete 
against each other as during the down-regulation of negative emotions (Sheppes & Gross, 2011). 
However, people also sometimes down-regulate their positive emotions (e.g., in pursuit of a goal; 
Tamir, 2009).  
The savoring account, as outlined above (cf. 2.2), not only describes the general mechanisms 
with which people derive joy from their positive experiences; it can also serve as a framework for 
specific up-regulation processes that generate, maintain, or enhance positive affective experiences 
(Bryant, 2003; Bryant & Veroff, 2007). When engaging in savoring, one attends to and appreciates 
past, present and future positive moments in life (Bryant, 2003). For example, through being present 
in the moment, one can savor current positive emotions, while positive mental time travel can enhance 
past or future positive experiences (Nelis, Quoidbach, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2011).  
Empirical studies conducted in daily life showed that savoring the present moment relates to 
increases in momentary levels of affect. For example, savoring positive events in daily life has been 
related to increases in self-reported momentary happiness (Jose et al., 2012) and the number of up-
regulation strategies one uses has been positively associated with subsequent mood ratings (Heiy & 
Cheavens, 2014). Even though laboratory assessments of the up-regulation of positive emotions are 
scarce, one study showed that, compared to simply reacting to, up-regulating emotions in response to 
amusing film clips led to increases in the subjective experience of amusement, as well as facial 
expressions and autonomic physiology (e.g., heart rate and sympathetic nervous system activation) 
related to amusement (Giuliani, McRae, & Gross, 2008). Taken together, engaging in the deliberate 
up-regulation of positive emotions is one of the means through which positive affective experiences 
can be successfully enhanced, as indicated by increases in positive affect in the laboratory and in daily 
life.  
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4.2.2 Link to Subjective Well-Being 
Building upon theoretical notions that stress the role of the short-term affective processes for 
the development of subjective well-being (e.g., Hollenstein et al., 2013), and the importance of intense 
positive affective experiences in particular (Bryant, 2003; Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 2001), 
greater increases in positive affect when up-regulating one’s positive emotions (i.e., greater success in 
up-regulating positive emotions) should relate to higher levels of subjective well-being.  
Several studies provide first evidence that the up-regulation of positive emotions is indeed 
positively related to subjective well-being. The frequent use of savoring strategies has been shown to 
be positively correlated with life satisfaction and happiness ratings (Bryant, 2003) and another study 
showed that the typical use of up-regulation strategies was related to both affective and cognitive 
indicators of subjective well-being (Quoidbach, Berry, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2010). Along these 
lines, clinical research has shown that deficits in positive emotion regulation are a characteristic of 
various emotional disorders, such as mood and anxiety disorders (Carl et al., 2014). Together, these 
studies established a positive relation between trait levels of emotion regulation, indicative of habitual 
or typical emotion regulation behavior, and interindividual differences in subjective well-being. 
However, it remains unknown how actual within-person changes in positive affect when up-regulating 
positive emotions, as assessed through self-reports of momentary affective experiences, relate to 
interindividual differences in subjective well-being. 
4.2.3 Neural Level 
In accordance with the conceptualization of emotion regulation as an effortful process that 
requires some level of control for initiation, most neural models of emotion regulation focus on the 
interaction between neural cognitive control systems and neural circuits involved in affective reactions 
to stimuli and events (Etkin et al., 2015; Ochsner et al., 2012). Meta-analyses have shown that (e.g., 
dorsolateral, ventrolateral and dorsomedial) prefrontal and (mainly anterior) cingulate cortices, 
otherwise associated with various cognitive control functions and working memory more generally 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2008), modulate activation in subcortical areas (e.g., the amygdala), which are 
associated with affective reactions (Buhle et al., 2014; Kohn et al., 2014). Most research focused on 
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the down-regulation of negative emotions, particularly using cognitive reappraisal. The theoretical 
notions and empirical findings from this research can be used as a foundation for understanding the 
neural correlates of the deliberate up-regulation of positive emotions.  
While most studies found cognitive reappraisal and cognitive control regions to decrease 
activation in the amygdala (e.g., Buhle et al., 2014), some studies found that regulatory efforts 
additionally modulated, namely increased, activity in the VS (McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & 
Gross, 2008; Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). The authors speculated that this 
increase in VS activity reflects an increase in positive affect. That is, fMRI data suggests that when 
engaging in cognitive reappraisal, participants not only reduce their negative but also enhance their 
positive affect. This assumption has been supported by studies that investigated regulation strategies 
that specifically aim at increasing positive emotions in negative contexts. These studies showed that 
activity in the VS was positively associated with the enhanced experience of positive affect during 
positive reappraisal (Doré et al., 2017) and increased when engaging in compassion-based up-
regulation of positive emotion (Engen & Singer, 2014). Following this, hypotheses can be derived on 
brain regions underlying enhanced positive emotional experiences during the up-regulation of positive 
emotions. That is, to the extent that engaging in the up-regulation of positive emotions (in positive 
contexts) successfully enhances positive affect, it should also increase activation in the VS.  
Indeed, the few studies that used fMRI to investigate the up-regulation of positive emotions, 
observed, next to activation in medial and lateral prefrontal areas, similar to the down-regulation of 
negative emotion, increased activation in the VS (Greening et al., 2014; Kim & Hamann, 2007; Li et 
al., 2018; Moutsiana et al., 2014; Vrticka, Sander, & Vuilleumier, 2011). On study also reported a 
positive relation between VS activity and interindividual differences in levels of positive affect when 
up-regulating (i.e., mean levels of positive affect across all regulation trials compared to control trials; 
Greening et al., 2014). These studies suggest that enhancing positive affective experiences through the 
successful up-regulation of positive emotions increases activation in the VS. However, it is not yet 
known whether the increased activation in the VS reflects interindividual differences in the general 
capacity to up-regulate positive emotions or whether VS activity also reflects dynamic within-person 
changes in positive affective experiences during up-regulation (i.e., trial-to-trial changes).  
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Examining how VS activity relates to within-person changes in affect during the up-regulation 
of positive emotions not only helps to delineate this regulation process at the neural level, but may also 
help to get a better understanding of subjective well-being and interindividual differences therein. 
Several neuroimaging studies suggest people with major depressive disorder to be characterized by VS 
dysfunction during the regulation of positive emotions. In one study, depressed participants showed 
dissociable effects between VS activity and levels of positive affect when up-regulating positive 
emotions, suggesting that VS recruitment does not successfully modulate affective experiences in 
these participants (Greening et al., 2014). In another study, participants with major depressive disorder 
failed to sustain VS activity (i.e., over the course of the fMRI session) when instructed to up-regulate 
their positive emotions, and this failure was accompanied by less self-reported positive affect (Heller 
et al., 2009). Though, no study to date has related VS activity during the up-regulation of positive 
emotions to levels of subjective well-being, the above findings underline the importance of taking 
neural activations into account when aiming to understand the processes underlying well-being. 
5 Affective Reactivity and Emotion Regulation: A Multimethod Approach 
Both laboratory-based experiments and studies conducted in more naturalistic settings can 
inform us about the affective processes underlying short-term changes in positive affective 
experiences and their relation to interindividual differences in subjective well-being. Through 
experimental manipulations in the laboratory, it is possible to gain a more mechanistic understanding 
of a specific affective process. This way, neuroimaging studies, for example, can uncover when and to 
what extent specific brain regions are engaged during a particular emotion regulation process (Ochsner 
& Gross, 2008). Yet, their rigor usually comes with the loss of generalizability of findings to the “real 
world” (Araújo, Davids, & Passos, 2007; Wilson, Aronson, & Carlsmith, 2010). With methods, such 
as the experience-sampling (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987) or the daily reconstruction method 
(Kahneman, Krueger, Schkade, Schwarz, & Stone, 2004), it is possible to repeatedly sample affective 
experiences and behaviors as they unfold in everyday life, allowing the study of affective processes 
with greater ecological validity (Ebner-Priemer & Trull, 2009). Together, each research approach 
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comes with its unique strengths and is therefore best designed for answering specific research 
questions.  
However, with most studies focusing exclusively on either of the methods, it remains an open 
question of how findings from these two reconcile. A meta-analysis found that effect sizes from 
laboratory and daily life studies were only moderately correlated, with a number of them even 
changing their direction of effect (Mitchell, 2012). Such possible divergence between laboratory and 
daily life findings can also be exemplified by research in the psychology of emotions. For example, as 
outlined above people with major depressive symptoms have been shown to have reduced affective 
reactions to positively valenced stimuli in the laboratory (Bylsma et al., 2008), but enhanced affective 
reactivity to positive events in daily life (Bylsma et al., 2011). Along similar lines, a meta-analysis of 
laboratory studies showed that experimentally induced expressive suppression is effective in reducing 
negative affect (Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012). In contrast, first evidence suggests that the use of 
expressive suppression in daily life is associated with increases in negative feelings (Brans, Koval, 
Verduyn, Lim, & Kuppens, 2013). These examples illustrate how the investigation of affective 
processes can yield divergent findings, which may be due to the use of different research methods. 
Studying affective processes in both the laboratory and in daily life within the same sample may help 
to parcel out the method-based roots of potential discrepancies in findings and may help to reach a 
more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon under investigation.  
Only few studies, to date, have taken such approach. Combined experimental research in the 
laboratory with experience-sampling in daily life found increased emotional inertia to be associated 
with a slower return to baseline of negative affect using these two methods (Koval et al., 2015). 
Similarly, an fMRI study showed that sustained activation in the VS during the experience of reward 
in a gambling task was related to prolonged positive affect during a smartphone-based gambling task 
in daily life (Heller et al., 2015). These studies provide an important first step in integrating laboratory 
and daily life research designs, but for most psychological phenomena and processes, it is not yet clear 
how laboratory findings translate into measures in daily life. 
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6 Summary of Aims and Research Objectives  
The overarching aim of this dissertation is to better understand interindividual differences in 
subjective well-being through an investigation of the affective processes – affective reactivity and 
emotion regulation – underlying short-term changes in positive affective experiences. This approach 
follows a dynamic perspective on the study of individual differences and the proposition that 
interindividual differences in well-being emerge from affect dynamics (e.g., Hollenstein et al., 2013). 
It is also in accordance with theoretical notions from positive psychology that suggest positive 
affective experiences to play a pivotal role in the development of subjective well-being (Bryant, 2003; 
Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 2001).  
Regarding the relationship between affective reactivity to positive events and subjective well-
being, theoretical and empirical work shows a mixed picture. Based on work from positive psychology 
that highlights the beneficial effects of intense positive affective experiences for high subjective well-
being (e.g., Carl et al., 2014; Fredrickson, 2001), I would expect enhanced affective reactivity to 
positive events to be related to higher subjective well-being. Yet, in accordance with other theoretical 
notions that, for example,  point to potential emotional costs of intense positive experiences (e.g., 
Solomon, 1980) and work that shows greater emotional stability and less variable affective 
experiences to relate to higher subjective well-being (e.g., Houben et al., 2015), I would expect people 
with higher subjective well-being to show reduced affective reactivity to positive events. Taking these 
different pictures of the link between affective reactivity to positive events and subjective well-being 
into account, I test both respective hypotheses in the empirical studies in this dissertation. That is, I 
test whether enhanced or reduced affective reactivity is related to higher subjective well-being.  
A potential link between the up-regulation of positive emotions and subjective well-being is 
mainly informed by research from positive psychology that underlines the adaptive function of high 
positive affect for subjective well-being (Fredrickson, 2001) and the capacity to up-regulate positive 
affective experiences in particular (Bryant, 2003; Bryant & Veroff, 2007). Based on this, I hypothesize 
greater increases in positive affect when up-regulating positive emotions (i.e., greater success in up-
regulating positive emotions) to relate to higher subjective well-being.     
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The empirical approach of this dissertation was as follows: First, through observations at the 
subjective and the neural level, the affective processes of affective reactivity and emotion regulation, 
and their potential relation to interindividual differences in subjective well-being were investigated. 
Second, different research methods were combined and integrated in the empirical studies. 
Laboratory-based methods were used to gain a more mechanistic understanding of the processes under 
investigation and daily life research methods were used to capture the processes under “natural” 
circumstances. The details of the research objectives of the studies are summarized below and the 
combined approach of different levels of analysis and methods is illustrated in Figure 2. 
The first research objective was to test how affective reactivity and successful up-regulation of 
positive emotions in the laboratory relate to interindividual differences in subjective well-being (Paper 
I). In line with the approach of this dissertation to capture affective reactivity and emotion regulation 
as they occur within individuals, I assessed participants’ momentary positive affective experiences, 
while they were instructed to react and to up-regulate in response to positive film-clips. The use of 
performance-based indicators of affective reactivity and emotion regulation that capture actual within-
person changes in positive affect extends previous studies that established a positive relation between 
subjective well-being and self-report measures of reactivity (e.g., Carl et al., 2014) and positive 
emotion regulation (e.g., Bryant, 2003). In addition, trait levels of emotion regulation were assessed. I 
hypothesized that greater increase in positive affect when reacting to the positive film clips and when 
up-regulating positive emotions, relate to higher subjective well-being. Exploratively, I investigated 
the relation between these changes in affect when up-regulating (i.e., performance-based indicators of 
emotion regulation) and trait levels of emotion-regulation. 
The second research objective was to examine the neural correlates underlying the successful 
up-regulation of positive emotions in the laboratory and in daily life (Paper II). Previous studies 
related VS activity to affective reactions to positive stimuli (e.g., Vrtička et al., 2008) and to 
differences in affect in the successful up-regulation of positive emotions across people (Greening et 
al., 2014). Extending this, it was specifically tested in this study whether activation in the VS also 
relates to within-person changes in positive affect (i.e., trial-to-trial changes in affect) when up-
regulating. Following the empirical approach of this dissertation to combine different methods, it was 
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further tested whether increased VS activity during the up-regulation of positive emotions in the 
laboratory relates to increased changes in affect when up-regulating in daily life, as captured through 
the experience-sampling method. 
Finally, a third research objective concerned the inconsistent picture of the relation between 
affective reactivity to positive events and subjective well-being. Empirical studies supported either a 
link between enhanced or reduced affective reactions to positive events and higher subjective well-
being. While that latter seems surprising given the suggested role of intense positive experiences in 
higher subjective well-being, it aligns with other theoretical work that stresses the emotional costs 
resulting from more extreme affective experiences (e.g., Solomon, 1980). Given these opposing 
theoretical predictions and diverse empirical findings, the third research objective of this dissertation 
was to provide a large-scale and systematic empirical test of the relationship between affective 
reactivity to positive events and interindividual differences in subjective well-being (Grosse 
Rueschkamp et al., 2018). More specifically, across six studies that all captured positive event 
occurrence and momentary affect in daily life via the experience-sampling or daily diary method, as 
well as trait levels of well-being, it was tested whether higher subjective well-being is related to 
enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to positive events.  
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Figure 2. Central variables investigated in this dissertation and research objectives addressed in the 
empirical studies (Papers I, II and III). Paths reflect assumed influences between the different 
variables. The multimethod approach encompassed research designs the laboratory and in daily life 
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Abstract 
Theories suggest that the up-regulation of positive emotions is important for well-being. 
However, with previous studies focusing on self-reported habitual up-regulation, it remains unknown 
how subjective well-being is related to up-regulation success, as indicated by performance-based 
measures of emotion regulation. In the present study, 183 participants were instructed to either up-
regulate their emotions or to react to amusing film clips, while providing ratings of their positive 
affect. Subjective well-being and habitual emotion regulation were assessed via self-reports. While we 
did not find evidence for a relation between up-regulation success and subjective well-being, greater 
habitual emotion regulation was associated with higher subjective well-being. These findings suggest 
that people who report to up-regulate their positive emotions more frequently not necessarily do so 
more successfully, and only the former seems to be characteristic of higher subjective well-being. 
These results point to the importance of integrating different methods in the study of emotion 
regulation.   
Keywords: subjective well-being, up-regulation, positive emotions, regulation success, 
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Successful emotion regulation is suggested to be a crucial part of well-being and resilience 
(Gross & John, 2003). This is best made explicit by the fact that maladaptive emotion regulation in the 
context of negative experiences is associated with several forms of psychopathology, such as mood 
and anxiety disorders (e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Joormann & Gotlib, 2010). 
Similarly, successful down-regulation of negative emotions has been related to higher levels of 
subjective well-being (e.g., Côté, Gyurak, & Levenson, 2010; McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 
2012). However, in daily life, people not only down-regulate their negative, they also attempt to 
enhance their positive affective experiences (Gross et al., 2006). First evidence indicates that the latter 
might also be crucially important for well-being, as the frequent or habitual up-regulation of positive 
emotions has been linked to higher subjective well-being (e.g., Quoidbach, Berry, Hansenne, & 
Mikolajczak, 2010). However, it is not yet clear whether habitual up-regulation also indicates up-
regulation success (i.e., how strongly one actually increases positive affect when up-regulating). As an 
enhanced experience of positive emotions is thought to be particularly beneficial for physical and 
psychological well-being (Fredrickson, 2001), greater up-regulation success should be related to 
higher subjective well-being – the experience of predominantly positive emotions and a positive 
evaluation of one’s life (Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). The aim of the present study was to 
investigate this hypothesized link between subjective well-being and up-regulation success, indicated 
by a performance-based measure of emotion regulation in the laboratory, and to explore how up-
regulation success relates to habitual emotion regulation.  
Emotion regulation has been defined as the process by which people influence the nature, the 
frequency and the duration of their emotions (Gross, 1998; Gross & Thompson, 2007). For example, 
people can try to change the meaning of an emotion eliciting stimulus (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & 
Gabrieli, 2002) or they can aim at altering their behavioral response to a certain stimulus (Gross, 2002) 
in order to reduce or enhance the emotional response. There is reason to believe that the deliberate 
enhancement of affective experiences may be important for well-being. Within the study of positive 
psychology, theories have emerged that promote the role of positive emotions in positive functioning 
and subjective well-being, specifically higher subjective well-being. One of these propositions 
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suggests that the increased experience of positive emotions broaden people’s attention and thinking in 
ways that, on the long run, enable people to build a host of personal resources (cognitive, 
psychological, social, and physical; Fredrickson, 2001). These resources, in turn, are thought to 
positively influence subjective well-being. Thus, experiencing intense positive emotions may have 
benefits for subjective well-being. This general idea has been supported by studies which, for 
example, indicate that people with higher global positive affectivity show a heightened reactivity to 
positive events (Carl et al., 2014). Yet, people do not only react to positive events with positive 
emotions, they may also further up-regulate their positive affective experiences (Bryant, 2003). This 
process of deliberately maximizing positive affective experiences – termed savoring – has been 
defined as a self-regulatory mechanism that aims at the generation, maintenance, or enhancement of 
positive affect, and has been proposed to increase subjective well-being (Bryant, 2003; Bryant & 
Veroff, 2007). Thus, people who are more attuned to their positive emotions and more appreciative of 
the positive moments in their life enjoy these moments more and for a longer period of time and 
should therefore have higher levels of subjective well-being.  
Empirical studies support this proposed link between an enhanced up-regulation of positive 
emotion and higher levels of subjective well-being. The use of several savoring strategies (Quoidbach 
et al., 2010), as well as higher frequency of up-regulating (Livingstone & Srivastava, 2012) have been 
positively associated with various indicators of cognitive and affective well-being. Additionally, a 
stronger belief in one’s own ability to up-regulate positive emotions has been related to greater life 
satisfaction and happiness (Bryant, 2003; Smith & Hollinger-Smith, 2015). Finally, along these lines, 
first evidence indicates that symptoms of depression are related to the less frequent use of up-
regulation strategies (Nelis et al., 2011). Taken together, these studies support the claim for a positive 
relationship between the up-regulation of positive emotions and subjective well-being. These studies 
all investigated habitual emotion regulation, that is, typical or average regulation behaviors. Habitual 
emotion regulation is usually measured through self-reports that require participants to make 
judgments across various contexts and therefore only reflect quite global evaluations of specific 
behaviors. Thus, these measures of habitual emotion regulation are not indicative of how succesfully 
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one up-regulates positive emotions, that is, how strongly one actually enhances positive affective 
experiences when up-regulating.  
To the contrary, there are indeed a few studies that have investigated the up-regulation of 
positive emotions using performance-based indicators of regulatory success. One of the studies 
showed that the instructed up-regulation of emotions to amusing film clips in the laboratory was 
related to increases in the emotional experience and facial expression of amusement, as well as 
increases in amusement-related physiology as compared to mere emotional reactivity to such clips 
(Giuliani et al., 2008). Similarly, in another study, up-regulating emotions in response to positive 
images resulted in enhanced levels of self-reported affect (Kim & Hamann, 2007). These studies show 
that engaging in up-regulation efforts can lead to an increase in positive feelings, and that quantifiying 
this increase in positive feelings provides a performance-based indicator of successful emotion 
regulation. Yet, to date it remains unknown how the successful up-regulation of positive emotions 
(i.e., increases in positive affect when up-regulating) relates to subjective well-being. In accordance 
with current theories of positive psychology (cf. Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 2001), it can be 
expected that comparatively greater regulatory success is related to relatively high levels of subective 
well-being.  
The Present Study 
The aim of the present study was to investigate individual differences in the successful up-
regulation of positive emotions, as indicated by a performance-based measure of emotion regulation in 
the laboratory, and to relate these to differences in subejctive well-being. We instructed participants to 
either simply react (reactivity condition) or to up-regulate their positive emotions (up-regulate 
condition) in reaction to positive film clips. We not only tested the relation between a higher 
emotional reactitivity towards positive stimuli and higher well-being (e.g., Carl et al., 2014), but we 
also hypothesized that specifically greater up-regulation success is related to higher levels of 
subjective well-being. To capture changes in positive affect, participants rated their momentary affect 
immediately before and after watching the filmclips. Such ratings are well suited for capturing 
changes in affective experiences, as they rely on immediate experiences. They are thereforefore – in 
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contrast to retrospective self-reports of feelings that relie on semantic knowledge – less biased by 
beliefs about the self (Robinson & Clore, 2002a). In line with previous research, additional 
exploratory analyses were conducted to test the relationship between habitual emotion regulation and 
regulation success (McRae et al., 2012), as well as habitual up-regulation of positive emotions and 
subjective well-being (Bryant, 2003). 
Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
One-hundred and eighty-three undergraduate students (48.0% women), aged between 20 and 
32 years (M = 24.3, SD = 3.1 years) from Berlin, Germany, participated in this study in exchange for 
course credits or monetary compensation (5€/ hour). The study was approved by the ethics committee 
of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. The study lasted a total of 5 hours, split into two experimental 
sessions (2.5 hours each). Each session consisted of several working memory tasks (results of which 
will be presented elsewhere) and an emotion regulation task. At the end of each session, participants 
filled in various trait questionnaires.  
During the emotion regulation task, participants were instructed to regulate their emotions to 
sad and amusing short film clips (2-3 min). All film clips were excerpts from feature films (Amusing: 
When Harry met Sally, A Fish Called Wanda, and Benny and Joon; Sad: The Champ, 21 Grams, and 
My Girl) and have previously been shown to evoke sadness or amusement in the laboratory (Gross & 
Levenson, 1995; Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010). The film clips were split into two 
sequences of three films each (one sequence shown in each session; counterbalanced across 
participants), such that no two films of the same valence were shown consecutively. The sequence 
relevant for the present investigation (Figure 1A) started with an amusing-inducing film clip and the 
instruction to increase positive feelings (up-regulate condition), followed by a sadness-inducing film 
clip and the instruction to maintain positive emotions, and finally another amusing-inducing film clip 
and the instruction to simply react (reactivity condition). The order of the experimental conditions 
(i.e., order of film clips with fixedly matched instructions) was the same for each participant. Different 
short neutral film sequences (30 sec each) from the silent film Die Sinfonie einer Großstadt (English: 
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Symphony of a Metropolis) were shown in between the emotional film clips with the purpose to bring 
affect back to baseline.   
Figure 1. Schematic of the experimental design. (A) Order of conditions in each session. (B) One trial 
(i.e., within one condition) in the emotion regulation task.
Note. a counterbalanced between participants; PA = positive affect.
Before each film clip, participants first provided a baseline rating of their momentary affect, 
assessed via the rating (5-point Likert scale; 1 [not at all] – 5 [extreme]) of five positive (amused, 
cheerful, happy, good, pleased) and five negative affect items (sad, bad, unwell, depressed, unhappy), 
as well as one item reflecting positive arousal (excited) and one item reflecting empathy 
(compassionate). This affect rating was followed by the regulation instruction, the emotional film clip, 
and a second rating of momentary affect. After a short relaxation period (60 sec), participants were 
asked for a third time to rate their momentary affect (Figure 1B). Upon completion of the emotion 
regulation task, participants were asked to evaluate each film clip, by indicating on a 5-point Likert 
scale (1 [not at all] – 5 [very much]), how much each affect item (same affect items as in the 
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momentary affect rating) provides a good description of the film clip. Given our interest in reactivity 
to positive stimuli and up-regulation, we only considered the respective conditions (i.e. up-regulation 
and reactivity condition) as well as the first two ratings of momentary positive affect in the analyses.       
Measures 
Positive affect: An overall score of positive affect (PA) was calculated for each affect rating, 
that is, before (T1) and after (T2) each film clip. This was done by aggregating over all positive affect 
items (Reliability at T1: Cronbach’s α = .92).  
Subjective well-being: Subjective well-being was assessed with the Satisfaction with Life 
Scale (SWL; answering scale: 1 [completely disagree] – 7 [completely agree]; Diener, Emmons, 
Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), measuring the cognitive component of subjective well-being, the  positive 
subscale of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; answering scale: 1 [very little to 
never] – 5 [extremely]; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), measuring the affective component of 
subjective well-being, and the WHO-5 Scale  ( answering scale: 1 [at no time] - 5 [all the time]; World 
Health Organization, 1998), measuring overall subjective well-being. We used an overall score of 
subjective well-being (the mean across all z-standardized scores, Cronbach’s α = .72) for analyses. 
Habitual emotion regulation: Habitual up-regulation of positive emotions was assessed with 
the subscale of the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (CERQ; Garnefski, Kraaij, & 
Spinhoven, 2001) that measures adaptive emotion regulation startegies [answering scale: 1 (never) – 5 
(always)], the reappraisal subscale of the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 
2003) that measures cognitive reappraisal [answering scale: 1 (does not apply at all) – 5 (applies 
completely)], and a shortened version of the Emotion Regulation Profile-Revised (ERP-R; Nelis, 
Quoidbach, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2011). The ERP-R measures the hypothetical regulation of 
positive emotions: Participants indicate for different scenarios which strategy they were most likely to 
engage in. We only considered four scenarios targeting positive emotions and only considered 
adaptive strategy endorsement. Cronbach’s α for the different emotion regulation scales was .88, .78 
and .93, respectively. 
Analyses 
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Up-regulation success: To test whether participants reacted to the amusing film clips with an 
increase in positive affect and successfully up-regulated their emotions during the task, we conducted 
a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with PA as the dependent variable and time (T1 
and T2) and condition (up-regulation and reactivity condition) as within-subject factors.  
Up-regulation success and subjective well-being: To test whether people with higher levels of 
subjective well-being have enhanced levels of reactivity to positive film clips and are particularly 
successful when up-regulating their positive affect in response to positive filmclips, we conducted the 
same repeated measures ANOVA as just described and additionally included overall subjective well-
being as a covariate. Additionally, we calculated Pearson correlations between overall subjective well-
being, reactivity, and regulation success, calculated as the change in PA from before to after each film 
clip (i.e., T2-T1). 
Habitual emotion regulation and subjective well-being: Pearson correlations were conducted 
between habitual emotion regulation indices and overall subjective well-being. 
Habitual emotion regulation, reactivity and up-regulation success: Pearson correlations were 
conducted between habitual emotion regulation indices, reactivity, and regulation success were 
calculated as the change in PA from before to after each film clip (i.e., T2-T1). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics of all variables can be found in Table 1.  
Emotion regulation success: Across both conditions, there was an increase in PA from before 
to after the film clip, as indicated by a significant main effect of time, F(1, 182) = 417.6, p < .001. 
Moreover, participants had higher levels of PA in the up-regulation condition, as indicated by a 
significant main effect of condition, F(1, 182) = 129.89, p < .001 (Figure 2).  The was no significant 
interaction between condition (reactivity/up-regulation) and time (T1/T2), F(1, 182) = 0.025, p = .874, 
indicating that the change in PA from before and after the film clip did not differ between conditions. 
Together, positive film clips elicited positive reactions, as indicated by increases in positive affect. 
Regulatory efforts towards enhanced positive affect, as instructed in the up-regulation condition, did 
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not seem to have resulted in further increases in positive affect, most likely due to the different 
baselines between the two conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Self-reported positive affect (PA) for each condition. Participants had higher levels of PA in 
the up-regulation condition, both before (T1) and after the film clip (T2; significant main effect of 
condition, F(1, 182) = 129.89, p < .001). 
 
 
Table 1.   
Descriptive Statistics of all Variables in this Study. 
Variable M SD 
Subjective well-being   
  SWL 24.41 5.49 
  PANAS positive 33.93 6.09 
  WHO-5 20.31 4.31 
Trait emotion regulation    
  CERQ adaptive 64.18 2.38 
  ERP-R positive 4.32 3.59 
  ERQ  Reappraisal 25.91 6.03 
Positive affect   
 Up-regulation   
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This result was followed up with a paired-sample t-test to test whether one of the two film 
clips of the different conditions was perceived as more positive. If the film clip of the watch condition 
had been perceived as more positive, this could potentially have explained why we did not find 
relatively stronger increases in PA in the up-regulation condition. The result was, however, that 
participants perceived the film clip in the up-regulation condition as more positive, compared to the 
film clip in the reactivity condition, t(182) = 4.533, p < .001. 
Subjective well-being and up-regulation of positive emotions: There was no significant 3-way-
interaction between condition, time and subjective well-being, F(1, 181) = 0.21, p = .651; Table 2). 
Thus, participants with higher subjective well-being did not have a higher increase in PA when up-
regulating positive emotions (i.e., they did not show greater up-regulation success), compared to 
simply reacting to the positive film clips. Similarly, there was no significant interaction between time 
and subjective well-being, indicating that participants with higher subjective well-being did not have 
higher increases in PA across the two conditions. Separate ANCOVAs for the two conditions 
confirmed that well-being did not interact with time in either condition. That is, well-being did not 
matter for reactivity or up-regulation success in this study.  
 
  T1 2.72 0.75 
  T2 3.60 0.73 
 Reactivity   
  T1 2.30 0.78 
  T2 3.18 0.85 
Note. SWL = Satisfaction with Life Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; WHO-5 = 
WHO (Five) Well-being Index; CERQ = Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; ERP-R = Emotion 
Regulation Profile Revised; ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; T1 = Affect rating before the film 
clip; T2 = Affect rating after the film clip 
Table 2.    
Results from the Repeated Measures ANOVA with PA as a Dependent Variable. 




Within-Subjects      
 Condition 31.98 1 31.98 129.23** .42 
 Condition x Subjective well-being .02 1 .02 .08 .00 
 Time 142.88 1 142.88 415.73** .70 
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Habitual emotion regulation and subjective well-being: There was a significant positive 
correlation between subjective well-being and the adaptive emotion regulation subscale of the CERQ 
(r = .52, p < .001) and the reappraisal subscale of the ERQ (r = .34, p < .001), but not the positive 
subscale of the ERP-R (r = .07, p = .35; Table 3).  
Habitual emotion regulation and up-regulation success: There was a marginally significant 
positive correlation between up-regulation success (i.e., the change score from the up-regulation 
condition) and the ERP-R (r = .15, p = .05). All other correlations did not reach significance (Table 3), 
indicating that the more conventional measures were not associated with our performance-based 




The study investigated the relationship between the successful up-regulation of positive 
emotions (indexed by a performance-based measure of emotion regulation) and subjective well-being. 
 Time x Subjective well-being .06 1 .06 .19 .001 
 Condition x Time .004 1 .004 .03 .00 
 Condition x Time x Subjective well-being 
.04 1 .04 .21 .001 
Note. PA = positive affect. ** p < .001, * p < .05.  
Table 3.  
Pearson Correlations Between Habitual Emotion Regulation, Regulation Success and Subjective Well-
Being  
 Overall  well-being Habitual emotion regulation 





Habitual emotion regulation     
CERQ adaptive  .52**    
ERQ adaptive .34** .40**   
ERP-R positive        .07        .03 .02  
     
Up-regulation success        .01       -.11         -.02 .15* 
Reactivity        .04        .02 .12         .11 
Note. Up-regulation success = change in PA from T1 to T2 in the up-regulation condition; Reactivity = 
change in PA from T1 to T2 in the reactivity condition.  
** p < .001, * p < .05.  
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More specifically, we tested the hypothesis that greater increases in positive affect when up-regulating 
positive emotions (i.e., greater up-regulation success) are related to higher levels of subjective well-
being. We expected this effect, over and above that of subjective well-being on simply reacting to 
positive film clips.   
During the emotion regulation task, participants reacted to the positive film clips, as indicated 
by increases in their positive affect. Interestingly, participants did not have particularly stronger 
increases in positive affect when instructed to up-regulate their emotions, compared to simply reacting 
to a positive film clip. Moreover, our hypothesis of a relation between greater up-regulation success 
and higher subjective well-being was not supported. Similarly, we did not find that higher subjective 
well-being was related to greater positive reactivity to positive stimuli.  Finally, we found a somewhat 
mixed pattern regarding habitual emotion regulation. While two indices of habitual emotion regulation 
(the adaptive subscale of the CERQ and the reappraisal subscale of the ERQ) were not significantly 
related to regulation success but positively linked to subjective well-being, the third indicator (positive 
subscale of the ERP-R) was marginally positively related to regulation success, but not subjective 
well-being.  
No Difference in Change in Positive Affect Between Conditions 
The fact that we did not find a difference in the increase in positive affect between our two 
conditions seems to suggest at first that either no regulation occurred or that regulatory efforts did not 
lead to further increases in affect, compared to simply reacting to the positive film clip. Yet, given 
previous studies with similar paradigms that did report successful up-regulation of positive emotions 
(e.g., Giuliani et al., 2008) it seems unlikely that no regulation occurred in our study or that regulation 
was not successful. Instead, what may have happened is the following. Due to the inclusion of sad film 
clips and the experimental design (i.e., fixed order of conditions); participants seem to have 
experienced a drop in momentary affect before the reactivity condition from which they had not fully 
recovered. That is, baseline positive affect was much higher in the up-regulation condition than in the 
reactivity condition. Thus, it could be that participants implicitly (e.g., through a greater reaction or 
implicit up-regulation) or explicitly (e.g., through deliberate up-regulation of positive emotions) 
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maximized their positive affect in the reactivity condition without the instruction to do so. This 
speculation is further supported by the fact that participants perceived the film clip in the reactivity 
condition as less positive. Thus, if participants had simply reacted to the film clip in the reactivity 
condition, increases in positive should have been lower than in the regulation condition. Together, 
participants may have used the amusing film clip in the reactivity condition as a means to brighten 
their relatively sad mood. This idea is in line with recent research that emphasizes the role of positive 
emotions as a buffer against negative and distressing experiences. Both, reduced positive reactivity to 
daily stressors (i.e., less decreasses in positive affect in response to a negative event; Sin, Graham-
Engeland, Ong, & Almeida, 2015), as well as the deliberate enhancement of positive affect in negative 
contexts (McRae & Mauss, 2016; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007) have been related to markers of well-
being and resilience.  
This interpretation of the present findings needs to remain speculative. As there was no 
significant difference in the increase in positive affect between the two conditions, it is not possible to 
conclude whether either of the observed changes reflects an unmodulated reactivity or deliberate up-
regulatory efforts.  
Subjective Well-Being and Successful Up-Regulation of Positive Emotions 
Against our expectation, we neither found that higher levels of subjective well-being were 
particularly strongly related to higher upregulation success (particularly strong increases in positive 
affect in the up-regulation condition), nor did we find that higher levels of well-being were related to 
greater positive reactions (higher increases in positive affect in the reactivity condition). This finding 
seems surprising, given previous studies that have shown a positive link between habitual up-
regulation of positive emotions and subjective well-being (Bryant, 2003; Quoidbach et al., 2010) and 
studies showing that well-being is associated with enhanced reactions to positive stimuli (Bylsma et 
al., 2008; Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018). However, we did find a positive association between 
habitual emotion regulation and subjective well-being, whereas these same indicators of habitual 
emotion regulation were not associated with up-regulation success. Thus, these findings may suggest 
that people who report to regulate more frequently (as measured through questionnaires tapping into 
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habitual emotion regulation) not necessarily do so more successfully. Moreover, only the former 
seems to be characteristic of people with higher subjective well-being, contradicting theoretical work 
that stresses the capacity to up-regulate positive experiences for high levels of subjective well-being 
(Bryant & Veroff, 2007) or the idea that intense positive affective experiences have benefits for well-
being (Fredrickson, 2001). This finding is of importance given the various studies that treat habitual 
emotion regulation as an indicator for the capacity to up-regulate positive emotions.  
One possible explanation for these divergent findings regarding the relationship with 
subjective well-being is that different types of measures were used as indicators for habitual emotion 
regulation and up-regulation success. Habitual emotion regulation, just as subjective well-being, was 
measured via self-reports of global behavioral tendencies. Both measurements therefore likely include 
similar belief-based biases (e.g. a person with a positive self-belief will likely rate his overall well-
being as more positive, but also his ability to up-regulate positive experiences as higher; Robinson & 
Clore, 2002). The influence of these biases, however, declines when reports of momentary affect are 
used. Moreover, the indicators of emotion regulation success that were derived from these self-reports 
(i.e., difference scores were calculated from momentary affect ratings) are beyond participants’ 
introspection or evaluations. Hence, the shared method variance between these indicators of up-
regulation success and levels of subjective well-being should be minimized.  
One indicator of habitual emotion regulation (the shortened version of the ERP-R) seems to 
fall out of this pattern. In contrast to the other scales (which capture adaptive emotion regulation more 
generally), this trait questionnaire is specific to positive emotions and, additionally, assesses emotion 
regulation via vignettes (Nelis et al., 2011). These require participants to indicate their regulation 
behavior in very specific situations (resembling actual experiences), instead of making more global 
evaluations thereof. Therefore, retrospective biases might be less of concern, potentially explaining the 
marginally significant correlation with up-regulation success in our study. Nevertheless, it is important 
to point out that this correlation was only small and requires being replicated.     
Limitations and Implications for Future Research  
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The present study has several limitations. Most importantly and as already mentioned above – 
there was a difference in the level of positive affect between the two conditions before the two positive 
film clips, which may have resulted from our specific experimental design. Thus, it could not be 
determined how these different baselines might have influenced the degree of reactivity or regulation 
behavior in either condition and therefore limits the interpretability of the present findings. An 
important goal for future studies would be to test the present hypotheses with different experimental 
designs (e.g., no simultaneous use of negative stimuli within the same emotion regulation task).  
Another limitation is that instructions were matched with the film clips. Thus, it was not 
possible to fully control for confounding factors, such as differences in the evaluation of the film clips. 
To overcome these limitations, future research should test up-regulation success with a greater number 
of trials as well as randomized instructions to eliminate the possibility of such effects.  
Conclusion 
Taken together, we found that participants had significant increases in positive affect in 
response to the positive film clips, however not greater increases when instructed to up-regulate their 
positive emotions, compared to simply reacting to the film clips. Furthermore, while we found, in line 
with previous studies, a positive association between emotional reactivity and subjective well-being as 
well as habitual emotion regulation and subjective well-being, no such link was evident between our 
performance-based indicators of reactivity or up-regulation success and subjective well-being. 
Furthermore, up-regulation success in the laboratory task was not or only very weakly related to 
habitual emotion regulation. These results point towards the differences between performance-based 
indicators and self-report measures of emotion regulation, and challenge the idea that a greater 
capacity to up-regulate positive emotions is beneficial for subjective well-being. These findings 
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Abstract  
Emotion regulation is typically used to down-regulate negative or up-regulate positive 
emotions. While there is considerable evidence for the neural correlates of the former, less is known 
about the neural correlates of the latter – and how they are associated with emotion regulation and 
affect in daily life. From 63 healthy young participants (22±1.6 years, 30 female), fMRI data was 
acquired while they up-regulated their emotions to positive and neutral images or passively watched 
them. From the same participants, daily affect and emotion regulation behavior were measured using 
experience-sampling over 10 days. Focusing on the ventral striatum (VS), which was previously 
associated with positive affective processing, we found increased activation during the up-regulation 
to both positive and neutral images. VS activation for the former positively correlated with between- 
and within-person differences in self-reported affect during fMRI but was not significantly associated 
with up-regulation in daily life. However, participants with lower daily affect showed a stronger 
association between changes in affect and activation in emotion-related (medial frontal and 
subcortical) regions – including the VS. These results support the involvement of the VS in up-
regulating positive emotions and suggest a neurobehavioral link between emotion-related brain 
activation and emotions in daily life.  
 Keywords: positive emotions, experience-sampling, ventral striatum, affect, up-regulation 
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Our emotional experiences are characterized by ups and downs. While these changes depend 
on situations we encounter, we also influence how we feel through deliberately up- or down-regulating 
our emotions. There are different motivations to do so, but, in general, people are pro-hedonically 
motivated, that is, they want to maintain or increase their positive and decrease their negative 
emotions (Riediger et al., 2009). Previous neuroimaging studies have mainly focused on the down-
regulation of negative emotions and identified brain regions or networks supporting this type of 
regulation: Most often, “cognitive control” regions in prefrontal and parietal cortices have been shown 
to modulate subcortical regions involved in emotional responding (e.g., amygdala; Buhle et al., 2014). 
However, people can also pursue pro-hedonic goals by enhancing positive emotions. While behavioral 
studies in the laboratory (Giuliani et al., 2008) and in daily life (Jose et al., 2012) found that up-
regulating positive emotions can enhance momentary levels of affect, less is known about the brain 
regions underlying this form of emotion regulation and the heightened experience of affect. 
One of the brain structures suggested to be involved in – particularly positive – affective 
processing is the ventral striatum (VS). The VS has been implicated specifically in reward-related 
behavior (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997) and more generally in 
positive emotional responding, for example, to pleasant music (Blood & Zatorre, 2001), smiling faces 
(Vrtička et al., 2008), or positive images (Sabatinelli et al., 2007). Furthermore, VS activity can be 
modulated through emotion regulation, for example by cognitive reappraisal, which can  increase 
positive emotions in negative contexts (Doré et al., 2017). Thus, to the extent that the up-regulation of 
positive emotions successfully enhances positive affective experiences, it should also modulate 
activity in the VS.  
Indeed, the few existing fMRI studies that examined the up-regulation of positive emotions 
reported increased activation in the VS – along with activation in medial and lateral prefrontal areas 
(similar to the down-regulation of negative emotion), the temporal lobe, and the anterior cingulate 
(Greening et al., 2014; Kim & Hamann, 2007; Li et al., 2018; Moutsiana et al., 2014; Vrticka et al., 
2011). In one of these studies, increased VS activity was related to behavioral measures of regulation 
success, that is, higher positive affect during up-regulating compared to just watching positive stimuli 
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(Greening et al., 2014). However, several aspects of the role of the VS during the up-regulation of 
positive emotions remain unknown:  
First, previous studies that found increased activation in the VS during the up-regulation of 
positive emotions used a passive baseline condition of “naturally” viewing positive stimuli as a control 
condition. However, to disentangle neural responses of affect-related up-regulation from more general 
regulatory efforts, an “active” control condition is needed; such as the up-regulation to neutral stimuli, 
which are thought to induce minimal affect (Gasper, 2018). Based on reports that the VS supports the 
heightened experience of positive affect during emotion regulation (e.g., Doré et al., 2017), we 
hypothesized stronger VS activation during the up-regulation to positive than to neutral stimuli, as the 
latter should not lead to changes in momentary affect.  
Second, while activation in the VS has been related to between-person differences in the 
ability to up-regulate positive emotions (i.e., individuals with more activation have higher positive 
affect; Greening et al., 2014), it is important to also consider variability within individuals. A relation 
between VS activity and within-person changes in affect would indicate that, in addition to being 
persistently activated across contexts, the VS also reflects more subtle moment-to-moment changes in 
affect during the up-regulation of positive emotions. Such dynamic changes in affective states have 
also been associated with reward-related learning processes in the VS (Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, & Niv, 
2016; Rutledge et al., 2014). For example, exaggerated reward expectations during heightened positive 
affective states lead to decreases in positive affect. Lower affective states then facilitate increases in 
positive affective experiences through adjusted reward expectations (Eldar & Niv, 2015; Eldar et al., 
2016). Combined with the relation between VS activity and differences in affect during the up-
regulation of positive emotions (e.g., Greening, 2014), we hypothesized that activation in the VS also 
reflects within-person changes in affect during the up-regulation of positive emotions. Understanding 
the neural responses that support these brief changes in affect is particularly relevant considering the 
unpredictability of everyday-life situations. Ever-changing contexts and an individual’s interaction 
with them naturally result in varying regulatory efforts and varying affective states.  
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To test an association between brain activation and moment-to-moment changes in affect – 
and to determine its generalizability (Araújo et al., 2007) – it is beneficial to (also) test individuals in 
their “natural habitat”. Studies that combined laboratory and daily-life measures found, for example, 
that reward-related VS activity was positively related to positive affect during a smartphone game in 
daily life (Heller et al., 2015). Assuming a similarity of behaviour in- and outside the laboratory, we 
expected that increased VS activity during emotion regulation in the fMRI also relates to changes in 
momentary affect when up-regulating positive emotions in daily life.  
Taken together, in the present study, we investigated the neurobehavioral associations of the 
up-regulation of positive emotions during fMRI and in daily life.  First, a standard emotion regulation 
paradigm was used to measure neural and behavioral responses while participants were instructed to 
up-regulate their affect to positive and neutral images during fMRI – compared to passively watching 
them. Given its above mentioned involvement in positive affective processing, the present study 
focused on the role of the VS for the heightened experience of affect during the up-regulation of 
positive emotions. We tested three hypotheses: (1) The VS is recruited more strongly when up-
regulating to positive images compared to just watching them and to up-regulating to neutral images; 
(2) higher VS activation is related to higher between-person levels of affect during up-regulation; (3) 
higher VS activation is related to higher within-person changes in affect during up-regulation (i.e., on 
a trial-by-trial basis). 
Second, participants completed an additional 10 days of smartphone-based experience-
sampling in their daily lives, during which they reported their momentary affect and degree of 
regulating positive emotions. Given the small empirical basis with a similar approach, we explored 
whether stronger activation in the VS during instructed up-regulation in the laboratory is related to 
higher changes in momentary affect when up-regulating in daily life.  
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Seventy-seven healthy participants between 18 and 25 years (M=22, SD=1.6, 39 women) were 
recruited through mailing lists and online ads. Exclusion criteria were current psychiatric or 
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neurological disorders, an above normal body mass index (18.5 to 25 kg/m2), and standard MRI 
contraindications (e.g., metallic implants). Data from two participants were excluded due to technical 
issues (wrong MRI sequence parameters and crashing task presentation) and two participants decided 
to terminate their participation. After a more detailed screening during the testing session, an 
additional ten participants were excluded because of a history of neurological or psychiatric diagnoses. 
Hence, 63 participants (M=22, SD=1.6, 30 women) entered the analyses.  
Procedure 
The experiment comprised two phases, an fMRI and an experience-sampling method (ESM) 
phase, the order of which was counterbalanced across participants (49% fMRI first). During the ESM 
introductory session, participants received smartphones and completed trait questionnaires (not 
relevant for the current research question; Supplement 1.1). During fMRI, an emotion regulation task 
and a reward-learning task (the results of which will be presented elsewhere) were performed. Both 
tasks were practiced beforehand outside the scanner. Participant reimbursement ranged from 44.50 to 
90 Euros, depending on the performance in the reward learning task and the number of completed 
ESM measurement occasions. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the medical faculty 
at the University of Leipzig. 
Emotion regulation task in the MRI 
Forty positive (Pos; valence: M=7.09, SD=0.34; arousal: M=4.59, SD=0.72) and 40 neutral 
images (Neu; valence: M=5.29, SD=0.17; arousal: M=3.15, SD=0.40) were chosen as stimuli from the 
Emotional Picture Set (EmoPicS; Wessa et al., 2010) based on the normative ratings (9-point Self-
Assessment Manikins: 1=sad/calm, 9=happy/excited) and between conditions matched for number of 
persons depicted, social interactions, close-up images and eye contact. Participants were instructed to 
either up-regulate their emotions (“deliberately intensify the emotions you are experiencing”; Up) or 
to passively watch (“experience the emotions naturally as they come and go“; Watch) indicated by the 
cue words  “Enhance” or “Watch” (for exact wording in German, Supplement 1.2). No specific 
emotion regulation strategy was instructed with the aim to maximize the comparability with the 
assessment in daily life, where people report using  several emotion regulation strategies (Heiy & 
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Cheavens, 2014). Each of the four experimental conditions (PosUp, PosWatch, NeuUp, NeuWatch) 
had 20 trials, split into two runs of 40 trials each. For each participant, images were randomly assigned 
to the four conditions and the trial order was pseudo-randomized with the constraint of maximally 
three consecutive trials from the same condition. Before and after each image, participants rated their 
current affect (“At the moment I feel”) on a scale from -3 (“bad”) to +3 (“good”; see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Schematic of one trial in the emotion regulation task: (i) fixation cross, (ii) pre-image affect 
rating (trial continued when answer was given), (iii) instruction cue word (“Enhance” or “Watch”), 
(iv) inter-stimulus interval, (v) post-image affect rating (trial continued when answer was given), and 
(vi) short break.
Experience-sampling in daily life
During the 10-day ESM phase (two periods of five days, separated by a two-day break), 
participants answered questions on a smartphone (Huawei Ascend G330), which beeped six times per 
day at pseudo-random time points (between 45 and 195 min apart) within 12 hours. On average, 
participants answered on 54.5 beep-induced occasions (SD=10.2). At each occasion, we assessed 
momentary affect (“At the moment I feel”, scale: -3 (“bad”) to +3 (“good”)) and the degree of emotion 
regulation (“I tried to intensify my pleasant feelings”; scale: 0 (“not at all”) to +6 (“very much”)) since 
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the last occasion. In the following, “momentary affect” refers to ratings during the ESM phase and 
“self-reported affect” refers to ratings during the fMRI task.  
MRI acquisition and processing 
MRI was performed at the Berlin Center for Advanced Neuroimaging using a 3-T Siemens 
Tim Trio MRI (Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) with a standard 12-channel head coil. T1-weighted 
images were acquired with an MPRAGE pulse sequence (TR=1900 ms, TE=2.52 ms, FOV=256 mm, 
192 slices, flip angle=9°, voxel size=1 mm isotropic). Functional images were acquired using a T2*-
weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR=2090 ms, TE=22 ms, flip 
angle=90°, FOV=192 mm, voxel size=3 mm isotropic). Forty slices of 2.5 mm (0.5 mm gap) were 
obtained in interleaved order parallel to the anterior-posterior commissure (AC-PC) line. A field map 
(TR=438, TE1=5.19 ms, TE2=7.65 ms, flip angle=60°, FOV=192 mm) was acquired (before the EPI 
sequence) for distortion correction. The experiment was presented on an MR-compatible screen 
(NordicNeuroLab, Bergen, Norway) using OpenSesame 3.0.6 (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). 
MR images were processed and analyzed using SPM12 (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/ 
spm/software/spm12/). First, four dummy scans, acquired at the beginning of each run, were excluded. 
FMRI preprocessing consisted of slice time correction, realignment to the mean EPI, co-registration of 
the T1-weighted image to the mean EPI, segmentation into three tissue classes (GM, WM, CSF), and 
normalization to MNI space (3 mm isotropic voxels) with the IXI555 template (from 555 healthy 
subjects; www.brain-development.org) plus spatial smoothing (with an 8-mm full-width-at-half-
maximum Gaussian kernel) using DARTEL. No participant had to be excluded due to head movement 
(cut-off: >0.3 mm of mean frame displacement; Power, Barnes, Snyder, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2012; 
Power, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2015). 
Statistical Analyses  
Behavioral analyses. As a manipulation check, we first tested successful emotion regulation 
during fMRI and in daily life using linear-mixed modeling. Successful up-regulation of positive 
emotions during fMRI (i.e., higher levels of self-reported affect during up-regulation to positive 
images compared to just watching them and to up-regulation to neutral images) was determined using 
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the post-image affect rating as the outcome variable with valence (Pos, Neu), instruction (Up, Watch), 
and their interaction as predictors. Follow-up analyses were conducted on positive and neutral trials 
separately, only with instruction as a predictor. To determine trial-wise regulation success, the change 
in affect for each trial was calculated as the difference between the post- and pre-image self-reported 
affect. The pre-image rating provides a trial-specific baseline, reflecting within-person changes in 
affect more directly (Augustine & Hemenover, 2009).  
To test successful emotion regulation in daily life, momentary affect at each occasion was 
used as the outcome variable and the degree of emotion regulation as a predictor. To get a better proxy 
of the change in momentary affect, affect at the previous occasion was included as a lagged score as 
an additional predictor. Measures from these analyses were used for hypothesis-specific tests of a 
relation between neural activation and differences in affect (see below).  
fMRI – first and second-level analyses. At the first level, a general linear model (GLM) was 
specified for each participant to model the BOLD signal for each condition (using a canonical 
hemodynamic response function). The six motion parameters were entered as regressors of no interest. 
At the second (i.e., group) level, random effects analysis was performed. According to our hypotheses, 
region-of-interest (ROI) analyses of the VS were conducted using a binarized mask based on 
coordinates from 9 reward-related studies (Rothkirch, Schmack, Deserno, Darmohray, & Sterzer, 2014 
for more details) and family-wise error (FWE) corrected for multiple comparisons at p<.05.  
VS ROI analyses were complemented by exploratory whole-brain analyses, for which cluster-
extent based thresholding was used with p<.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel- and p<.05 (FWE-
corrected) at the cluster-level. For each contrast, cluster extent thresholds k (ranging from 92 to 113 
voxels) were estimated with the tool “SPM Cluster Size Threshold” (version date: 12 Jan 2016; 
https://github.com/CyclotronResearchCentre/SPM_ClusterSizeThreshold). 
To test for an association between dynamic within-person changes in affect (i.e., trial-by-trial 
changes in affect) and BOLD signal, parametric analyses were conducted: changes in affect were 
included as a parametric regressor at the first and a one-sample t-test was performed at the level.  
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All resulting t-maps are available on NeuroVault (Gorgolewski et al., 2015): 
https://neurovault.org/collections/MAZDXCZW/. To psychologically interpret the results of the 
exploratory whole-brain analysis in a data-driven way, the respective t-maps were compared (using 
NeuroVault’s decode function) with terms of the online database Neurosynth, which contains 
activations and associated (psychological, anatomical) labels from 14,371 studies (Yarkoni, Poldrack, 
Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011).  
All (Pearson) correlations of the link between behavioral and neural measures were outlier-
corrected (3 SD) and to determine statistical significance, a (two-sided) α-level of .05 was used. 
VS activity during up-regulation. To examine whether the VS is particularly activated during 
the up-regulation to positive images, compared to just watching them and to up-regulating neutral 
images, the interaction of valence and instruction ((PosUp>PosWatch)>(NeuUp>NeuWatch)), their 
two main effects (Pos>Neu and Up>Watch), and – given the study’s focus on regulation effects – the 
simple effects PosUp>PosWatch and NeuUp>NeuWatch were analyzed in the VS. 
Next, the hypothesis was tested that increased activation in the VS is related to higher 
between-person levels of affect when up-regulating positive emotions (i.e., successful up-regulation). 
For this, VS activity of the PosUp>PosWatch contrast was correlated with person-specific estimates of 
the random slopes from the linear-mixed model of the behavioral data (positive trials only), which 
represent average levels of affect during PosUp vs. PosWatch. 
To test whether increased activation in the VS is related to greater within-person (i.e., trial-by-
trial) changes in affect when up-upregulating positive emotions, we conducted a parametric analysis 
with changes in affect for the PosUp condition only (n=60, as three participants showed no variance in 
their self-reported affect in this condition).  
Relating VS activity and up-regulation in daily life. As a behavioral check, laboratory 
measures of affect (i.e., mean self-reported affect of pre- and post-image ratings across all trials) were 
correlated with affect in daily life (i.e., mean momentary affect across all occasions). 
To test the hypothesis that greater VS activation when instructed to up-regulate during fMRI is 
related to higher changes in momentary affect when up-regulating in daily life, person-specific 
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estimates of the random slopes were extracted from the linear-mixed model of the ESM data. These 
estimates (i.e., each person’s change in momentary affect in relation to the degree of up-regulation), 
were then correlated with VS activity when up-regulating positive emotions (extracted parameter 
estimates from PosUp>PosWatch). 
Emotion-related brain activity and its association affect in daily life. To test which brain 
regions – beyond the VS – are associated with changes in affect, an exploratory parametric whole-
brain analysis was conducted. To increase comparability between affect measured in the laboratory 
and in daily life (where there are no regulation instructions and events are not categorized by valence), 
this analysis included changes in affect across all conditions (i.e., trials) irrespective of instruction or 
stimulus valence. To test the link to between-person differences affective experience in daily life 
(Hamann & Canli, 2004), parametric effects from all significant clusters of this analysis were 
extracted and correlated with the participants’ mean momentary affect over all measurement occasions 
during the ESM phase.  
Results 
Behavioral results  
For up-regulation during fMRI, a significant interaction (β=0.28, p<.001) and main effect of 
valence (β=0.76, p<.001) but no significant main effect for instruction (β=-0.04, p=0.53) were found. 
Follow-up analyses showed that participants successfully up-regulated to positive (β=0.24, p<.001) 
but not to neutral images (β=-0.04, p=0.52, Figure 2). 
In daily life, participants had a greater change in momentary affect, the stronger they up-
regulated their positive emotions (significant main effect of the degree of emotion regulation, β=0.29, 
p<.001, and affect at the previous occasion, β=0.14, p<.001; Table S2). 
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Figure 2. Self-reported affect in the emotion regulation task in the fMRI. There was a significant main 
effect of valence and a significant valence-by-instruction interaction effect, that is, higher self-reported 
affect for positive versus neutral images and for up-regulating emotions to positive images versus 
passively watching them. No significant difference was observed for up-regulating to neutral images 
versus passively watching them. Results are displayed as boxplots with median and first and third 
quartile. ***=p<.001; n.s.=not 
 
fMRI results 
VS activity during up-regulation. No significant voxels were found for the interaction 
((PosUp>PosWatch)>(NeuUp>NeuWatch)) in the VS, which would have indicated higher activation 
specifically for the up-regulation to positive images, compared to passively watching them and the up-
regulation of neutral images. However, in bilateral VS, main effects of valence ([-12, 3, -9], T=4.0; 
[18, 0, -9], T=4.6) and instruction ([-15, 0, -6], T=5.44; [15, 3, -3], T=6.47; [-9, 18, 0], T=3.13) were 
significant. Follow-up analyses showed significant activation  in the bilateral VS for the simple effects 
PosUp>PosWatch ([-15, 0, -6], T=4.42; [15, 0, -6], T=4.54) and NeuUp>NeuWatch ([-18, 3, -3], 
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T=4.86; [15, 6, -3], T=5.92). That is, there was higher activation in the VS while up-regulating to both 
positive and neutral images, compared to just watching them.  
VS activity and between-person differences in self-reported affect. Participants with stronger 
activation in the VS when up-regulating to positive images (PosUp>PosWatch) also reported higher 
average levels of affect (r(63)=0.28, p=.03; Figure 3A).  
VS activity and within-person changes in affect. Relatively greater trial-by-trial changes in 
affect were related to increased engagement of the VS during the up-regulation of positive emotions, 
as shown by parametric increases in the left VS (PosUp condition; [-12, 6, -12], T=3.39, Figure 3B). 
 
 
Figure 3. Association of activity in the ventral striatum (VS) with between-person (i.e., average) and 
within-person (i.e., trial-by-trial) differences in self-reported affect. (A) Increased VS activity (mean 
activation across the entire region-of-interest, ROI) was related to mean differences in self-reported 
affect for the up-regulation of emotions to positive images (PosUp), compared to passively watching 
them (PosWatch) and (B) positive association of changes in self-reported affect in the left VS during 
PosUp (ROI analysis: [-12, 6, -12], T=3.39, p=.05, FWE-corrected). *=p<.05 
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Whole-brain activity during up-regulation. In the exploratory whole-brain analysis of 
increased activation during the up-regulation specifically of positive images (compared to just 
watching them and the up-regulation to neutral images, i.e., the interaction of valence and instruction), 
no voxels survived multiple-comparison correction. The main effect of valence (Pos>Neu) showed 
widespread activation in lateral and medial temporal, frontal, and parietal cortices and in subcortical 
areas (Figure 4A, Table 1). The main effect of instruction (Up>Watch) yielded activation in a large 
cluster around the left supplementary motor area and in frontal, occipital, and cerebellar clusters 
(Figure 4B, Table 1). Deactivation results (i.e., the inverse contrasts) are reported in the Supplement 
(Table S3, section 1.3, and Figure S1).  
 
Table 1. 
Whole-brain analysis for the interaction, main effect of valence, and main effect of instruction. For 
corresponding brain plots, cf. Figure 4. For the inverse contrasts, cf. Table S3 and Figure S1. 
    MNI coordinates 
Brain regions Side k t x y z 
       
Interaction       
 no significant voxels        
Positive>Neutral       
 Supramarginal gyrus  R 502 7.7 66 -39 27 
 Supramarginal gyrus L 318 7.23 -60 -36 30 
 Middle temporal gyrus L 277 6.94 -60 -60 3 
 Inferior occipital R 147 6.73 42 -84 -9 
 Superior frontal gyrus L 441 5.89 -15 60 3 
 Precuneus R 192 5.61 21 -42 12 
 Insula L 676 5.55 -42 6 0 
 Rolandic operculum R 248 5.34 51 6 6 
 Midcingulate gyrus L 339 5.18 -12 -24 42 
 




Figure 4. Brain activation in the emotion regulation task (main effects). Regions of increased 
activation for the (A) main effect of valence (Positive>Neutral) and (B) main effect of instruction 
(Up>Watch). No significant voxels were found for the interaction. Threshold: p<.001 (uncorrected) at 
the voxel- and p<0.05 with family-wise error (FWE) correction at the cluster-level. For details cf. 
Table 1. Coordinates are in MNI space 
 
Association of whole-brain activity and changes in affect. The exploratory analysis of 
associations between trial-by-trial changes in affect across all conditions and activation across the 
whole brain showed significantly positive correlations in widespread regions around medial frontal 
and subcortical areas and significantly negative correlations in lateral parietal but also in medial and 
lateral frontal areas, extending into the left insula (Figure 5, Table 2). The Neurosynth analysis mainly 
Up-regulate>Watch       
 Supplementary motor area L 10731 7.54 -9 15 69 
 Middle frontal gyrus R 163 6.69 51 0 51 
 Calcarine sulcus R 132 4.4 30 -72 9 
Note. Clusters labeled according to the anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 
2002). Threshold: p<.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel- and p<.05 with family-wise error (FWE) 
correction at the cluster-level. 
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associated these regions with the anatomical labels amygdala, hippocampus, ventromedial PFC and 
the psychological concepts arousal, emotion, and valence for the positive association with changes in 
affect and with inferior frontal, parietal, dorsolateral, and working memory, task, and comprehension 
for the negative association with changes in self-reported affect (for a full list of the first 25 entries and 





Whole-brain parametric analysis with changes in affect. For corresponding brain plots, cf. Figure 5. 
    MNI coordinates 
Brain regions Side k t x y z 
       
Increased activation       
 Anterior cingulate gyrus R 1010 5.77 18 33 3 
 Caudate nucleus R 210 5.49 6 3 -6 
 Hippocampus L 148 5.4 -27 -36 0 
 Middle occipital gyrus L 119 4.45 -39 -60 0 
Decreased activation       
 Middle frontal gyrus R 765 5.44 45 18 45 
 Inferior frontal gyrus, pars 
orbitalis 
L 115 4.91 -39 18 -12 
 Angular gyrus R 219 4.57 54 -57 33 
Note. Clusters labeled according to the anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 
2002). Threshold: p<.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel- and p<.05 with family-wise error (FWE) 
correction at the cluster-level. 
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Figure 5. Whole-brain parametric analysis with changes in affect. Regions in which the BOLD signal 
was positively (yellow) or negatively (blue) related to changes in self-reported affect during image 
presentation in the emotion regulation task (across all conditions). Threshold: p<.001 (uncorrected) at 
the voxel- and p<.05 with family-wise error (FWE) correction at the cluster-level. For details cf. Table 
2.  
 
Neurobehavioral associations of up-regulation in fMRI and in daily life  
Participants who had higher average affect in the laboratory also had higher affect in daily life 
(r(63)=0.31, p=.01, Figure S2). 
Relation between VS activity and up-regulation in daily life. The association between VS 
activity during the up-regulation of positive emotions (PosUp>PosWatch) during fMRI was not related 
to the change in momentary affect during up-regulation in daily life (r(63)=0.00, p=.97).  
Exploring whole-brain activity, changes in affect, and affect in daily life. Participants with 
lower average affect in daily life (mean-momentary affect during the ESM phase) had a stronger 
association between the engagement of emotion-related regions (across the whole brain) and changes 
in affect during the emotion regulation task (r(61)=-0.30, p=.02, Figure 6).  
 
 
Paper II 74 
 
 
Figure 6. Link between affect in daily life and emotion-related brain activation in the laboratory. 
Mean momentary affect during the ESM phase was negatively correlated with the BOLD signal in 
medial frontal and subcortical emotion-related regions that showed a significant association with 




This study investigated neurobehavioral associations of the up-regulation of positive emotions 
during fMRI and their relation to emotion regulation and affect in daily life. Specifically, we tested the 
involvement of the VS in the experience of affect during the up-regulation of positive emotions. We 
found that VS activation was increased during the up-regulation to images, relative to passively 
watching them, irrespective of their content’s valence (positive or neutral). For positive images, 
increased VS activity was related to (1) higher between-person differences in self-reported affect and 
(2) greater within-person changes in affect during up-regulation. This shows that the VS is not only 
activated persistently across contexts but also tracks within-person changes in affect – suggesting a 
central role for the VS in the up-regulation of positive emotions. Against our hypothesis, VS activity 
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was not significantly related to changes in momentary affect when up-regulating positive emotions in 
daily life. However, an exploratory (whole-brain) parametric analysis showed that the lower a 
participant’s general affect in daily life, the stronger the involvement of a set of medial frontal and 
subcortical emotion-related brain regions (including the VS) in changing the affect during the task in 
the laboratory.  
VS activity during the up-regulation of positive emotions 
We did not find the VS to be uniquely activated during the up-regulation to positive images 
but also during the up-regulation to neutral images. Behaviorally, however, the up-regulation to 
neutral images did not change participants’ affect. Thus, in addition to the VS representing heightened 
positive experiences (Kringelbach & Berridge, 2009), it may serve another function during emotion 
regulation: VS activity may represent the general pursuit of an up-regulation goal (Ochsner et al., 
2012). This idea is in line with the meta-analytic finding of increased VS activity during the up-
regulation (as compared to the down-regulation) of both positive and negative emotions (Morawetz, 
Bode, Derntl, & Heekeren, 2017).  
Like in a previous study (Greening et al., 2014), we found that increased activation in the VS 
was associated with higher average levels of self-reported affect when up-regulating positive 
emotions. Hence, the strength of VS recruitment can be considered a neural indicator of between-
person differences in the ability to up-regulate positive emotions. We additionally found that increased 
activation in the VS was associated with greater moment-to-moment changes in affect during the up-
regulation of positive emotions. Thus, the VS seems to be sensitive to varying regulatory efforts that 
may result from factors such as the specific type (Heiy & Cheavens, 2014) or intensity (Silvers, 
Weber, Wager, & Ochsner, 2015) of the emotion to be regulated.   
Neural responses underlying changes in affect  
Our data suggest other brain regions and networks (in addition to the VS) to reflect changes in 
affective experiences. The whole-brain parametric analysis showed that changes in affect – also an 
index of successfully up-regulating positive emotions – were associated with activation in several 
brain regions that have been implicated in affective functioning, such as amygdala, hippocampus, 
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ventromedial PFC, and striatum (cf. our Neurosynth decoding results). This finding aligns with the 
‘affective workspace hypothesis’ that affective experiences rely on a flexible set of brain regions 
generally implicated in affective processing rather than on single brain regions representing positivity 
or negativity (Lindquist et al., 2016).  
Next to activation in these emotion-related regions, changes in affect were also associated 
with deactivation of a fronto-parietal network, comprising lateral parietal and medial as well as lateral 
prefrontal cortices, which has previously been related to goal-directed cognition in general (Spreng, 
Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010) and the cognitive control of emotions in particular 
(Ochsner et al., 2012). Studied mainly in the context of the down-regulation of negative emotions, this 
network has been repeatedly shown active during cognitive reappraisal (Buhle et al., 2014) and 
associated with within-person changes in negative affective experiences (Silvers, Wager, Weber, & 
Ochsner, 2015). In our study, similar prefrontal control regions were relatively less recruited with 
positive changes in affect. Two possible explanations for this finding are:  
First, deactivation in these prefrontal regions might indicate that increasing one’s positive 
affect (e.g., during the up-regulation of positive emotions) is less cognitively challenging and involves 
less cognitive control (“less suppression”) of subcortical emotion regions than, for example, the active 
down-regulation of negative emotions, as suggested previously (Morawetz et al., 2017). Put 
differently, the down-regulation of negative emotions may require (more) cognitive effort to change an 
emotional response (e.g., by altering its meaning through reappraisal; Buhle et al., 2014) while the up-
regulation of positive emotions may simply mean “admitting more” of an already existing emotional 
experience. Along these lines, participants find it easier to regulate their positive than their negative 
emotions (Kim & Hamann, 2007) and they do so more successfully in their daily lives (Heiy & 
Cheavens, 2014).  
Second, the present finding suggests that enhancing momentary affective experiences might 
initiate distinct processes compared to other forms of emotion regulation. A recent study found (beside 
activations in emotion-related regions) deactivation in right fronto-parietal regions for the endogenous 
generation of positive emotions (Engen, Kanske, & Singer, 2017). Thus, enhancing positive affective 
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experiences may more strongly draw upon emotion generation rather than alteration processes, 
compared to decreasing negative affect (Silvers, Wager, et al., 2015; see also Figure S3 and 
Supplement 1.4). In sum, the fronto-parietal control network seems to be relevant for the management 
of both positive and negative affective experiences. 
Relating neurobehavioral associations with emotion regulation and affect in daily life 
The hypothesized link between VS activity related to changes in affect during fMRI and shifts 
in momentary affect when up-regulating in daily life was not supported by the data. Also the 
association between average levels of affect during fMRI and daily life was relatively weak in our 
study. This may be due to methodological constraints that limit the comparability between measures 
from the laboratory and the real world. It could be, for example, that the capacity to change one’s 
emotional response upon instruction (as tested in the laboratory; Webb, Miles, & Sheeran, 2012), 
differs from the capacity to spontaneously regulate one’s emotions (as usually done in daily life).  
Interestingly, in participants with lower average affect in daily life, more variance of changes 
in affect could be explained with activation in a network of emotion-related brain regions (including 
the VS). This could indicate that the lower one’s affect, the more this “core set” is involved in pro-
hedonically changing one’s affective states. Speculatively, such changes could reflect reward-related 
processes: that is, people with lower average affect have lower expectations of positive events, which 
leads to higher reward-prediction errors and higher mood (Eldar et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2014). 
Fittingly, a meta-analysis found activation in a similar affective network during the experience of 
reward as opposed to loss (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011) and recent ESM findings by our group 
suggest that people with lower well-being benefit more (in terms of their momentary affect) from daily 
positive events (Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018).  
Limitations and further directions 
There are several limitations: First, as partly discussed above, there are inherent differences 
between emotion regulation in laboratory-based tasks and in daily life (e.g., standardized stimuli vs. 
idiosyncratic events or instructed vs. spontaneous emotion regulation). Future studies could aim at 
establishing a greater parallelism by, for example, having participants engage in spontaneous rather 
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than instructed emotion regulation during fMRI or by experimentally manipulating daily events (cf. 
Koval & Kuppens, 2012).  
Second, when investigating affective processes, it is important to consider the time-scale at 
which affective change occurs (Hollenstein et al., 2013). During fMRI, changes in affect are measured 
over seconds, whereas in daily life affective responses are assessed over minutes and hours. Thus, 
these two measures possibly capture different regulation processes (e.g., mood versus affect 
regulation). 
Conclusion 
By enhancing our positive emotional experiences, we can substantially improve the way we 
feel. This study highlights the relevance of the VS during the up-regulation of positive emotions by 
showing that not only between-person differences but also dynamic within-person changes in affect 
are supported by VS activity. The present findings further suggest that the ability to enhance one’s 
positive experiences might rely less on cognitive control processes, as indicated by the relative 
deactivation in a fronto-parietal network, and more on the capacity to endogenously generate 
emotions. Finally, people who tend to feel worse in daily life show a stronger link between neural 
activation in emotion-related regions (including the VS) and changes in their affective experiences. 
Together, these findings emphasize the role of the VS for positive affect and underline the importance 
of including both laboratory and daily life measures in the study of emotion. 
  
 





Big-Five Inventory (Lang & Lüdtke, 2005) 
Satisfaction with Life Scale; (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) 
Positive and Negatvie Affect Scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) 
Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Garnefski et al., 2001) 
WHO-5 questionnaire (World Health Organization, 1998) 
Emotion Regulation Profile-Revised (Nelis, Quoidbach, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 2011) 
Dispositional Positive Emotion Scales (Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006) 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) 
 
1.2 Emotion regulation instructions during fMRI original German wording 
„Willkommen bei dieser Studie.  
Sie werden verschiedene Bilder sehen, die unterschiedliche Emotionen hervorrufen können. Vor 
jedem Bild erhalten Sie eine Anleitung, was Sie tun sollen. Diese lautet entweder 'VERSTÄRKEN  
oder 'ANSEHEN'.  
Wenn Sie die Anleitung 'VERSTÄRKEN' sehen, versuchen Sie bitte, willentlich Ihre Gefühle zu 
verstärken, die Sie haben wenn Sie die Bilder sehen und welche die dargestellte Szene in Ihnen 
auslöst. Versuchen Sie also, Ihre Gefühle so intensiv wie möglich zu erleben.  
Wenn die Anleitung 'ANSEHEN' lautet,  
möchten wir Sie bitten, Ihre Gedanken und Gefühle einfach kommen und gehen zu lassen, so wie das 
natürlicherweise passiert. 
Vor und nach jedem Bild werden Sie gefragt, wie Sie sich gerade fühlen. Bitte bewerten Sie Ihre 
Gefühle auf  einer Skala von +3 (gut) bis -3 (schlecht), indem Sie mit der linken und rechten Pfeiltaste 
das entsprechende Kästchen wählen und dann mit der unteren Pfeiltaste Ihre Antwort einloggen. 
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Bitte antworten Sie spontan ohne langes Nachdenken. Sie haben max. 10 Sekunden Zeit um eine 
Antwort zu geben.  
Nach einer kurzen Pause werden Sie dann ein weiteres Mal nach Ihren Gefühlen gefragt. Wenn Sie 
noch Fragen haben, stellen Sie diese bitte jetzt dem Versuchsleiter.“ 
 
Free English translation 
„Welcome to this study.  
You will see different images that can evoke different emotions. Before each image you will receive 
an instruction about what you should do. This can be either “INCREASE” or “WATCH”. 
If you see the instruction „INCREASE”, please try to voluntarily increase your feelings, which you 
experience while viewing the images and which the depicted scene evokes in you. That is, try to 
experience your feelings as intensely as possible. 
If the instruction is „WATCH“, we kindly ask you to just let your feelings and thoughts come and go, 
as it naturally happens. 
Before and after each image you will be asked how you currently feel. Please rate your feelings on a 
scale from +3 (good) to -3 (bad) by choosing the corresponding box with the left and right button and 
then confirming your answer with the middle button.  
Please answer spontaneously without thinking too long. You have maximally 10 seconds to give an 
answer.  
After a short break you will be asked once more about your feelings. If you have questions, please ask 
the experimenter now.“ 
  
 




Table S1.   
Results from the linear mixed-effects model predicting change in affect and affect in the emotion regulation 
task 
 Self-reported affect  (post-image) 
Change in affect  
(post – pre-image rating) 
Variable Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Fixed Effects     
  Intercept 0.81*** 0.08 -0.30*** 0.06 
  Valence 0.76*** 0.07 0.79*** 0.09 
  Instruction     -0.04 0.06      -0.09 0.06 
  Valence x Instruction 0.28*** 0.08  0.29** 0.09 
Random Effects     
 Within-person 1.34  1.94  
 Between-person     
  Intercept 0.32  0.10  
  Valence slope 0.19  0.30  
  Instruction slope 0.07  0.05  
  Valence x Instruction slope 0.12  0.14  
***=p<.001  **=p<.01    
Table S2.   
Results from the linear mixed-effects model predicting affect when up-regulating positive emotions in daily 
life 
 Momentary affect 
Variable Estimate SE 
Fixed Effects   
  Intercept   0.92*** 0.11 
  Affect at previous occasion              0.14*** 0.02 
  Degree of emotion regulation                 0.29*** 0.03 
Random Effects   
 Within-person                 2.37  
 Between-person   
  Intercept                 0.69  
  Affect at previous occasion slope                 0.01  
  Degree of emotion regulation  slope                 0.02  
***=p<.001  **=p<.01   
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1.3 Deactivation for interaction: Follow-up analyses 
Extracted parameter estimates from the cluster [6, 48, 42] showed a significant valence by 
instruction interaction, F(1, 62)=19.5, p<.001. Pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference 
(t(62)=-4.57, p<.001) between NeuUp (mean b=0.21) and PosUp (mean b=0.04) as well as 
(t(62)=4.05, p<.001) between NeuUp and NeuWatch (mean b=0.04; Figure 3), suggesting that 
activation in this cluster was driven by increased activation in NeuUp. 
 
Table S3. 
Whole-brain analysis for the interaction, main effect of valence, and main effect of instruction.   
    MNI coordinates 
Brain regions Side k t x y z 
       
Interaction: deactivation       
 Medial frontal gyrus R 144 4.92 6 48 42 
Neutral > Positive       
 Fusiform gyrus L 6489 18.67 -27 -54 -9 
 Inferior frontal gyrus, pars 
triangularis 
L 
595 8.13 -54 
24 21 
 Inferior frontal gyrus, pars 
triangularis 
R 
431 8.02 54 
27 27 
 Supplementary motor area L 227 5.39 -12 18 66 
 Middle frontal gyrus R 307 5.25 24 15 48 
Watch > Up-regulate       
 Inferior parietal lobe R 399 5.8 45 -51 54 
 Middle frontal gyrus R 247 5.52 27 15 54 
Note. Clusters labeled according to the anatomical labeling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 
2002). Threshold: p<.001 (uncorrected) at the voxel- and p< .05 with family-wise error (FWE) 
correction at the cluster-level 
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Figure S1. Brain activation in the emotion regulation task (inverse interaction). Decreased brain 
activation was found in the right dorsomedial prefrontal gyrus for the interaction of valence and 
instruction. Follow-up analyses indicate that there was significantly less activation for up-regulating to 
positive images and passively watching neutral images than for up-regulating to neutral images. (No 
significant voxels were found for the main interaction contrast, cf. Table 1.) Threshold: p<.001 




Neurosynth terms that show an association with activation in brain regions that are 
parametrically modulated by changes in affect  
Neurosynth term r 
Increased activation  
 amygdala  0.190 
 fa 0.151 
 hippocampus 0.149 
 vmpfc 0.147 
 amygdala hippocampus 0.138 
 neutral 0.136 
 arousal 0.135 
 faces 0.135 
 ventromedial 0.134 
 ventromedial prefrontal 0.133 
 callosum 0.131 
 corpus callosum 0.131 
 corpus 0.130 
 cortex vmpfc 0.129 
 amygdala response 0.127 
 





















 emotion 0.124 
 putamen 0.123 
 emotional 0.122 
 hippocampal 0.120 
 valence 0.120 
 cingulate cortex 0.117 
 fearful 0.117 
 pain 0.116 
 limbic 0.116 
 reactivity 0.115 
Decreased activation 
 frontal 0.258 
 working memory 0.218 
 working 0.216 
 inferior frontal 0.211 
 task 0.206 
 parietal 0.202 
 inferior 0.196 
 comprehension 0.189 
 sentences 0.181 
 sentence 0.171 
 demands 0.169 
 linguistic 0.166 
 tasks 0.164 
 dorsolateral 0.161 
 language 0.160 
 parietal cortex 0.157 
 frontoparietal 0.156 
 fronto parietal 0.155 
 prefrontal 0.154 
 frontal gyrus 0.154 
 theory mind 0.148 
 syntactic 0.143 
 mind tom 0.142 
 speaker 0.138 
 semantic 0.130 
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Figure S2. Association between mean affect during fMRI and mean affect in daily life. Mean self-




Figure S3. Overlap between brain activation in the emotion regulation task (inverse interaction) and in 
the whole-brain parametric analysis with changes in affect. The BOLD signal that was negatively 
correlated with changes in affect (green; whole-brain parametric analysis across all conditions, see 
also Table 2 and Figure 5) partially overlaps (yellow) with deactivation for the interaction of valence 
and instruction (red; whole-brain analysis, [6, 48, 42], T=4.92, see also Table S2). Threshold: p<.001 
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1.4 Deactivation for interaction and deactivation of whole-brain parametric analysis 
In its medial part, the fronto-parietal network overlapped with the deactivation of the 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) cluster found in the interaction of valence and instruction (see 
above and Figure S3 for the overlap). As this cluster was solely deactivated during the up-regulation 
of positive emotions, it further supports the idea that successful up-regulation of positive emotions, at 
least partly, depends on the deactivation of prefrontal control systems. However, if one understands 
the deactivation of the dmPFC cluster as a significant increase in activation for the up-regulation to 
neutral images, this cluster could indicate that, similar to the regulation of negative emotions, 
regulatory efforts to neutral images require auxiliary cognitive functions (Miller & Cohen, 2001). 
However, these seem to be dissociated from changes in affect, as indicated by the behavioral data and 
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Abstract 
Within the study of emotions, researchers have increasingly stressed the importance of 
studying individual differences in emotion dynamics and emotional responding and the way these 
relate to more stable differences in well-being. However, there is no clear picture regarding affective 
reactivity to positive events and how different emotional reactions relate to differences in well-being, 
particularly higher levels of well-being. Theoretical work and empirical findings from different lines 
of research (e.g. clinical studies, aging literature, positive and personality psychology) support either 
of two predictions: Higher well-being is related to an enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to 
positive events in daily life. Testing these opposing predictions, we examined global well-being and 
affective reactivity to daily positive events in six studies using the experience-sampling or daily diary 
method (Ns = 70, 66, 95, 200, 76, and 101). Global well-being was measured with various indicators 
and a well-being composite score. Across the majority of studies, we found that higher global well-
being was associated with reduced affective reactivity to positive events in daily life, as shown by 
smaller decreases in momentary negative affect. In three of the six studies, higher well-being 
composite scores were also associated with smaller increases in momentary positive affect. These 
findings seem to suggest that people with higher global well-being profit less from the joy of a 
positive event they experience in daily life. Instead, for people with lower well-being, positive events 
might be a meaningful way to brighten one’s momentary mood.  
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Levels of well-being differ across individuals. These differences in well-being are not only 
apparent in the presence or absence of psychological maladjustment, but also in different levels of 
positive indicators of psychological adjustment, such as positive affectivity, happiness, or life 
satisfaction (Houben, Van Den Noortgate, & Kuppens, 2015). Research has uncovered various 
psychological factors that are associated with well-being, including, for example, personality traits 
(Deneve & Copper, 1998). In recent years, however, researchers have increasingly stressed the 
importance of investigating emotion dynamics and looking at individual differences in patterns of 
emotional responding over time when studying well-being. One form of emotion dynamics is affective 
reactivity, which can be conceptualized as the change in momentary affect in response to an external 
event (Sliwinski, Almeida, Smyth, & Stawski, 2009). Regarding negative events, research has 
revealed stronger negative reactions in people with lower levels of well-being and poorer health (e.g. 
Charles, Piazza, Mogle, Sliwinski, & Almeida, 2013; Piazza, Charles, Sliwinski, Mogle, & Almeida, 
2013). The picture is less clear, however, for reactivity to positive events. Some studies have found a 
link between increased affective reactions and higher well-being (Carl et al., 2014). Conversely, other 
studies have reported decreased affective reactions to daily positive events in people with higher levels 
of well-being (Oishi et al., 2007). Relatedly, theoretical explanations exist for both directions of 
effects.  Given the discrepancy in theoretical reasoning and empirical findings, the purpose of this 
study was to integrate the theoretical arguments and findings from the diverse lines of research (e.g., 
clinical, positive psychology, and aging literature) and to provide a large-scale and systematic test of 
whether higher global well-being is associated with enhanced affective reactivity to positive events in 
daily life or whether individuals with higher global well-being show decreased reactivity.  
To do this, we analyzed data from six different studies that used experience-sampling and 
daily diary methods. In accordance with Diener and colleagues’ (1999) definition of well-being, which 
includes both high levels of positive and low levels of negative affect, as well as life satisfaction 
(Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999), we assessed global well-being with indicators that measure 
cognitive and affective as well as positive and negative aspects of well-being. These indicators 
represent self-reported stable individual differences in how people feel and think about their lives in 
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general. We investigated affective reactivity to positive events including reactions to both momentary 
positive and negative affect. The use of these two outcome variables is in accordance with the finding 
that positive events are associated with positive and negative affect at the within-person level (Zautra 
et al., 2005). This approach is also in line with our study aim to integrate different literatures and 
findings from previous studies that have analyzed both ends of the valence dimension of affect as 
outcome variables. 
Increased Reactivity to Positive Events for Individuals With Higher Global Well-Being? 
There is reason to believe that the experience of intense positive emotions in everyday 
situations has adaptive benefits, and that intense affective reactions to daily positive events are 
therefore related to higher levels of global well-being. Research in the realm of positive psychology 
suggests that intense momentary experiences of positive emotions are linked to various beneficial 
outcomes such as increased global physical and subjective well-being (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). 
Specifically, positive emotions are thought to broaden people’s attention and thinking in ways that 
enable them to build up a host of personal resources (cognitive, psychological, social and physical). 
The latter eventually influence their global well-being (Fredrickson, 2001). Accordingly, it has been 
shown that broadened coping, thinking, and positive affect reciprocally enhance each other over a 
period of five weeks (Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002).  
Another theoretical account, the savoring account, adds to this more general notion on the 
adaptive function of enhanced positive emotions. Savoring, defined as the capacity to attend to the 
joys, pleasures, and other positive feelings that we experience in our lives (Bryant, 2003; Bryant & 
Veroff, 2007), results in the maximization and prolonging of positive experiences, that is, the 
enhancement of momentary affect. This, in turn, is thought to be positively related to people’s well-
being more generally.  Indeed, multiple studies have successfully linked the habitual use of savoring 
with higher levels of global well-being (Bryant, 2003; Quoidbach, Berry, Hansenne, & Mikolajczak, 
2010; Smith & Hollinger-Smith, 2015). Likewise, savoring tendencies in daily life, as measured 
through experience-sampling and daily diary studies, have been linked to momentary and daily 
measures of experienced mood and positive affect (S. L. Gable, Reis, Impett, & Asher, 2004; Gentzler, 
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Morey, Palmer, & Yi, 2013; Langston, 1994). Although savoring is mostly considered to reflect 
emotion regulation rather than unmodulated affective reactions, findings on the positive effects of 
savoring in daily life could be taken as indirect evidence for a positive link between affective 
reactivity and higher well-being. More specifically, savoring positive experiences enhances and 
prolongs momentary positive mood in daily life. This should also be reflected in enhanced affective 
reactions to positive events. In extension, enhanced affective reactivity to positive events, like 
savoring, should be related to higher levels of well-being. In line with this reasoning, one daily diary 
study that investigated affective reactions to positive events indeed found increased reactivity to 
positive events in participants with higher global positive affectivity and lower depressive symptoms 
(Carl et al., 2014).   
Further support for a potentially positive link between global well-being and reactivity to 
positive events comes from research in personality psychology. Extraversion, in particular, has been 
linked to differences in levels of affect and affective reactions. It has been proposed, for example, that 
the positive correlation between extraversion and higher dispositional positive affect is due to 
enhanced affective reactivity to positive stimuli and events (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). Several 
laboratory studies have indeed shown increased reactivity in the context of positive mood inductions 
in people with higher levels of extraversion (Gross, Sutton, & Ketelaar, 1998; Larsen & Ketelaar, 
1991). This link was not replicated in more naturalistic settings, however, despite the generally higher 
positive emotionality of extraverts (Howell & Rodzon, 2011; Lucas et al., 2008).  
Finally, some clinical research seems to suggest a positive link between affective reactivity to 
positive events and higher global well-being—because it reveals decreased reactions to positive events 
in individuals with low levels of well-being. More specifically, one prominent view from depression 
research holds that major depressive disorder attenuates affective reactions to specifically positive 
stimuli (Bylsma et al., 2008). This phenomenon, known as positive attenuation, conforms to mood-
facilitation theory, which states that moods facilitate the experience of like-valenced emotions 
(Rosenberg, 1998). A meta-analysis provided empirical support for this phenomenon: Affective 
reactions to positive stimuli in the laboratory were decreased in depressed participants, compared to 
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healthy controls (Bylsma et al., 2008). Since depression is characterized by low overall well-being, 
among other things, these findings support the emerging picture of lower well-being and reduced 
affective reactivity. From the opposite perspective, one would expect increased reactivity to positive 
events in individuals with higher levels of well-being.   
Decreased Reactivity to Positive Events for Individuals With Higher Global Well-Being? 
Despite this support for the assumption of enhanced affective reactivity in people with higher 
levels of global well-being, there are theoretical considerations and empirical evidence from other 
fields of study that lead to opposing predictions. One such account proposes that people with higher 
global well-being profit less from the joy of a positive event they experience in daily life (Oishi et al., 
2007). The reason for this is that people with higher levels of global well-being pay less attention to 
single positive events as they experience them frequently, leading to a habituation process. This idea 
was tested in a daily diary study in which participants reported positive events as well as their daily 
satisfaction. Global well-being was measured through the Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWL; Diener, 
Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Those participants with higher life satisfaction were indeed the 
ones with the weakest within-person relationship between daily positive events and daily satisfaction.  
Empirical studies from other lines of research further support this finding. A study on 
emotional development across the adult life span investigated affective reactivity to daily positive 
events in younger and older adults. The older participants, relative to the younger ones, showed 
smaller increases in positive affect, and, extending previous findings, also smaller decreases in 
negative affect in reaction to positive events (Röcke et al., 2009). Even though the authors did not test 
whether global well-being moderates affective reactivity, older people had higher levels of well-being 
in this study, as indicated by significantly higher average levels of trait positive affect. Serving as 
indirect evidence, this may also point to lower affective reactivity to positive events for people with 
higher levels of global well-being. Röcke and colleagues (2009) furthermore speculated that reduced 
affective reactivity to daily positive events is one way for older people to keep their overall affective 
states more stable, which, in turn, would contribute to their generally higher levels of well-being (e.g. 
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Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Riediger, Schmiedek, Wagner, & Lindenberger, 
2009).  
The idea that reduced affective reactivity is associated with higher well-being is in line with 
recent research on emotion dynamics. In fact, there is strong evidence from a recent meta-analysis that 
higher global well-being is associated with a less variable and more stable emotional life,  
characterized by less variable, less unstable, and less inert emotions (Houben et al., 2015). While the 
associations were stronger for negative emotions, positive emotional stability has also been associated 
with well-being (Gruber et al., 2013; Houben et al., 2015). Events and event-related variability in 
affect were not taken into account in these studies. Yet, it is reasonable to assume that the more 
adaptive patterns of affect dynamics should be reflected in less strong affective reactions rather than 
intense affective reactions to daily events. Hence, people with higher well-being should have relatively 
stable emotion dynamics, including reduced affective reactivity to positive events as compared to 
people with lower well-being.  
This assumption is complemented by the literature on affect intensity, which suggests that 
intense positive emotions are accompanied by emotional costs. For example, the opponent-process 
theory posits that in order to produce intense positive reactions in to a positive event, one first needs to 
experience intense negative affect (Solomon, 1980). Similarly, events are proposed to be appraised 
relatively to other events (Parducci, 1968; Smith, Diener, & Wedell, 1989). Therefore, for an event to 
be appraised as particularly positive, one must have experienced events that were appraised as 
particularly negative. The underlying rationale of these theories is that affective judgments are made 
relative to previous affective experiences. In line with this view, affect intensity, the strength with 
which individuals typically experience emotions, generalizes over emotion categories (Larsen & 
Diener, 1987). With regard to between-person differences in well-being, this seems to imply that 
enhanced affective reactions to positive events cannot be related to highest levels of well-being—
because the amplification of positive feelings is partly due to the experience of negative feelings.  
Propositions of the opponent-process theory can also be linked to the clinical literature. Major 
depressive disorder and elevated levels of depressive symptoms are associated with enhanced affective 
 
Paper III 95 
 
reactivity to positive events. In particular, studies have revealed stronger decreases in negative affect 
and stronger increases in positive affect in reaction to daily positive events in people with enhanced  
levels of depression (Bylsma et al., 2011; Nezlek & Plesko, 2003; Peeters, Nicolson, Berkhof, 
Delespaul, & deVries, 2003; Thompson et al., 2012). This effect is referred to as “mood-brightening 
effect”, and it supports the idea of opponent-process models. More importantly, these findings seem to 
suggest reduced affective reactions to positive events in people with higher levels of global well-
being, because they provide evidence for the opposite: increased reactions to positive events in 
depressed people that characteristically have low levels of well-being. Notably, these studies on 
affective reactions in depressed people in daily life rebut earlier findings from the laboratory that 
favored a mood attenuation effect in depression (see above)1. Together, the theoretical notions and 
empirical findings summarized in this section would predict that people with higher levels of global 
well-being should be those with smaller increases in positive affect and smaller decreases in negative 
affect when experiencing positive events. 
The Present Study 
Taken together, two different pictures emerged on how affective reactivity to positive events 
might be related to global well-being. Theoretical arguments exist for either of the two pictures—
increased or decreased reactivity to positive events (i.e., the mood-facilitation versus opponent-process 
theory). Empirically, the picture of increased reactivity in people with higher levels of global well-
being is largely based on laboratory studies or studies using trait and other retrospective measures of 
affective reactivity and well-being (Bryant, 2003; Carl et al., 2014). Instead, the picture of decreased 
reactivity in people with higher levels of global well-being is to a greater extent based on studies that 
employed methodological approaches particularly useful for investigating affective reactivity in real 
life, such as the experience-sampling method (Bylsma et al., 2011; Oishi et al., 2007). Finally, studies 
in support of either picture differ in their use of global well-being indicators (e.g., depressive 
symptoms versus life satisfaction) and their measures of momentary affect (i.e., momentary positive 
versus momentary negative affect). This diversity calls for a large-scale and systematic test of the 
issue at stake, and this is what we aimed to do in this study. 
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We tested whether higher levels of global well-being are associated with increased or 
decreased reactivity to positive events in daily life. We tentatively expected higher global well-being 
to be related to reduced affective reactivity to positive events, as indicated by most studies that used 
similar methodological approaches. These studies, using experience sampling and other intense 
longitudinal designs, generate information on affective reactivity by using online reports of feelings in 
ecologically valid environments. Global well-being is assessed through retrospective reports in these 
studies. The former captures emotional experiences in the moment, while the latter is supposed to rely 
on memory and more general beliefs about oneself (i.e., representing semantic knowledge; (Robinson 
& Clore, 2002a, 2002b). Thus, these measures capture distinguishable aspects of the person and share 
comparatively little method variance. While experience sampling studies lack experimental control 
(e.g., of exposure to certain events and the report of such), they are informative on the link between 
well-being and momentary affective processes as they occur in real life.  
To test the relationship between affective reactivity and well-being, we used data from six 
studies that measured positive events and momentary affect in daily life, using the experience-
sampling or daily diary method. We expected the effect of major interest, the moderating effect of 
global well-being on affective reactivity, to be observable for both positive and negative affect as 
outcome variables.  
Method 
The data used in this study mostly come from previously published studies (central references 
are named below), so sample sizes were not specifically determined for this study specifically. They 
were based on previous experience-sampling/ daily diary studies conducted by the respective principal 
investigator. 
Study 1. This study was conducted with a sample of 70 students (50,0 % women), aged 
between 20 and 30 years (M = 25.6, SD = 2.7 years) from Berlin, Germany (see also Blanke & Brose, 
2017). The experience-sampling phase was scheduled between two laboratory sessions that were used 
for initial instructions and questionnaires. For the entire experience-sampling phase, which was 
conducted throughout nine consecutive days, participants carried smartphones (Huawei Ascend G330) 
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with them. On each day, six beeps were scheduled semi-randomly within a time frame of 12 hours. 
Participants responded to 54 beeps on average (SD = 3.2). They were, on average, reimbursed with a 
total of 65 Euros (depending on the number of beeps completed). The study was approved by the 
ethics committee of the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. 
Study 2. The analyses were conducted with a sample of 66 participants (48.5% women), aged 
between 18 and 30 years (M = 24.9, SD = 3.8) from three different sites in Germany. The participants 
were part of a larger sample (N = 378) ranging from 14 to 86 years of age from the first assessment 
wave of the Multi-Method Ambulatory Assessment Project (see also Riediger, 2018; Riediger et al., 
2009). Only a subsample of this larger sample was used in the present study in order to have a 
comparable age range of participants across studies. After an initial pre-interview during which 
participants filled in questionnaires, the experience-sampling phase started with six daily assessments 
(scheduled semi-randomly within a 12-hour time frame) on nine days throughout three weeks, during 
which participants carried smartphones (Nokia E50). Participants responded to 55 beeps on average 
(SD = 4.2). They were reimbursed with a total of 100 Euros. The study was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin.  
Study 3. This sample consisted of 95 students (56.1% women) aged between 18 and 24 years 
(M = 19.1, SD = 1.3) from Leuven, Belgium. The sample was drawn from a larger participant pool (N 
= 439) that included participants who had been pre-screened for depressive symptoms in order to 
ensure a wide range of well-being levels (see also Brans, Koval, Verduyn, Lim, & Kuppens, 2013). 
Participants came to the laboratory for an introductory session, during which they received initial 
instructions, filled in questionnaires, and received a palmtop computer (Tungsten E2). During the 
subsequent 7-day experience-sampling phase, participants could respond to a maximum of 10 beeps 
that were scheduled semi-randomly (within a 12-hour time frame) throughout each day. Participants 
responded to 61 beeps on average (SD = 4.4). They were reimbursed a total of 70 Euros. The study 
was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Leuven. 
Study 4. This study was conducted with a sample of 200 students (55.0 % women), aged 
between 17 and 24 years (M = 18.3, SD = 1.0) from Leuven, Belgium. As in Study 3, participants were 
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drawn from larger participant pool (N = 686) that included participants who were pre-screened for 
depressive symptoms. After an introductory session, during which participants filled in questionnaires, 
participants received a smartphone (Motorola Defy Plus) that they carried with them for the next seven 
days, programmed to beep 10 times semi-randomly throughout the day (within a time frame of 12 
hours). Participants responded to 61 beeps on average (SD = 6.3). Participants were reimbursed with a 
total of up to 120 Euros. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of Leuven. 
Study 5. This study was conducted with a sample of 76 students (50.7% women), aged 
between 20 and 25 years (M =21.9, SD = 1.6) from Berlin, Germany. The experience-sampling phase 
was part of a larger study that also included a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) session 
(the order of fMRI session and experience-sampling phase was counterbalanced between participants). 
During an introductory session, participants filled out questionnaires and received instructions for the 
experience-sampling phase starting the following day. Participants carried smartphones (Huawei 
Ascend G330) with them, which were programmed to beep semi-randomly 6 times (within a 12-hour 
time window) for 2 periods of 5 days, separated by a break of 2 days. Participants responded to 56 
beeps on average (SD = 8.4). Participants were reimbursed with a total of up to 90 Euros. The study 
was approved by the ethics committee of the Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain 
Sciences, Leipzig. 
Study 6. The sample consisted of 101 participants (51.5% women) aged between 20 and 31 
years (M = 25.6, SD = 2.7) from Berlin, Germany. All participants took part in a larger study, the 
COGITO study. Participation in this study included a microlongitudinal testing phase of an average of 
101 occasions (SD = 2.7) with 1-hour close-to-daily testing sessions at the laboratory (the 101 
occasions were spread out across 162 days, on average). Each participant also took part in an 
additional pre- and posttest of 2 weeks (see also Brose, Schmiedek, Lövdén, & Lindenberger, 2011). 
Again, only a subsample of the COGITO study was used in order to have a comparable age range 
across all studies. During the daily testing sessions, participants completed, among other tasks, daily 
diary self-reports. Participants were reimbursed with a total of 1450 to 1950 Euros, depending on how 
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quickly they completed the study. The study was approved by the ethics committee of the Max Planck 
Institute for Human Development, Berlin.   
Measures 
This is a summary of the main variables assessed in all studies. For an overview of the 
measurement specifics for each study, see Table 1.  
Momentary positive and negative affect: Affective experiences were measured at each 
occasion using various affect items. These were then used to calculate aggregate scores for positive 
affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) at each occasion (i.e., each beep / day). Importantly, Study 5 used 
bipolar affect items for the measurement of momentary affect. These items thus represent an overall 
score of momentary affect, which is reported under PA in the following. 
Positive events: Positive events were assessed by one of three means: (a) event occurrence 
(Studies 1, 2, and 3), i.e., by asking participants to report whether anything pleasant had happened 
since the last beep; (b) event intensity (Studies 4 and 5), i.e., by asking participants to rate the intensity 
of the most pleasant experience they had had since the last beep; or (c) a list of event categories (Study 
6), i.e., by asking participants to report if they had experienced different types of events, followed by 
an evaluation of the valence of the events on that day. The reported positive events from the list of 
event categories were then dummy-coded, while event intensity was used as a continuous variable.  
Global well-being: Global well-being was assessed with the following trait questionnaires: the 
Satisfaction with Life Scale (SWL; Diener et al., 1985); the Life Appraisal Scale (SLB; Ferring, 
Filipp, & Schmidt, 1996), also measuring life satisfaction; the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), measuring affective well-being; the CES-D (Radloff, 
1977), measuring depressive symptoms. Individual scores for each questionnaire were calculated by 
averaging across each scale’s scores. Additionally, aggregated PA and aggregated NA scores from the 
experience sampling (aggregated per person and across time) were taken as an additional indicator for 
global well-being. They thus represent average levels of PA and NA across each study period.  
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Table 1. 
Overview of Measure Specifics for Each Study 
 Study 1 (N = 70, Germany) Study 2 (N = 66, 
Germany) 
Study 3 (N = 95, 
Belgium) 
Study 4 (N = 200, 
Belgium) 
Study 5 (N = 76, 
Germany) 
Study 6 (N = 101, 
Germany) 
Measurement method (state level) 
 ESM ESM ESM ESM ESM Daily Diary 
PA items (ESM / Daily Diary) 






• Relaxed  
• Happy  
• Relaxed  
• Happy  
• Relaxed / Tense 
• Bad / Good 
• Well / Unwell 
• Tired / Awake 
• Agitated / Calm 












NA items (ESM / Daily Diary) 














• Anxious  
• Angry 





 7-point scale from 0 (does 
not apply at all) to 6 
(applies strongly) 
7-point scale from 0 
(does not apply at all) to 
6 (applies strongly) 
Slider scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 100 (very much) 
Slider scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 100 (very much) 
7-point scale from -3 (not 
at all) to +3 (very strongly) 
8-point scale from (does 
not apply at all) to 7 
(applies very well) 
Reference frame 
 Since waking up/ since the 
last beep 
Current (at the moment 
of the beep) 
Current (at the moment of 
the beep) 
Current (at the moment of 
the beep) 
Current (at the moment of 
the beep) 
Current (at the moment of 
the self-report) 
Event occurrence (question) 
 Did anything pleasant 
happen since the last beep? 
Since the last time we 
asked / waking up, have 
you done anything 
pleasurable or that made 
you happy, or thought 
about anything like this? 
Think about the most 
positive event that has 
occurred since the last 
beep. How intense was this 
event? 
Think about the most 
positive event that has 
occurred since the last 
beep. How intense was 
this event? 
Think about the most 
pleasant event that has 
occurred since the last 
beep / waking up. How 
much did you have 
positive feelings from the 
event? 
Since the last time you 
came to the lab or later 
during this day, did you or 
do you expect to 
experience the following 
event? Event types: 
argument, disagreement, 
 
Paper III 101 
 
overload, some event 
related to work, a friend, 
health, leisure, to finances 
Answering scale 
 Yes / No Yes / No Yes / No Slider scale from 0 (there 
was no event) to 100 (very 
positive) 
7-point scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 6 (very much) 
4-point scale from: 0 (did 
not occur) to 4 (did occur 
and affected me strongly);  
Valence rating: negative, 
slightly negative, neutral, 
slightly positive, positive;  
aggregated into 
dichotomous variable (0/1)  
Global well-being (trait level) 
Life satisfaction 
 SWL, 5 items LSB, 15 items SWL, 5 items SWL, 5 items SWL, 5 items SWL, 5 items 
Answering scale 
 7-point scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree) 
7-point scale from 1 
(does not apply to me at 
all) to 7 (completely 
applies to me) 
7-point scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree) 
7-point scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree) 
7-point scale from 1 
(completely disagree) to 7 
(completely agree) 
8-point scale from 0 (not at 
all) to 7 (very often) 
Affectivity 
 PANAS, 20 items + 6 
additional adjectives 
 PANAS, 20 items PANAS, 20 items PANAS, 20 items PANAS, 20 items 
Answering scale 
 5-point scale from 1 (very 
little to never) to 5 
(extremely) 
 5-point scale from 1 (very 
little to never) to 5 
(extremely) 
5-point scale from 1 (very 
little to never) to 5 
(extremely) 
5-point scale from 1 (very 
little to never) to 5 
(extremely) 
8-point scale from 0 (does 
not apply at all) to 7 
(applies very well) 
Depressive symptoms 
 CES-D, 20 items  CES-D, 20 items CES-D, 20 items  CES-D, 20 items 
Answering scale 
 5-point scale from 0 (never) 
to 4 (always) 
 4-point scale from 1 (rarely 
or none of the time, less than 
1 day) to 4 (most or all of the 
time, 5–7 days) 
4-point scale from 1 (rarely 
or none of the time, less than 
1 day) to 4 (most or all of 
the time, 5–7 days) 
 8-point scale from 0 (does 
not apply at all) to 7 
(applies very well) 
Note. ESM = experience sampling method; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; SWL = Satisfaction with Life Scale; LSB = Life Appraisal Scale; PANAS = 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale  
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Well-being composite scores: We used principal component analyses to additionally compute 
well-being composite scores for each study2. These analyses revealed that in each study well-being 
had one underlying factor that accounted for at least 50% of the variance3, thus conforming to previous 
studies that used composite scores of well-being (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). Moreover, the loadings of 
the different indicators were rather high and comparable in size, which means that they contributed to 
equal amounts of the variances in the component scores. This supports our broad conceptualization of 
well-being, including positive and negative indicators as well as cognitive and affective components of 
well-being. The composite scores were used as additional indicators of well-being, with the advantage 
that they provide a simplified picture of the study’s central findings. 
Analyses 
We used multilevel modeling to account for the hierarchical data structure, i.e., the nesting of 
occasions within participants. For our main analyses we used the following models (with PA and NA 
as criterion variables; equations are only provided for the example of PA): 
PAti = β0i + β1i × (timeti) + β2i × (positive eventti) + rti  (Level 1) 
 β0i = γ00 + γ01 × (well-beingi) + µ0i   (Level 2) 
β1i = γ10 + µ1i 
 β2i = γ20 + γ21 × (well-beingi) + µ2i  
At Level 1, we modeled affective reactivity. In the equation, Level-1 PA of person i on 
occasion t is predicted by the intercept β0i, the time-related change in affect β1i, and the occurrence of a 
positive event, β2i. At Level 2, we entered global well-being as a covariate. Here, β0i is a function of 
the average initial level of PA (γ00), as well as of between-person differences in global well-being 
(γ01). The slope, β2i, is a function of the average within-person relationship between the occurrence of 
a positive event and PA (γ20), and, most importantly, person differences in well-being (γ21). That is, γ21 
reflects the moderating effect of global well-being on affective reactivity to positive events. For the 
time-related change in affect, β1i, we modeled an average linear slope at Level 2. All residual 
variances (at Level 1 and Level 2; rti, µ0i, µ1i, µ2i) were modeled. For all Level 2 predictors (i.e., global 
well-being indicators), separate multilevel models were estimated. Event occurrence, the Level-1 
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predictor, was person-mean centered, while all well-being indicators, the Level-2 predictors, were 
grand-mean centered. Affective reactivity in Studies 1 to 3 and 6 can be interpreted as the deviation in 
momentary affect on occasions at which participants reported a positive event, in comparison to levels 
of momentary affect on occasions without a positive event. In contrast, in Studies 4 and 5, affective 
reactivity is the change in levels of momentary affect as a function of the change in perceived intensity 
of the event.  
To get at metrics that are comparable across studies, other than the unstandardized regression 
coefficients that are commonly obtained from multilevel models, we calculated Pseudo-R2 statistics, as 
an approximation for the strength of the interaction. This Pseudo-R2 statistic was calculated as the 
change in slope variance from a baseline model (including the Level-1 and Level-2 predictors without 
the cross-level interaction) to the final model (including the cross-level interaction). Since the analyses 
resulted in a large total amount of specified models (multiple well-being measures x 6 studies), 
detailed results are reported in the supplement. The relevant parameters of the cross-level interactions 
(well-being moderating affective reactivity to positive events, γ21), our main interest in, are reported in 
detail. In order to increase comparability across studies – and in the absence of meta-analytic tools for 
coefficients from multilevel models – we additionally calculated correlations of well-being indicators 
with the person-specific reactivity slopes. For this purpose, we specified affective reactivity models 
without Level-2 variables (i.e., no well-being indicators) and estimated person-specific slopes. These 
person-specific estimates reflect each person’s affective reactivity to positive events. We correlated 
these estimates with all global well-being indicators. These correlations give another approximation to 
a standardized measure of effect and were used to display our results graphically.  
Results 
Descriptive information (means and standard deviations) for each study and Level-2 well-
being indicator is provided in Table 1 in the supplement (due to the large amount of information). 
Regarding affective reactivity, participants experienced reliably higher PA and lower NA on occasions 
with a positive event, compared to occasions without a positive event, in Studies 1, 2, 3, and 6. In 
Studies 4 and 5, PA increased, and NA decreased significantly, as the perceived intensity of positive 
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events increased (see Table 2 in supplement). Additionally, there was a main effect of global well-
being. That is, higher global well-being, as indicated by either high scores on the well-being composite 
scores or positive indicators (SWL, Trait PA, Aggregated PA), or low scores on negative indicators of 
well-being (CES-D, Trait NA, and Aggregated NA), respectively, predicted higher levels of PA and 
lower NA in daily life in all studies (for a few exceptions in Study 6, see Table 2 in supplement). 
Within each study, positive indicators of global well-being correlated positively with each other and 
negatively with negative indicators of global well-being (with a few exceptions in Studies 4 and 6, 
please see Table 2).  
In the following, we will report in detail how the well-being composite scores moderate 
positive event reactivity (i.e., increases in PA and NA at occasions on which individuals reported a 
positive event). With this focus on the composite scores, we mean to condense and simplify the 
emerging pattern of moderation effects. This is followed by a brief summary of how the individual 
well-being indicators moderate positive event reactivity (first for positive indicators, then negative 
indicators). In Tables 3 and 4, we report the moderating effects for well-being on the within-person 
relationship between positive events and momentary affect. That is, we only report the estimates for 
the parameter γ21 that indicate the cross-level interaction (i.e., whether global well-being at Level-2 
interacts with positive events at Level-1 in the prediction of PA and NA). We also report the Pseudo-
R2 statistics for these cross-level interactions in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. For a complete report of 
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Table 2. 






indicator 1 2 3 4 5 
  




          
 
1. SWL      
2. Trait PA        .51**                  
 
2. Trait PA -     
3. CES-D       -.41**       -.37*           
 
3. CES-D - -    
4. Trait NA  -.34*       -.59*        .56**   
 
4. Trait NA - - -   
 
 
   
 
       5. Agg. PA        .42**        .47**       -.44**       -.38*  
 
5. Agg. PA        .47** - - - 
 6. Agg. NA       -.35*       -.35*        .58**        .43**       -.46** 6. Agg. NA   -.31** - - -      -.43** 






indicator 1 2 3 4 5 
  
1 2 3 4 5 
1. SWL      
 
1. SWL      
2. Trait PA        .55**     
 
2. Trait PA        .42**     
3. CES-D       -.60**       -.42**    
 
3. CES-D       -.54**      -.42**    
4. Trait NA       -.63**        .70**        .70**   
 
4. Trait NA       -.31**  -.13        .50**   
             5. Agg. PA        .53**       -.52**       -.60**       -.58** 
  
5. Agg. PA        .39**       .32**       -.45**      -.27** 
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6. Agg. NA       -.56**        .39**        .62**        .63**       -.62** 
 
6. Agg. NA       -.29**      -.15*        .42**       .51**      -.43** 






indicator 1 2 3 4 5   1 2 3 4 5 
1. SWL       1. SWL      
2. Trait PA        .67**      2. Trait PA        .37**     
3. CES-D - -     3. CES-D       -.41*      -.39**    
4. Trait NA       -.46**       -.44** -    4. Trait NA       -.32*       .04        .35**   
             
5. Agg. PA    .30*      .52**     -.3*    5. Agg. PA        .34**       .34**       -.24**      -.13  
6. Agg. NA - - - - -  6. Agg. NA       -.20*      -.17*    .40*       .33**       .11 
Note. WB = Well-being; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; SWL = Satisfaction with Life Scale; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
Depression Scale; Agg. = Aggregated 
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PA as outcome variable; well-being composite score at trait level. Results for the moderation 
effects and PA as an outcome variable are summarized in Table 3. As shown, the well-being 
composite score was a significant moderator in three of the six studies (Studies 2, 3, and 4). 
Specifically, higher well-being composite scores were related to smaller increases in PA in reaction to 
positive events in these studies. Pseudo-R2 statistics indicated that the well-being composite scores, 
when significant, accounted for 8 – 25% of the individual differences in affective reactivity to positive 
events.  
The correlations between the well-being composite scores and the person-specific estimates 
were in line with the cross-level interactions from the multilevel models. That is, these correlations 
between the well-being composite scores and the person-specific estimates of the within-person 
association between positive events and PA were negative (Figure 1a). Together, higher scores on 
these well-being composite scores were associated with decreased within-person affective reactivity.    
NA as outcome variable; well-being composite score at trait level.  Results for the moderation 
effects and NA as an outcome variable are summarized in Table 4. For NA as an outcome variable, the 
well-being composite score moderated affective reactivity to positive events in four of the six studies 
(Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4). In these studies, higher well-being composite scores predicted smaller 
decreases in NA in reaction to positive events. Pseudo-R2 statistics indicated that the well-being 
composite scores accounted for 16 – 37% of the individual differences in affective reactivity to 
positive events in these studies.  
The correlations between the well-being indicators and the person-specific estimates were in 
line with these results. The well-being composite score yielded positive correlations with the person-
specific estimates of the within-person association between positive events and NA (Figure 1a). This 
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Table 3.       
Cross-Level Interactions Between Global Well-Being Indicators and Within-Person Associations Between Positive Events and PA 
































































































                   
SWL -0.08 0.04 4.8 -0.11* 0.04 16.9 -2.24* 0.69 14.0 -0.02* 0.01 6.3 -0.02 0.02 0.4 -0.02 0.02 2.9 
Trait PA -0.24* 0.08 25.8 -  - -1.83 1.57 -0.1 -0.02 0.01 0.6 -0.03 0.03 -1.8 -0.01 0.03 -1.7 
CES-D 0.06 0.08 -1.5 - - - 4.02* 1.88 6.6 0.05* 0.02 3.9 - - - 0.10 0.07 3.7 
Trait NA 0.09 0.07 3.5 - - - 4.16* 1.43 12.1 0.04* 0.01 5.3 0.03 0.03 0.4 0.03 0.02 5.9 
                   
Agg. PA - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Agg. NA 0.03 0.05 -1.4 0.29* 0.12 14.7 0.19* 0.08 8.1 0.003* 0.00 6.9 - - - 0.04* 0.02 3.5 


























































Note. WB = Well-being; L-2 × L-1 = Level-2 – Level-1 Interaction; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; SWL = Satisfaction with Life Scale; CES-D = Center 
for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; Agg. = Aggregated. Aggregated PA was not included as a Level-2 predictor for momentary PA, and not included in the 
WB composite score, due to statistical dependence between the outcome and independent variable. * p < .05  ** p < .001 
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Table 4.       
Cross-Level Interactions Between Global Well-Being Indicators and Within-Person Associations Between Positive Events and NA 
































































































                   
SWL 0.14** 0.04 17.5 0.05 0.03 3.3 1.85** 0.40 26.7 0.02** 0.01 9.7 -    - - -0.03 0.02 -0.61 
Trait PA 0.27** 0.08 17.7 - - - 1.13 0.94 0.4 0.02 0.01 1.17 -    - - 0.01 0.02 -3.8 
CES-D -0.29** 0.07 30.3 - - - -4.96** 1.04 29.2 -0.05** 0.01 8.4 - - - -0.09 0.07 5.4 
Trait NA -0.15* 0.07 5.7 - - - -4.64** 0.77 42.5 -0.04** 0.01 13.9 -    - - 0.02 0.02 0.68 
             -    - - -    - - 
Agg. PA 0.21** 0.06 17.4 0.19* 0.06 23.9 0.17** 0.04 24.8 0.002** 0.002 11.2 - - - -0.05 0.03 1.29 
Agg. NA - - - -     -       - -  - -  - - - - -    - - 

















































Note. WB = Well-being; L-2 × L-1 = Level-2 – Level-1 Interaction; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; SWL = Satisfaction with Life Scale; CES-D = Center 
for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; Agg. = Aggregated. Aggregated PA was not included as a Level-2 predictor for momentary PA, and not included in the 
WB composite score, due to statistical dependence between the outcome and independent variable. * p < .05  ** p < .001 
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Figure 1. Correlations between global well-being indicators and person-specific reactivity slopes. 
Higher scores on positive indicators of well-being (SWL, Trait PA, Aggregated PA, and WB 
composite score) yield negative and positive correlations with the PA and NA slopes (a – d), while 
lower scores on negative indicators of well-being (CES-D, Trait NA, Aggregated NA) yield positive 
and negative correlations with the PA and NA slopes (e – g). These correlations thus indicate a lower 
affective reactivity to positive events.  
Note. WB = well-being; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; SWL = Satisfaction with Life 
Scale; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. * p < .05  ** p < .001
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PA as outcome variable; positive and negative indicators of global well-being at trait level. 
Results for the moderation effect of each of the global well-being indicators on affective reactivity 
with PA as an outcome variable can be found in Table 3. In summary, higher global well-being, as 
indicated by higher scores on positive indicators of global well-being (SWL and Trait PA) as well as 
lower scores on negative indicators of global well-being (CESD-D, Trait NA and Aggregated NA) 
predicted smaller increases in PA across five of the six studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6) at occasions 
with positive events. As indicated in Table 3, 12 out of 22 of these interaction effects in these five 
studies reached significance. Pseudo-R2 statistics indicated that the well-being indicators, when 
significant, accounted for 4 – 26% of the individual differences in affective reactivity to positive 
events.  
The negative and positive correlations between the reactivity estimates and the positive and 
negative trait measures also indicate that higher global well-being is associated with decreased 
affective reactivity (Figures 1b – g). 
NA as outcome variable; positive and negative indicators of global well-being at trait level. 
Positive and negative indicators of global well-being also moderated affective reactivity to positive 
events with NA as an outcome variable, as shown in Table 4. In summary, higher global well-being, as 
indicated by higher scores on positive indicators of global well-being (SWL, Trait PA and Aggregated 
PA) and lower scores on negative indicators of global well-being (CESD-D and Trait NA) predicted 
again smaller decreases in NA across four of the six studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4). As indicated in 
Table 4, 14 out of 17 of these interaction effects in these four studies reached significance. Trait 
measures in these studies accounted for 6 – 43% of the individual differences in affective reactivity to 
positive events. Again, the positive and negative correlations between the reactivity estimates and the 
positive and negative global well-being indicators indicate that higher global well-being correlates 
with smaller within-person associations.  
Together, these results show that across the six studies, we found various significant 
moderation effects of global well-being on the affective reactivity to positive events. All significant 
effects showed that higher global well-being was associated with reduced affective reactivity to 
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positive events. When looking at the pattern of the results per study, we found that in four of the six 
studies (Studies 1, 2, 3, and 4) the majority of the tested effects were significant, with all of them 
predicting reduced affective reactivity to positive events for higher global well-being. Two studies 
(Studies 5 and 6) do not follow this pattern, with few to no significant effects.  
Discussion 
The central aim of the present study was to test whether higher levels of global well-being are 
associated with enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to positive events in daily life, the latter being 
in line with recent research on emotion dynamics and well-being. We found that individuals with 
higher levels of global well-being are characterized by decreased reactivity to positive events. More 
specifically, in four of six studies we found that in the majority of the tested effects, individuals with 
higher global well-being showed smaller decreases in momentary negative affect and in some 
instances also smaller increases in momentary positive affect in reaction to positive events. We found 
these effects for positive and negative indicators of global well-being, as well as well-being composite 
scores. The inclusion of these various global well-being indicators and two different outcome variables 
(positive and negative affect) across six studies is a major extension of previous research. Moreover, 
the significant moderation effects we found for the well-being composite scores nicely summarize the 
overall picture that was gained from the analyses with the individual well-being indicators, and in one 
study they even show the moderation effect more clearly (Study 2). As the well-being composite 
scores encompass both positive and negative well-being indicators, they add to the strength and 
generalizability of our results and underline the importance of global well-being as a moderator of the 
within-person relationship between positive events and momentary affective experiences.  
Reduced Affective Reactivity for Both Positive and Negative Affect 
In the present study we found reduced affective reactivity to positive events for individuals 
with higher global well-being. This effect became apparent in smaller decreases in negative affect, and 
additionally, though only in some of the studies, in smaller increases in positive affect in light of 
positive events. The relatively consistent pattern of findings for negative affect as an outcome variable 
is in line with results from clinical studies. Here, individuals with lower well-being (one major 
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characteristic of those with major depressive disorder or depressive symptoms) showed greater 
decreases in negative affect in reaction to positive events (Bylsma et al., 2011; Peeters et al., 2003). 
Specifically, the greater decreases in negative affect suggest that positive events not only bring joy 
into our lives. They might just as well ameliorate our negative affect. This might be of particular 
importance for individuals with lower levels of global well-being that have higher baseline levels of 
negative affect. Contrary, individuals with higher global well-being might not have the same need to 
improve their levels of negative affect, potentially explaining their comparatively small decreases in 
negative affect in response to positive events in our study. The idea that positive events may be used to 
dampen negative affect also fits in with the idea that positive emotions may accelerate recovery from 
negative emotions (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998). It is also in line with different studies that stress 
the adaptive function of positive emotions in times of stress (e.g., Ong, Bergeman, Bisconti, & 
Wallace, 2006). 
Other than expected, well-being did not moderate affective reactivity in Study 5, and the 
evidence for moderation was scarce in Study 6. There are some methodological differences between 
these and the other studies that might explain the differences in findings. First, in Study 5, bipolar 
affect items, representing overall momentary affect, were used instead of distinct measures of positive 
or negative affect. This less differentiated measurement of affect might have blunted an effect on 
either of the two affect valences. Second, Study 6 clearly diverges with respect to the time scale 
covered. The time interval between occasions was days and not hours as in the other studies. As a 
consequence it might be that other negative events occurred during the day and had interfered with the 
reactivity to positive events investigated in this study. 
Present Findings and Emotional Stability   
The present results are in line with various theoretical accounts and prior empirical findings. 
One such finding is that higher emotional stability of negative and, to a lesser extent, also positive 
affect, is related to higher levels of well-being (Houben et al., 2015). Yet, these authors’ meta-analysis 
did not consider affective reactivity in their study of emotional stability. Thus, our findings seem to 
complement these prior insights on emotional stability and well-being, perhaps even in a way that may 
 
Paper III 114 
 
initially seem counterintuitive: Even in the presence of positive events, emotional stability—in the 
sense of decreased responding—is related to higher levels of well-being. That is, less fluctuation in 
momentary positive and negative affect, reflected in various indicators including affective reactivity, 
seems to be a pervasive characteristic of people with higher levels of well-being. However, while our 
results suggest that reduced affective reactivity is characteristic of individuals with higher levels of 
well-being, we do not assume that individuals have reached such higher levels of well-being because 
of their reduced reactivity—an issue that we will discuss below.  
Even though our results align with the importance of emotional stability for global well-being, 
they somewhat contradict the idea that responding flexibly to changing emotional contexts is linked to 
adaptive functioning and psychological health (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). For example, flexibly 
adjusting one’s emotional responses to changing emotional stimuli in the laboratory is associated with 
higher trait resilience (Waugh, Thompson, & Gotlib, 2011), an indicator related to higher global well-
being. Relatedly, inflexible responding may be indicative of some manifestations of psychopathology, 
such as context insensitivity in major depressive disorder (Rottenberg, 2005). Therefore, responding to 
positive events in daily life would be deemed an adaptive response according to the flexibility view. 
At first glance, this seems to contradict the present findings. However, one needs to be careful when 
drawing such conclusions. As we investigated affective reactivity to real life events through the 
experience-sampling and daily diary method, we cannot control for the type of events reported, 
making it difficult to define the level of appropriateness or inappropriateness of an emotional 
response. It would therefore be possible that the observed smaller affective reactions in individuals 
with higher well-being reflect more adjusted responses. Furthermore, it could be that people with 
higher levels of well-being respond more flexibly to changes in the valence of emotional significant 
events. Thus, a higher flexibility does not become apparent in strong reactions, but rather in a quick 
adaptation to variations in positive and negative events in daily life.   
No Evidence for Enhanced Affective Reactivity  
None of the associations in our study were in in favor of the proposition of enhanced affective 
reactivity to positive events in people with higher global well-being. One explanation for this may be 
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that further increases in positive and decreases in negative affect when something positive occurs are 
merely more difficult to accomplish, as these individuals with higher global well-being already have 
high levels of positive and low levels of negative affect, respectively. That is, the potency of positive 
events seems to diminish toward highest levels of well-being. Importantly, those individuals with 
highest levels of well-being neither reached the ceiling of the scale measuring positive affect, nor did 
they reach the floor of the scale measuring negative affect. Furthermore, many observations go into 
the estimation of affective reactivity as measured in individuals with different levels of global well-
being (i.e., the number of occasions in each study). This diminishes the biasing effects of extreme 
scores on the reactivity estimates (i.e., the error components in the reactivity estimates should be low). 
This, in turn, reduces the likelihood that the observed results are due to regression to the mean.  
When viewed from the perspective of the savoring proposition, the findings of our study are 
indeed surprising. One possible explanation might be that individuals with higher well-being derive 
greater benefits in terms of well-being by savoring greater life events rather than small everyday 
events. For example, reminiscing about the past (one of multiple savoring strategies; Bryant, 2003) 
might prolong the positive emotional experience of these events, by keeping the memory of such 
events alive. Future studies with a focus on savoring positive life events would be able to shed light on 
this possibility.  
The present findings also diverged from other research in favor of enhanced affective 
reactivity in people with higher levels of well-being, in particular personality and clinical research 
(e.g. Bylsma et al., 2008; Gross et al., 1998). Notably, findings from both bodies of research were 
mainly based on laboratory studies, which could partly explain the difference in findings. For 
example, people with lower levels of well-being (e.g., people depressed people) are potentially less 
motivated to attend to the standardized stimuli that are usually used in laboratory settings, while in 
daily life the greater emotional relevance might foster their motivation to attend to the events they 
experience. However, to disentangle such context effects, future studies need to investigate affective 
reactivity in the laboratory and in daily life within the same individuals (see Koval et al., 2015, for 
such multimethod approaches). 
 
Paper III 116 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While one strength of the present study is the investigation of affective reactivity to positive 
events and global well-being across several studies and with various global well-being indicators, one 
noteworthy limitation is that to our knowledge, there is no established procedure for meta-analyzing 
cross-level interaction effects from multilevel analyses. We tried to confront this shortcoming by 
computing well-being composite scores through principal-component analyses, and by including these 
as well-being moderator variables in our analyses. Nevertheless, such a meta-analytic approach would 
have enhanced claims about reliability and the size of the found effects. Establishing such a procedure 
would be highly valuable for future studies dealing with similar data.   
Our results suggest that individuals with higher well-being are characterized by reduced 
affective reactivity to positive events. This relationship, as investigated in the current study, is purely 
correlational and does not allow for any conclusions regarding the direction of the effects. If we were 
to speculate about causal relationships among the different variables and about their potential 
developmental trajectories, the following more long-term dynamics seem possible. In periods of lower 
well-being, for example after the experience of a negative life event or during recovery from a 
depressive episode, daily positive events may gain in importance in the sense of brightening one’s 
mood. Such enhanced affective reactivity in periods of low well-being may, in the longer term, even 
lead to increases in well-being. The more one generally recovers from a negative life event or a 
depressive episode, the more positive events lose importance for general well-being—a decoupling 
occurs and well-being is no longer as contingent on positive events as it was during the recovery 
period. Recent findings on the long-term coupling of neuroticism and affective reactivity to negative 
events could be interpreted as being in accordance with this view (Howland, Armeli, Feinn, & Tennen, 
2017). Here, the strength of affective reactions to negative events as approached with experience 
sampling varied from year to year, and it became stronger as neuroticism and overall stress increased. 
That is, affective reactivity was also dynamic across a longer time scale in this study, and it was also 
related to global individual difference variables.  
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Another limitation pertains to the assessment of our positive event variable. Positive events 
were measured differently in two of our studies, namely using intensity ratings (Studies 4 and 5) 
instead of dichotomous items. Decreased reactivity for individuals with higher global well-being as 
found in Study 4 yields a slightly different interpretation in comparison to the studies with 
dichotomous event variables. While affective reactions generally increased as a function of stimulus 
intensity in this study as to be expected from the literature (see Table 2 in the supplement; cf. Larsen 
& Diener, 1987), individuals with higher global well-being actually show less such proportional 
increase. On the one hand, this reduces comparability across studies, but on the other hand, it shows 
that the observed differences in affective reactivity cannot be ascribed to differences in event intensity.    
Finally, as each study involves the re-analysis of existing data, it was not possible to do a-
priori power analyses to determine sample sizes needed to appropriately power the present research 
question. Nevertheless, we observed comparable effects in the study with the smallest (Study 1, N = 
70, number of occasions = 54) and the largest sample (Study 4, N = 200, number of occasions = 61). It 
thus seems that the different studies had sufficient power to observe the effects under investigation. 
Conclusions 
In summary, in the majority of our studies we found that higher levels of global well-being 
were associated with a reduced affective reactivity to positive events, in line with recent research on 
emotion dynamics and well-being. These results show that, even in the presence of positive events, 
less fluctuation in the experiences of positive and negative affect seem to be a defining characteristic 
of people with higher global well-being. Nevertheless, everyday positive events are part of daily life, 
and especially for individuals with lower global well-being, they seem to be a meaningful way to 
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10 General Discussion 
With the work in this dissertation I sought to contribute to answering the question of why 
some people are happier than others. With this in mind, the aim of this dissertation was to get a better 
understanding of subjective well-being – one commonly used scientific concept of happiness. 
Empirically, I approached this aim by investigating the affective processes – affective reactivity and 
emotion regulation – underlying short-term changes in positive affective experiences and their 
potential link to interindividual differences in subjective well-being. I initially presented two different 
lines of research that motivated this empirical approach. The first line of research provides a rationale 
for the study of positive emotions as a constituent element of subjective well-being, by positing that 
intense positive affective experiences are particularly beneficial for higher levels of subjective well-
being (Bryant & Veroff, 2007; Fredrickson, 2001). The second line of research emphasizes the 
importance of studying people’s changing affective experiences and behaviors, as these, over time, 
may impact the development of more stable emotional outcomes, such as subjective well-being 
(Wichers, 2014; Hollenstein et al., 2013). Specific research questions were addressed in three 
empirical studies that included investigations at the subjective and neural level as well as in the 
laboratory and in daily life. These research questions concerned (1) whether enhanced affective 
reactions to positive stimuli and greater increases in affect when up-regulating positive emotions, as 
measured in the laboratory, relate to higher subjective well-being, (2) which brain regions underlie 
within-person changes in positive affective experiences when up-regulating positive emotions, and (3) 
whether enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to positive events in daily life relates to higher 
subjective well-being.  
Major findings of each study are briefly summarized in Table 1. In the following, I will integrate 
these findings and discuss their contribution to the literature. I will focus on the overall picture that 
emerged in this dissertation of how affective reactivity and the up-regulation of positive emotions can 
be characterized at the subjective and neural level and how they relate to interindividual differences in 
subjective well-being. Finally, I will elaborate on limitations and potential implications for future 
research.  
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Table 1 
Summary of the Papers Contributing to this Dissertation 
Aims Findings Conclusion 
Paper I: Examine the relation between the 
successful up-regulation of positive emotions (as 
indicated by a performance-based measure), 
habitual up-regulation of positive emotions and 
subjective well-being.  
Up-regulating, as compared to reacting to positive 
film clips, did not significantly increase positive 
affect – likely due to the specific experimental 
design and particularly strong increases in positive 
affect in the reactivity condition. Successful up-
regulation of positive emotions was not 
significantly associated with trait emotion 
regulation. Further, only greater habitual, but not 
more success in up-regulating positive emotions 
seems to be related to higher subjective well-being. 
These findings show that people who up-regulate 
their positive emotions more frequently are not 
necessarily more successful at it, and only the 
former seems to be positively associated with 
subjective well-being. They furthermore point 
towards differences in performance-based and self-
reported measures of emotion regulation. 
Paper II: Investigate the neural correlates 
underlying the experience of affect during the up-
regulation of positive emotions and relate them to 
emotion regulation and affect in daily life. 
 
Increased activation in the ventral striatum (VS) 
was related to between- and within-person 
differences in affect during the up-regulation of 
positive emotions in the laboratory, but not when 
up-regulating in daily life. Further, increases in 
positive affect were associated with increased 
activation in medial frontal and subcortical 
emotion-related brain regions (including the VS) 
and decreased activation in a fronto-parietal control 
network. The lower participant’s overall affect in 
daily life, the stronger the involvement of these 
emotion-related brain regions when enhancing 
affect in the laboratory.  
This study highlights the role of the VS in the up-
regulation of positive emotions by showing that it is 
not only activated across contexts, but also reflects 
more transient changes in affect within individuals. 
The findings further suggest that enhancing one’s 
positive emotions might rely less on cognitive 
control processes than other forms of emotion 
regulation (e.g., the down-regulation of negative 
emotions). Finally, the study underlines the 
importance of including measures from both the 
laboratory and daily life in the study of emotion. 
Paper III: Provide a large-scale and systematic test 
of whether people with higher global well-being 
have enhanced or reduced affective reactions to 
positive events in daily life.  
 
Across six experience-sampling and daily diary 
studies, higher global well-being (as measured with 
various positive and negative indicators as well as a 
well-being composite score) was related to smaller 
decreases in negative and in some studies also 
smaller increases in positive affect in response to 
positive events. 
These findings show that for people with lower 
global well-being, positive events might be an 
effective way to brighten their momentary mood. 
Further, adding to previous research, they indicate 
that even in the presence of a positive event, less 
fluctuation in positive and negative affect seems to 
be a characteristic of higher subjective well-being. 
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10.1 Affective Reactivity, Emotion Regulation and Subjective Well-Being 
In the present dissertation I investigated the relation between affective reactivity, emotion 
regulation and interindividual differences in subjective well-being. Regarding affective reactivity, I 
tested the two opposing predictions of whether enhanced or reduced affective reactivity to positive 
events relate to higher subjective well-being. In respect to the up-regulation of positive emotions, I 
hypothesized greater increases in affect, when up-regulating positive emotions, to relate to higher 
subjective well-being. Across all studies, results showed that positive events and stimuli reliably 
elicited affective reactions and that these can be further increased through the deliberate up-regulation 
of positive emotions (for one exception see Paper I, and for a discussion thereof see 10.3). However, I 
did not find evidence for a link between enhanced affective reactivity to positive events or stimuli and 
higher subjective well-being or greater success in up-regulating positive emotions and higher 
subjective well-being in any of the studies. In one study, evidence was even found for the opposite: 
Higher subjective well-being was related to reduced affective reactivity to positive events in daily life 
(Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018). The overall picture that emerged in this dissertation therefore 
seems to speak against the idea that maximizing positive experiences implicitly (through enhanced 
affective reactivity) or explicitly (through the up-regulation of positive emotions) relates to higher 
subjective well-being.  
These findings seem to contradict theoretical work from positive psychology that stresses the 
beneficial effects of intense positive affective experiences for subjective well-being. The broaden-and-
build theory, for example, posits that positive emotions broaden people’s attention and thinking in 
ways that lead to increased personal resources and ultimately increased subjective well-being. 
Moreover, the savoring account suggests the process by which people derive joy from the positive 
experiences in their life – termed savoring – to be one of the mechanisms underlying higher levels of 
subjective well-being. Besides this emphasis on the importance of intense positive affective 
experiences for subjective well-being, the findings in this dissertation suggest that these do not seem to 
weigh much in the overall composition of subjective well-being. Instead, people with higher 
subjective well-being seem to even have reduced affective reactions to positive events in daily life 
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(Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018). This finding of reduced affective reactivity in people with higher 
subjective well-being aligns with empirical and theoretical work from research on affect dynamics. 
For example, one study showed that smaller increases in positive affect in response to daily positive 
events were related to higher life satisfaction (Oishi et al., 2007). The authors argued that people with 
higher levels of subjective well-being pay less attention to a single positive event as they frequently 
experience positive events, leading to a habituation process. The finding of reduced affective reactivity 
in people with higher subjective well-being also fits into the picture of greater overall emotional 
stability and higher well-being, as found in a meta-analysis on affect dynamics (Houben et al., 2015). 
The finding in this dissertation complements the findings reported in this meta-analysis: Even in the 
presence of positive events, is more stability in positive and negative affect (as indicated by decreased 
affective reactivity) related to higher subjective well-being. 
While I found affective reactivity to positive events to be reduced in people with higher 
subjective well-being in one study (Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018), no such association was found in 
the laboratory (Paper I) and no significant association – in either direction – was found between the 
successful up-regulation of positive emotions (i.e., greater increases in positive affect when up-
regulating) and subjective well-being (Paper I). One possible explanation for why no significant link 
was found between the affective processes and subjective well-being in the laboratory may be the 
method that was used to generate these findings. For example, in the laboratory, affective experiences 
are induced artificially through standardized stimuli, while in daily life these emerge naturally in 
response to personal events people experience in their lives. The smaller significance of the 
standardized stimuli in the laboratory might have dampened people’s motivation to further enhance 
their feelings. Thus, besides their potential greater capacity to up-regulate positive emotions, people 
with higher subjective well-being might not have engaged in up-regulation efforts to a full extent (for 
a detailed discussion on differences in findings across laboratory and daily life methods, see 10.5). 
Hence, it seems possible that a relation between the successful up-regulation of positive emotions and 
subjective well-being would have become evident when measured in daily life.  
However, given the overall picture that emerged in this dissertation (i.e., no evidence for a role 
of intense positive affective experiences in higher subjective well-being) it seems rather unlikely that 
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greater success in up-regulating positive emotions in daily life is related to higher subjective well-
being.  
Alternatively, it could be that in contrast to successfully up-regulating positive emotions, as 
assessed in the present dissertation, rather the flexible regulation of one’s positive emotions is central 
to subjective well-being. Flexibility in general has been defined as the capacity to shift affect and 
behavior in response to changing events or contextual demands (Hollenstein et al., 2013) and has been 
deemed essential for adaptive functioning and well-being (Kashdan & Rottenberg, 2010). Regulatory 
flexibility in particular, is thought to encompass the flexible use of different regulation strategies in 
accordance with one’s changing goals (Bonanno & Burton, 2013) and the flexible engagement in 
regulatory efforts based on the specific situation at hand (Blanke et al., 2019). Such regulatory 
flexibility might be of relevance for the up-regulation of positive emotions. It has been proposed that 
the efficiency of specific up-regulation strategies depends on the strength of one’s initial affective 
reaction, that is, the intensity of the affective experience to be regulated. For example, directing one’s 
attention to the present moment is thought to be more efficient when the experience to be regulated is 
rather intense, compared to when the situation is only mildly positive (Quoidbach, Mikolajczak, & 
Gross, 2015). Thus, the capacity to flexibly select the most efficient up-regulation strategy could 
reflect one component of regulatory flexibility in respect to the up-regulation of positive emotions. 
Alternatively, knowing when it is most beneficial to up-regulate one’s positive experiences might also 
be an important component of the flexible regulation of positive emotions. Savoring positive 
experiences, for example, has been shown to have the greatest impact on current affect when one only 
experiences few positive events (Jose, Lim, & Bryant, 2012, see also 10.3). Together, flexible strategy 
selection or flexible engagement in up-regulatory efforts might constitute an important aspect of the 
relation between the up-regulation of positive emotions and subjective well-being.  
In sum, the overall picture that emerged in this dissertation emphasizes the importance of 
taking dynamic aspects into account when aiming to understand the role of positive affective 
experiences in subjective well-being: Not the experience of intense positive affective experiences in 
the context of positive events, but rather less fluctuation in positive affect seems to be a defining 
characteristic of people with higher subjective well-being.  
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10.2 Neural Responses Underlying Changes in Positive Affective Experiences 
The aim of the present dissertation was to get a better understanding of interindividual 
differences in subjective well-being by investigating affective reactivity and emotion regulation as 
they unfold within individuals over time. This dynamic approach was substantiated at the neural level 
by an investigation of the neural correlates underlying within-person changes in positive affective 
experiences when reacting to positive stimuli or up-regulating positive emotions (Paper II). Focusing 
primarily on the up-regulation process, the findings showed that engaging in the up-regulation of 
positive emotions increased activation in the ventral striatum (VS), a subcortical region previously 
associated with positive affective processing (e.g., Vrtička et al., 2008), and this activation relates to 
within-person (i.e., trial-to-trial) changes in momentary affect. Thus, the strength of VS recruitment 
can serve as a neural indicator of the successful up-regulation of positive emotions, as indicated by 
increases in positive affect when up-regulating in laboratory settings. This finding further 
demonstrates that the previously found link between VS activity and between-person differences in 
affect when up-regulating positive emotions (Greening et al., 2014) also holds at the within-person 
level. For a discussion of the relation between VS activity during the up-regulation of positive 
emotions and changes in affect when up-regulating in daily life, see 10.5. 
Additionally, within-person changes in positive affective experiences (across both affective 
reactivity and emotion regulation) were related to increased activation in a “core-set” of medial frontal 
and subcortical emotion-related brain regions. This set comprised, next to the VS, regions such as the 
amygdala, the hippocampus, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which have previously been 
implicated in emotion-related processing (e.g., the amygdala in the detection of threat; Phelps & 
LeDoux, 2005). This pattern of neural activation fits with recent brain models of emotion that suggest 
affect to be reflected in brain networks rather than in single regions that operate in a valence-
dependent fashion (e.g., the VS or the amygdala; Berridge, 2019; Lindquist, Satpute, Wager, Weber, 
& Barrett, 2016). For instance, the “affective workspace” hypothesis posits that both positive and 
negative affective experiences rely on a flexible network of brain regions, which is implicated in 
affective processing more generally (Lindquist et al., 2016). Similarly, the “affective modes” 
hypothesis states that neural “modules” (e.g., brain regions or neurotransmitter systems) are not 
General Discussion 124 
 
 
permanently related to specific affective functions (e.g., processing of threat or reward in the 
amygdala and VS, respectively) but that these functions are subject to change, as conditions or 
affective states change (Berridge, 2019). Both models therefore assume distributed patterns of neural 
activity across networks to represent different affective states (Kragel & LaBar, 2016). The current 
findings add to this, by showing that not only the VS, but patterns of neural activity across an emotion-
related network of brain regions change with increases in positive affective experiences.  
Alongside, I found within-person changes in positive affective experiences to be also 
associated with relative deactivation in a fronto-parietal network (including lateral parietal and medial, 
as well as lateral prefrontal cortices). This fronto-parietal network has been shown active during 
inhibition and control processes for the down-regulation of negative emotions (e.g., Etkin et al., 2015; 
Ochsner et al., 2012). The present finding therefore could suggest that enhancing positive affective 
experiences – in contrast to reducing negative affective experiences – might rely more on the capacity 
to “suppress” these control functions to “allow more” of one’s (positive) affective experiences. This 
interpretation is in line with the mechanisms thought to underlie the up-regulation of positive 
emotions. In contrast to the down-regulation of negative emotions, during which affective reactions 
and regulatory processes are competing (Sheppes & Gross, 2011), affective reactions and regulatory 
processes are thought to reinforce each other during the up-regulation of positive emotions (Jose et al., 
2012). Hence, when up-regulating positive emotions, an already existing affective experience is 
further intensified and regulatory efforts are suggested to be inversely proportional to the intensity of 
the affective experience to be regulated (Quoidbach et al., 2015). In other words, when one has strong 
positive affective reactions, subsequent up-regulation should be comparable easy and effortless, while 
rather mild positive (or negative) affective reactions should require greater regulation efforts – and 
greater recruitment of this fronto-parietal control network.  
Taken together, the present findings at the neural level complement the dynamic approach of 
this dissertation, by showing that activation in the VS not only reflects the general capacity to (up-) 
regulate positive emotions, but also dynamic affective responses that are observable within 
individuals. Additionally, changes in positive affective experiences during affective reactivity and the 
up-regulation of positive emotions are mirrored by the neural responses in a set of emotion-related 
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brain regions and the fronto-parietal control network – with increased and decreased activation, 
respectively. The latter finding indicates that the neural mechanisms underlying changes in people’s 
positive affective states may be different from those underlying changes in negative affect.   
One finding in the present dissertation may even provide an indication for a possible link 
between the neural correlates of positive affective experiences, as identified in the present dissertation, 
and interindividual differences in subjective well-being. People with lower daily affect (an indicator of 
lower subjective well-being) enaged the emotion-related brain regions (as described above) to a 
greater extent when enhancing positive affective experiences in the laboratory. The stronger 
engagement of these emotion-related brain regions, especially given the involvement of the VS, may 
hint at a greater involvement of reward-related processes in these people during positive affetcive 
responding. Thus, people’s subjective responses to rewards at the neural level may pose one of the 
processes underlying subjective well-being. Though this remains to be tested, this shows that a 
thorough understanding of the neural correlates of the affective processes may ultimately also advance 
our understanding of interindividual differences in subjective well-being. 
10.3 Positive Affect Dynamics: Making the Most of the Least 
None of the findings in the present dissertation were in favor of the proposition that the 
maximization of positive affective experiences (through enhanced affective reactivity or the up-
regulation of positive emotions) relates to higher subjective well-being. One possible explanation for 
this may be that further increases in momentary affect are more difficult to accomplish for people with 
higher subjective well-being, due to their already high baseline levels of positive affect. Consistently, 
a previous study observed that savoring positive experiences had a greater impact on momentary 
happiness ratings for people who experienced positive events infrequently (Jose et al., 2012)  – an 
indicator of relatively lower levels of subjective well-being (Diener, Sandvik, & Pavot, 2009). Or 
viewed from the opposite perspective, it might be simply easier to enhance one’s current affect when 
one feels low, in line with the notion that positive emotions help to dampen negative affect and to 
recoer from negative and distressing experiences (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998).  
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Findings from this dissertation also lend support for this idea that people benefit most from 
maximizing positive affective experiences in times of lower well-being. In Paper I, I observed 
unexpectedly strong increases in positive affect in the reactivity condition, due to a possible drop in 
baseline affect before this condition (likely due to the preceding sadness-inducing film clip). Hence, 
participants might have (implicitly or explicitly) maximized their positive affect to brighten their 
mood. In Paper III, enhanced affective reactions to positive events were observed in people with 
lower subjective well-being, possibly also reflecting a mood brightening effect (Grosse Rueschkamp 
et al., 2018). Moreover, this moderation effect of well-being on affective reactivity was most 
consistent across for negative affect as an outcome variable. This indicates that people with lower 
levels of well-being mostly experience a drop in negative affect when experiencing positive events. 
Finally, in Paper II, participants with lower overall daily affect (average affect during the experience-
sampling period) more strongly engaged an emotion-related “core set” of brain regions (including the 
VS) when enhancing affect in the laboratory. As already discussed above, this may point to a potential 
stronger involvement of reward-related processes in these people. That is, people with lower daily 
affect may have lower expectations of positive experiences, which results in greater positive reward-
prediction errors when something positive occurs (i.e., the actual positive experience exceeds one’s 
expectations thereof) and subsequent increases in affect. Hence, it could be that when feeling 
comparatively low, one particularly profits from these (rather implicit) responses to rewards (i.e., 
positive experiences) in terms of their increases in momentary affect. In sum, these findings all 
underline the idea that maximizing positive affective experiences (through enhanced affective 
reactions or successful up-regulation)  may help people “make the most of the least” when feeling low 
(Jose et al., 2012, p. 185). 
10.4 Long-Term Dynamics of Positive Affective Experiences and Subjective Well-Being 
The approach of this dissertation to investigate the affective processes underlying short-term 
changes in positive affective experiences to better understand interindividual differences in subjective 
well-being has partly been motivated by theoretical work on the long-term dynamics of daily affect 
and well-being. This work suggests that people’s short-term responses to their changing affective 
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experiences accumulate and eventually impact the development of more enduring emotional 
outcomes, such as well-being (e.g., Hollenstein et al., 2013; Wichers, 2014). Accordingly, the 
recurrent heightened responses to daily positive experiences should lead to higher well-being.  
Findings in this dissertation are only correlational and therefore no conclusions can be drawn 
regarding directions of effects. Still, the reduced affective reactions in people with lower subjective 
well-being do not seem to be in accordance with the just mentioned theoretical ideas. Instead, I would  
speculate the following: People’s affective responses (e.g., affective reactions and up-regulation 
efforts) to positive experiences are of particular relevance when one feels low, such as in in times of 
increased stress or after experiencing a negative life event. In these times, people may experience 
particular strong increases in their positive affect when they experience something positive, given their 
comparably low baseline levels of affect (lower positive and higher negative affect; see also 10.3). 
Here, positive affective responses might reflect something like a “mood-brightening effect” (Bylsma 
et al., 2011, p. 155). Over time, the heightened positive affective experiences accumulate and 
eventually may elicit positive change in one’s levels of well-being. Importantly, with increasing levels 
of subjective well-being, positive events and related affective short-term gains (e.g., increases in 
positive affect) seem to lose in importance.  
These speculated long-term dynamics of positive affective experiences and subjective well-
being would deviate from those of negative affect dynamics and lower well-being. Here, it has been 
shown (in accordance with the above outlined theories on the coupling of short- and long-term 
dynamics) that heightened responses to daily negative experiences predict increases in future 
depressive symptoms (Brose et al., 2017). Thus, those people with the lowest levels of well-being are 
characterized by the strongest responses to daily negative experiences. This pattern clearly does not 
mirror the pattern found in this dissertation: People with highest levels of well-being were not to 
characterized by the strongest, but by the weakest reactions to positive events (Grosse Rueschkamp et 
al., 2018). It therefore seems as if the processes underlying negative affect dynamics and lower well-
being, as described by theoretical accounts and empirical findings, may not simply be transferrable to 
those underlying positive affective experiences and subjective well-being. This also becomes apparent 
in more short-term mechanisms, such as the differential psychological and neural processes underlying 
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the regulation of negative and positive emotions. While the former depends on the inhibition of an 
affective reaction, neurally supported by the recruitment of a fronto-parietal control network (Ochsner 
et al., 2012), the regulation of positive emotions rather works through the reinforcement of an affective 
experience and the suppression of this same fronto-parietal control network (Paper II). Together, the 
work in this dissertation points to fundamental differences in the basic mechanisms underlying short- 
and (as speculated) long-term dynamics of positive and negative affective experiences and global 
well-being outcomes.  
Importantly, also leading theories from positive psychology, which aim to explain positive 
affective functioning and particular high levels of subjective well-being, do not seem to describe the 
above speculated long-term dynamics of positive affect dynamics and subjective well-being. The 
broaden-and-build theory, for example, posits that positive emotions trigger upwards spirals towards 
higher subjective well-being (Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, initial positive affective experiences increase 
the frequency and intensity of future positive experiences and eventually lead to increased subjective 
well-being. Based on this, one would expect people with higher subjective well-being to experience 
the strongest positive affect – contrasting the finding of a relation between reduced affective reactivity 
and higher well-being in this dissertation.  
Even though the broaden-and-build theory does not seem fully capture the long-term dynamics 
of positive affect dynamics and subjective well-being, it, nevertheless, may provide an indication of 
some of the mechanisms through which positive affective experiences possibly elicit long-term change 
in times of lower well-being. For example, the broaden-and-build theory states that positive affect 
broadens people’s attention and behaviors in ways that, over time, help build psychological and 
physical resources (Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, positive affective experiences may trigger specific 
feelings, behaviors or thoughts in people with lower levels of well-being, which motivate them to 
explore and to engage in activities that they may otherwise to pursue (e.g., social encounters or 
physical exercise). These new experiences may then positively impact their psychological and 
physical functioning and eventually also their subjective well-being.   
General Discussion 129 
 
 
10.5 Assessing Affective Reactivity, Emotion Regulation and Subjective Well-Being 
Affective reactivity, emotion regulation and subjective well-being were assessed through 
different measures and methods in the present dissertation (for an overview of these measures and 
methods see Table 2). In the laboratory, affective reactivity and emotion regulation were assessed 
through self-reports of momentary affect when participants were instructed to react to or to up-regulate 
in response to standardized stimuli (e.g., positive images or film clips; Papers I and II). These 
measures at the subjective level were complemented through measures of BOLD-signal at the neural 
level (Paper II). Additionally, trait emotion regulation was assessed through self-reports of habitual or 
typical emotion regulation behaviors (Paper I). In daily life, affective reactivity was assessed through 
self-reports of momentary affect in response to self-reported daily events and emotion regulation 
through self-reports of affect and self-reported degree of up-regulating positive emotions (Papers II). 
Finally, subjective well-being was assessed either through self-reports (Papers I and III) or through 
self-reported momentary affective experiences in daily life that were then aggregated (Papers II and 
III). In the following, I will discuss how the different measures of affective reactivity and emotion 
regulation fit together and how they diverge. Additionally, I will discuss possible implications of using 
different methods in the study of affective processes and subjective well-being.  
Subjective and neural level. Measures of affective reactivity and emotion regulation at the 
subjective and the neural level showed both associations, as well as dissociable effects. At the 
subjective level, participants experienced increases in momentary affect when they reacted to positive 
stimuli in the laboratory and participants were able to further increase their momentary affect when 
instructed to up-regulate (Paper II). Overall, these findings were mirrored at the neural level: Increases 
in momentary affect (through either affective reactions or through the engagement in up-regulation 
efforts) selectively engaged a network of emotion-related brain regions. Increased VS activity in 
particular, known to be specifically involved in reward-related processes (e.g., Kringelbach & 
Berridge, 2009), was identified as a neural indicator for the successful up-regulation of positive 
emotions.  
However, there were also instances in which there was no clear mapping between reports of 
affective experiences and neural activations. First, VS activity did not relate to changes in affect when 
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up-regulating positive emotions in daily life, which is most likely due to the different methods used 
(i.e., task-based fMRI in the laboratory versus experience-sampling in daily life, see below). Second, 
the up-regulation in response to neutral stimuli was related to increased activation in the VS, which 
was not paralleled by changes in the subjective experience of affect. Given our experimental 
manipulation (i.e., instruction to up-regulate in response to neutral images), this finding points towards 
a different psychological function of the VS during the regulation process, such as the representation 
of a regulation goal (Ochsner et al., 2012).  
The inclusion of measures of affective reactivity and emotion regulation at the neural level, in 
addition to observations at the subjective level, has helped identify the brain regions that underlie the 
affective processes. However, the present findings at the neural level also led to insights that would 
not be obtainable by relying on the level of subjective experience alone: Increases in positive affective 
experiences were not only associated with activation in emotion-related brain regions but also with 
deactivation of the fronto-parietal network, likely suggesting relative less recruitment of cognitive 
control functions when enhancing positive affective experiences. In sum, the present findings show 
that the investigation of affective reactivity and emotion regulation through both subjective and 
physiological data can substantially advance our understanding of the affective processes. 
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Table 2  
Overview of Measures and Methods Used to Assess Affective Reactivity, Emotion Regulation, and Subjective Well-Being in the Present Dissertation 
  Laboratory Daily life 
  Subjective experience Neural level Subjective experience 
  Emotion regulation paradigm Self-reports fMRI ESM / Daily Diary 
Affective reactivity 
Paper I Change in PA when instructed to react to positive film clip    
Paper II 
Change in overall affect when 
instructed to react to positive 
images 
 
BOLD signal when 
reacting to positive 
images 
 
Paper III    
Within-person association 
between PA/NA/overall 
affect and positive events 
Emotion regulation 
Paper I 
Change in PA when instructed to 
up-regulate versus reacting to 
positive film clip 
Habitual emotion regulation 
[CERQ, ERQ, ERP-R]   
Paper II 
Change in overall affect when 
instructed to up-regulate versus 
reacting to positive images 
 
BOLD signal when 
instructed to up-
regulate (versus 
reacting) to positive 
images 
Change in overall 





Paper I  Cognitive and affective component [SWL, PANAS positive, WHO]   
Paper II   Aggregated overall affect  
Paper III  
Cognitive and affective component, 
depressive symptoms 
[SWL, PANAS, CES-D] 
Aggregated PA/ NA  
Notes. fMRI = functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging; ESM = experience sampling method; PA = positive affect; NA = negative affect; CERQ = Cognitive 
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; ERP-R = Emotion Regulation Profile Revised; ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; SWL = Satisfaction with Life 
Scale; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; WHO-5 = WHO (Five) Well-being Index; CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale  
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Changes in affective experiences versus retrospective self-report. All studies that contributed 
to this dissertation assessed affective reactivity and emotion regulation through self-reports of 
momentary affective states (i.e., performance-based indicators), either in an emotion regulation 
paradigm in the laboratory (Papers I and II) or through the experience-sampling and daily diary 
method (Papers II and III). In Paper 1, positive emotion regulation was additionally assessed through 
retrospective self-reports, which reflect trait-level differences in regulatory behaviors, such as frequent 
or typical emotion regulation behaviors. Though these trait levels of emotion regulation are also 
thought to be indicative of one’s emotion regulation capacities, there was no significant association 
between performance-based indicators of emotion regulation and trait levels of emotion regulation 
(Paper I). Additionally, only trait emotion regulation was significantly (positively) related to self-
reported subjective well-being (Paper I).  
The discrepancy between trait level indicators and performance-based indicators of affective 
reactivity and emotion regulation can potentially be explained by a discrepancy in the sources of 
memory retrospective self-reports and reports of momentary affective experiences draw on. More 
precisely, according to Robinson and Clore (2002a, 2002b), online reports of emotion (i.e., 
assessments of momentary affect) make use of an actual subjective experience in a certain moment. 
Retrospective self-reports (i.e., self-reports of emotion regulation), instead, draw on semantic 
knowledge that include various biases, such as identity-related beliefs or cultural beliefs about 
emotion. Therefore, measures of changes in affect, captured through the repeated assessment of 
momentary affective states, should be more accurate indicators of affective reactivity or emotion 
regulation. Similarly, aggregated means of momentary affective states that are captured repeatedly 
over time (Papers II and III), should be more accurate indicators of average levels of affective 
experiences (i.e., the affective component of subjective well-being), as compared to those captured 
through self-reports of subjective well-being (e.g., Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  
The described differences in reports may also explain why only trait reports of emotion 
regulation were significantly linked to self-reported subjective well-being (Paper I). Subjective well-
being, just as trait emotion regulation, was assessed via retrospective self-reports, likely including the 
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same biases. Thus, it could be speculated that individuals with higher subjective well-being might hold 
beliefs about themselves and their emotional competencies, due to personality characteristics for 
example, that makes them more likely to rate both their subjective well-being and their emotion 
regulation capacities as higher. Such integration of beliefs does not occur, however, in online reports 
of momentary experiences.  
More generally, these differences between measures (i.e., retrospective self-reports versus 
changes in affective experiences) also potentially explain why most findings in this dissertation 
diverge from earlier research from the realm of positive psychology. The latter reported a positive 
relation between the affective processes and subjective well-being (e.g., Bryant, 2003; Carl et al., 
2014). The majority of these previous studies relied on retrospective self-reports of affective reactivity 
or positive emotion regulation, while studies in this dissertation captured these affective processes as 
they occur within individuals. Subjective well-being was not significantly associated with within-
person changes in positive affect in the laboratory (Paper I) and negatively associated with within-
person associations between positive affect and positive events in daily life (Grosse Rueschkamp et 
al., 2018). Together, the findings in this dissertation emphasize the need for repeated assessments of 
affect within individuals to better understand affective reactivity and emotion regulation and their 
relation to interindividual differences in subjective well-being. 
Laboratory and daily life. A methodological strength of the dissertation was the inclusion of 
different measures from both the laboratory and daily life. Each of these methods had its advantage, 
providing valuable insights into affective reactivity and emotion regulation. High experimental control 
and careful experimental manipulations in the laboratory (Papers I and II) allowed getting a better 
mechanistic understanding of the affective processes. For example, successful up-regulation of 
positive emotions was assessed as the change in affect when participants were instructed to up-
regulate versus when they simply reacted to positive stimuli, thus, disentangling regulatory effects 
from initial affective reactions. Similarly, through the use of standardized stimuli (i.e., images and film 
clips), it was possible to control for the type, valence, and intensity of the emotion induction. In Paper 
II, for instance, I found that the VS is not only activated during the up-regulation of positive emotions 
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but also when up-regulating in response to neutral images, suggesting also an affect-independent 
function of the VS in the regulatory process.  
The use of experience-sampling or daily-diary methods in daily life allowed to capture 
affective reactivity and emotion regulation as they unfold in the context of everyday life, maximizing 
ecological validity (Hoppmann & Riediger, 2009). For example, it was possible to observe momentary 
affective experiences and idiographic events over a longer period of time (up to 10 days for the 
experience-sampling studies and up to 101 days for the daily diary study in Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 
2018).  
Some findings in this dissertation suggest a link across these different methods. In Paper II, I 
found average levels of affect in the laboratory (across all trials) to be positively related to average 
levels of affect in daily life (across all measurement occasions). Additionally, lower average daily 
affect was related to increased engagement of an emotion-related set of brain regions when enhancing 
affective experiences in the laboratory (Paper II). However, there were also discrepancies in findings 
across methods. For example, there was no relation between affective reactivity or the up-regulation of 
positive emotions and subjective well-being in the laboratory (Paper I). Yet, higher subjective well-
being was significantly related to reduced affective reactivity to positive events in daily life (Grosse 
Rueschkamp et al., 2018). Moreover, no significant association was found between VS activity during 
the up-regulation in the laboratory and changes in affect when up-regulating in daily life, as assessed 
within the same sample. Some of the above described methodological differences possibly explain 
these inconsistencies in findings.  
First, instructed (as measured in the laboratory paradigms) and spontaneous emotion 
regulation (as measured in daily life) may reflect different regulation capacities. For example, 
spontaneous regulation might encompass the capacity to determine whether regulation is required, 
while instructed regulation might rather indicate the ability to follow instructions. Second, the use of 
standardized stimuli in the laboratory versus idiographic events in daily life may have differently 
impacted the observed effects. For example, the greater personal relevance of idiographic events in 
daily life may have motivated people to attend to them more and to regulate their emotions to a greater 
extent. Possibly, such enhanced motivation was particularly pronounced in people with lower 
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subjective well-being, who do not experience positive events frequently (Oishi et al., 2007). Thus, this 
may offer an explanation for why there was a significant (negative) association between reactivity and 
subjective well-being in daily life (Paper II), but not in the laboratory (Paper I).  
Additionally, changes in affect are assessed at different timescales in the laboratory and in 
daily life, possibly capturing different affective processes (Hollenstein et al., 2013; Koval, Pe, Meers, 
& Kuppens, 2013). For instance, compared to emotions, moods are often thought to be longer-lasting 
and slower (Rosenberg, 1998). Therefore, changes in affect that are assessed over seconds or minutes 
in the laboratory likely reflect emotion-related processes, whereas affective changes that are captured 
over hours or days (as in daily life) may be driven by mood-related processes (Rottenberg, 2005). 
Taken together, the integration of methods from the laboratory and daily life has led to some 
important insights into the affective processes affective reactivity and emotion regulation. The 
established associations between affect in the laboratory and daily affect, as well as task-based neural 
activations and daily affect provide evidence of a link between laboratory and daily life. Yet, a greater 
parallelism between specific measures could help to detect more fine-grained processes (e.g., 
regulation processes) across both laboratory and daily life.  
General methodological considerations. The present dissertation presents a broad empirical 
approach to the study of affective reactivity, emotion regulation and subjective well-being. This 
approach integrated measures at two levels of analysis (i.e., subjective and neural level), performance-
based measures from both the laboratory and daily life and self-reports of the affective processes. 
While the use of these various measures and methods has led to some valuable insights on affective 
reactivity, emotion regulation and their relation to subjective well-being, it has also become apparent 
that findings across these different measures and methods do not necessarily align. This realization 
leads to several important implications for the study of the affective processes and subjective well-
being. First, it is crucial to determine which measure and method is best suited for capturing the 
phenomenon under investigation. For example, if the focus of investigation lies on phenomena that 
show substantial within-person variability (e.g., affective experiences), it is essential to capture them 
repeatedly within individuals across time. One-time assessments do not suffice to describe these 
phenomena accurately and may lead to premature conclusions. Second, it is important to consider if 
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and to what extent findings obtained across different methods are comparable. It is common among 
researchers to assume, for example, that laboratory results predict behavior in the daily life, yet, 
without explicitly testing such link between laboratory and daily life, this assumption may not be 
justified. In sum, the findings in this dissertation stress the need to integrate different methods in the 
study of the emotion to apprehend a more comprehensive picture of the processes underlying 
subjective well-being. 
11 Limitations  
Affective reactivity and emotion regulation. Affective reactivity and emotion regulation were 
conceptualized as distinct affective processes throughout this dissertation. Besides empirical efforts to 
measure these separately, a clear-cut distinction might be questionable. For example, during 
experience-sampling in daily life, ratings of momentary affect do not immediately follow upon the 
occurrence of a positive event (but up to two hours later). Therefore, instead of reflecting enhanced 
affective reactions, heightened momentary affect may also reflect regulatory efforts, in terms of efforts 
to prolong one’s positive affective experiences (one constituent element of the concept of savoring; 
Bryant & Veroff, 2007). This blurring of affective reactivity and emotion regulation is usually of less 
concern in laboratory research paradigms, where participants are instructed to either simply react to or 
to regulate. Nevertheless, a distinction between affective reactivity and emotion regulation can also be 
ambiguous in the laboratory, due to other features of experimental design choices (e.g., negative-
valenced stimuli). For example, the intermixed negative-valenced stimuli in the emotion regulation 
task in Paper I have likely led to different baselines of affect in the experimental conditions, which in 
turn may have impacted the degree of affective reactivity and emotion regulation (see also 10.3). 
However, given that affective reactivity and emotion regulation are strongly related and intertwined, 
even when measured perfectly, it is difficult to say with certainty to what extent they might have 
influenced each other. 
Emotion regulation strategies. We did not instruct the use of specific up-regulation strategies 
in our laboratory paradigms (Papers I and II), therefore, no conclusions can be drawn regarding the 




makes the present findings less comparable to previous studies, most of which focused on the 
investigation of specific strategies (Buhle et al., 2014; Webb et al., 2012). Still, our rationale behind 
our paradigm was that we wanted to maximize comparability to empirical investigations of emotion 
regulation in daily life, where people often report using several (up to eight in Heiy & Cheavens, 
2014) different strategies in an attempt to up-regulate positive emotions. For this reason we opted for 
an emotion regulation paradigm in which participants were not instructed to use a specific regulation 
strategy.  
Affect measures. Momentary affect was measured differently across the different studies in 
this dissertation (for an overview, see Table 2), posing a constraint on the comparability of reactivity 
and regulation: In Paper I only positive affect was assessed, in Paper II overall affect was assessed 
through a bipolar affect item (indicative of overall momentaryaffect), and the studies contributing to 
Paper III captured positive and negative affect separately or overall momentary affect (Grosse 
Rueschkamp et al., 2018). Specifically through the use of a bipolar affect item in Paper II, it is not 
possible to distinguish the effects of reactivity and regulation on either valence (i.e., increases in 
positive versus decreases in negative affect), as it has been observed by Grosse Rueschkamp and 
colleagues (2018). However, given the particular time constraints during fMRI and participants’ 
burden of completing a total of 160 ratings of their momentary affect (pre- and post-stimulus rating on 
80 trials), a more differentiated affect measure comprising positive and negative valence items would 
not have been feasible.  
Multimethod approach. Not all hypotheses have been tested both in the laboratory and in daily 
life. For instance, the hypothesized relation between greater up-regulation success of positive emotions 
and higher subjective well-being was only tested in the laboratory, leaving it an open question whether 
such relation would be detected when investigated in daily life. This possibility seems particularly 
appealing since a significant relation between affective reactivity and subjective well-being was 
evident in daily life (Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018) but not in the laboratory (Paper I). It seems 
possible, for example, that people are more engaged in up-regulation efforts when they actually 
experience positive events in their own lives, as opposed to when positive affect is induced through 




A specific limitation concerns the examination of brain-daily life associations in Paper II, 
which reflects a rather novel empirical approach. Given the small empirical basis (only few studies 
used a similar approach, but see for example Heller et al., 2015; Seidel et al., 2018) the specific tested 
associations have to be considered exploratory. As exploratory analyses are always more open to 
biases (e.g., regarding selection of variables) and more prone to false positives (Simmons, Nelson, & 
Simonsohn, 2011), the respective findings (i.e., relation between lower overall daily affect and greater 
engagement of emotion-related brain regions when enhancing positive affective experiences) require 
to be replicated through confirmatory research.  
Sample characteristics. All samples that were used across the different studies in this 
dissertation consisted of young adults aged between 17 and 31 years (with the sample in Paper II only 
ranging from 20 to 25 years). While this rather narrow sampling was deemed necessary to keep the 
influence of confounding factors to a minimum, it limits the generalizability of the findings. Central 
variables in this dissertation have previously been related to age-group differences, such affective 
reactivity to positive events, which has been shown to be reduced in older, compared to younger 
participants (Röcke, Li, & Smith, 2009). Thus, it seems possible that reported associations in this 
dissertation (e.g., the link between affective reactivity and subjective well-being) are subject to change 
through the emotional development across the life-span. The present findings should therefore be 
tested in samples comprising different age groups.   
12 Future Research Directions 
The findings in this dissertation bear several implications and directions for future research. 
These implications concern the assessment of affective reactivity and emotion regulation across 
multiple methods (across the laboratory and daily life in particular), specific challenges of studying 
positive affective experiences, a possible link between neural processes and interindividual differences 
in subjective well-being, possible long-term dynamics of positive affective experiences, and potential 
implications of positive affect dynamics in clinical settings.    
Determining indicators for affective reactivity and emotion regulation. One important avenue 
for future research would be to do a comprehensive assessment of affective reactivity and emotion 
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regulation across different methods and to systematically test how and to what extent they converge 
and possibly diverge. Similarly to the approach taken in this dissertation, these indicators should 
encompass measures at multiple levels of analysis, such as the behavioral, subjective, and the (neuro-) 
physiological level, and should be assessed both in the laboratory and in daily life. While some 
measures, such as those of brain functioning, are only limitedly assessable in daily life (but see 
Mihajlovic, Grundlehner, Vullers, & Penders, 2015 for applications of electroencephalography in 
daily life activities), various other behavioral, experiential and physiological (e.g., cardiovascular or 
respiratory) measures have been obtained through ambulatory assessments and successfully linked to 
affective experiences (Wilhelm, Pfaltz, & Grossman, 2006). Importantly, to disentangle possible 
discrepancies across different methods, it would be of particular value to do such systematic test of 
affective reactivity and emotion regulation within the same sample, similar to the approach taken in 
this dissertation (Paper II). Moving forward, a comprehensive investigation of affective reactivity and 
emotion regulation across multiple levels of analysis and methods would pose an important step in 
understanding the processes underlying subjective well-being.   
Testing generalizability of research findings from laboratory in daily life. Directly related to 
the above, one major challenge for future research is to test how findings from the laboratory translate 
to behavior and functioning in daily life. One important step in this direction is to establish a 
parallelism between laboratory and daily life measures. First, laboratory research designs might be 
modified such that they mirror real-world conditions more accurately. For example, idiographic 
stimuli (e.g., autobiographical memories) could be used instead of standardized images, as these 
possess higher self-relevance (Salas, Radovic, & Turnbull, 2012). New technologcial advances, like 
virtual reality, may also help to better account for the complexity of real-life situations and interactions 
in the laboratory, providing higher realism in controlled experimental conditions (Biedermann et al., 
2017). For example, elements in virtual reality unfold more dynamically (than, e.g., a static 2D 
photograph) and last longer (than one trial length) than conventional stimuli (e.g., images). 
Given the limited room for compromises in controlled experiments in the laboratory, 
especially in highly constrained fMRI settings, it is also essential to consider adjustments of research 
paradigms in daily life. One such adjustment would be to experimentally manipulate events in daily 
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life. This would ensure that all participants experience the same event but at the same time maximize 
ecological validity through the measurement of affective processes in daily life. Such an approach has 
previously been applied in a study investigating the effects of social stress on emotional inertia. The 
authors successfully induced social stress in daily life by informing their participants of the 
requirement to perform the Trier Social Stress Test and simultaneously measured affect with the 
experience-sampling method (Koval & Kuppens, 2012). Taken together, work has to be done to 
further address and test the ecological validity of research findings from the laboratory to be able to 
draw firm conclusions about how these findings explain behavior in the context of everyday life.  
Reward responsiveness, affective reactivity and subjective well-being. One major finding from 
the work in this dissertation is that people with higher levels of subejctive well-being seem to be 
characterized by reduced affective reactivity to positive events in daily life (Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 
2018). At the neural level, it has been shown that experiences of momentary happiness are best 
explaine by one’s subjective responses to rewards. More specifically, in one fMRI study, participants 
completed a probabilistic reward task that involved decisions between risky and certain monetary 
choices (Rutledge et al., 2014). Results showed that, instead of task earnings being the main predictor 
of momentary happiness, subjective happines ratings were best explained by reward expectations and 
most strongly the resulting reward prediction errors (i.e., the difference between expected and actual 
outcome). Subjective ratings of happiness were additionally shown to correlate with VS activity 
(Rutledge et al., 2014). Given the in this dissertation reported relation between daily affective 
reactivity to positive events and  subjective well-being, it would therefore be intriguing to test whether 
differences in one’s subjective responses to rewards at the neural level possibly underlie these 
differences in affetcive reactions and overall levels of subjective well-being. It could be hypothesized, 
for example, that people with lower subjective well-being have lower expectations of positive 
experiences in their lives and thus have greater reward-prediction errors when something positive 
occurrs, leading to a stronger increase in their momentary affect. This hypothesis would also fit with 
the finding that people with lower daily affect to enagage emotion-related brain regions to a greater 
extent when increasing momentary affect (Paper II), as this greater engagement may speak for 
increased reward-related processing in people with lower subejctive well-being. Yet, a direct test of a 
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relation between differences in reward-responsiveness, affective reactivity to positive events and 
overall levels of subjective well-being is still needed.  
Current work from our research group might be able to shed light on this. As part of the same 
research project that was reported in Paper II, participants additionally enaged in a reward-learning 
task, in which they had to play slot machines with varying probabilities of dispensing monetary 
rewards (see also Eldar & Niv, 2015). Given the systematic manipulation of the likelihood of 
obtaining these rewards it is possible to test how momentary positive affective experiences may be 
shaped by expectations about rewarding outcomes and resulting reward-prediction errors. These neural 
processes can subsequently be linked to daily affect dyamics (e.g., affective reactions to daily positive 
events) as captured through the experience-sampling method (see Paper II for details) and, ultimately, 
also overall levels of subjective well-being.  
Challenges of studying positive affective experiences. The study of positive affective 
experiences comes with particular challenges that researchers have to deal with. First, positive 
experiences, as compared to negative, tend to elicit less strong short-term reactions in terms of 
behavioral, cognitive and affective responses (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001), as 
well as neural responses (Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998). This poses researchers with the 
challenge of designing experiments that elicit clear and reliable affective reactions when, for example, 
aiming to induce positive emotions in the laboratory.  
Fittingly, positive emotions usually yield smaller effect sizes than negative ones (Cohn & 
Fredrickson, 2009). As compared to negative affect dynamics, the association between positive affect 
dynamics and well-being has been reported to be smaller in a meta-analysis (Houben et al., 2015). 
Similarly, the impact on long-term change in personality traits, has been proposed to be smaller for 
daily positive than daily negative experiences (Mund & Neyer, 2014; Wrzus & Roberts, 2017). In the 
present dissertation, I tried to tackle this challenge through the use of relatively large samples, ranging 
from N = 70 to 200 for the behavioral studies (Papers I and III) and N = 63 for the fMRI study (Paper 
II), aiming to achieve sufficient power to detect possible effects. Nevertheless, the comparatively 
small effect sizes remain an important consideration when studying positive affective experiences and 
should be taken into account by researchers.  
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Long-term dynamics of positive affective experiences and subjective well-being. Based on the 
picture that emerged in the present dissertation, I already speculated on the possible prospective 
effects of positive affect dynamics on the development of subjective well-being. One important avenue 
for future research would be to identify such developmental pathways. Emerging research on the long-
term couplings of negative affect dynamics and global individual differences variables (e.g., 
symptoms of psychopathology; Brose et al., 2017), as well as first advances in linking positive affect 
dynamics to long-term personality change (Borghuis et al., 2018), can serve as starting points. These 
studies utilized so-called “measurement-burst designs”, which encompass a combination of micro-
longitudinal (e.g., experience-sampling or daily diary methods) and longitudinal designs and are 
therefore well-suited for investigating long-term change within individuals (Nesselroade, 1991; 
Sliwinski, 2008).  
A recent study on positive affect dynamics and personality change applied such approach. In 
this study middle-aged women completed three measurement bursts per year over a five-year period, 
in which positive experiences were assessed daily. Results indicated that daily positive experiences 
were related to rank-order increases in extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional 
stability and openness (Borghuis et al., 2018). Though the long-term dynamics of positive affect 
dynamics and subjective well-being have yet to be identified, this study lends first support for the idea 
that daily positive affect dynamics can elicit long-term change. Importantly, the reported finding that 
daily positive affect leads to long-term changes in personality traits (Borghuis et al., 2018) may be in 
accordance with the idea that positive affect dynamics may have the strongest impact on long-term 
change in times of lower well-being (as elaborated on above). Given that the reported trait changes 
concerned rank-order changes, it would possible, for example, that those participants, who initially 
experienced the lowest levels of daily positive affect, benefited the most from their positive affective 
experiences and therefore showed the strongest trait changes. However, this interpretation of the 
results from Borghuis and colleagues (2018) has yet to be tested. Insights into developmental 
pathways of subjective well-being may not only inform on the processes fostering higher levels of 
subjective well-being, but may also be of practical relevance for interventions in clinical settings, as I 
will elaborate on next.  
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Positive affect dynamics in clinical settings. Following up on potential developmental 
pathways of subjective well-being, the question arises to what extent positive affect dynamics might 
be a promising avenue for clinical research, and potential clinical interventions in particular. In line 
with the finding that people with lower levels of well-being profit more from positive events in terms 
of their momentary affect (Grosse Rueschkamp et al., 2018), it seems possible, for example, that 
positive affective experiences may be used to foster positive change in people who undergo a 
depressive episode or are otherwise affected by a mental disorder. Similarly, other findings from the 
work in this dissertation might reveal a particular path, where the cultivation of behaviors to maximize 
positive affective experiences seems particularly fruitful. As the enhancement of momentary affect 
was associated with relative less neural activation in a fronto-parietal network, previously implicated 
in cognitive control processes (Paper II), cultivating positive affect dynamics might be particularly 
valuable for people who have difficulties with implementing otherwise cognitive-laden strategies (e.g., 
strategies aimed at down-regulating negative affect). These examples illustrate how positive affect 
dynamics, informed by findings from work in the present dissertation, may constitute a component of 
clinical interventions (Carl, Soskin, Kerns, & Barlow, 2013; Garland et al., 2010). But undoubtedly, a 
possible relevance of these positive dynamics in the clinical context has yet to be established and 
should be a goal for future research. 
13 Conclusion 
Positive events are an integral part of everyday life. Our reactions to these shape our positive 
affective experiences and through the deliberate up-regulation of these experiences we can even 
further improve the way we feel. In this dissertation I investigated the idea that the maximization of 
positive affective experiences is one of the mechanisms underlying higher subjective well-being.  
Empirically, the picture that emerged in this dissertation does not speak for a central role of 
intense positive affective experiences – through enhanced affective reactivity to positive events or 
greater increases in positive affect when up-regulating positive emotions – in higher subjective well-
being. Rather, higher levels of subjective well-being seem to be reflected in dynamic aspects of 




fluctuation in positive affect when experiencing positive events in daily life. Yet, enhancing everyday 
positive experiences can be a meaningful way to brighten one’s current mood, especially in times of 
lower well-being. The picture that emerged in this dissertation was supported through findings 
obtained at the subjective and the neural level, as well as in the laboratory and in daily life.  
Overall, the present findings underscore the importance of taking dynamic aspects into 
account to better understand how daily positive affective experiences contribute to higher levels of 
subjective well-being. Given the rather inconsistent pattern of findings across methods, the work in 
this dissertation also points to the need of integrating different methods in the study of affect dynamics 
when aiming to delineate the processes underlying subjective well-being. Together, it became apparent 
that more theoretical and empirical work is needed to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the 
role of positive affective processes in subjective well-being and how individual differences in 
subjective well-being come about. Though it seems, as if the quest for happiness is not as 
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